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THE IDEA OF PROCESS IN AMERICAN
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The Idea of Process in American Political and Social Science

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

American political science is currently experiencing considerable internal turbulence centering about the relationships between theory and empirical research. In part this involves familiar questions which have agitated economics, psychology, and sociology in their earlier years; they are the legacy of the empirical revolution. But the state of political science is more complex, in large part because the revolution has achieved a degree of success sufficient to the appearance of its Thermidor, the counter-revolution. We now know much more about the possibilities and the limitations of empirical techniques; enough, certainly, to be dissatisfied with arguments that might have appeared decisive twenty-five years or even a decade ago. This means that exploration of fundamentals in contemporary political science requires a much greater sophistication and much more knowledge than comparable inquiry into the sociology of the 1930s. We have, to this extent, benefited from our legacy.

American social theory in general, and certainly American political science, has often been indicted for its lack of profundity. It is not always clear what this means, but I think it must be conceded that we have not developed the social theorist who is also a philosopher in the profound sense. Where, for example, is our Hegel, our Marx, our Locke or Hobbes? Beside these men our Madisons and Calhouns appear as political tacticians. Whatever are the causes and the broader implications of this condition, it is indisputable that the American study of politics and society has conducted inquiry at a different theoretical level than its European counterpart. American social theory has been much more empirical;

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few of our social philosophers for example have felt the need for an epistemological base.

I do not suggest that this American inclination has been without its very positive aspects. It has made it possible to get on with the business of learning about politics and society without entering the morass involved in creating a total and systematic philosophy of man and the universe which entrapped so many Nineteenth century German philosophers. It is certainly possible to spend one's life laying the foundations which, as Georg Simmel astutely remarked, are always less secure than the structure built upon them. Yet it is true that the many converging currents of natural science and philosophy that compose the empirical revolution, and the consequent interest in the rigor and reliability of knowledge, demand greater theoretical depth than American social theory has thus far possessed. There are many indications that American sociology and politics must soon enter the thicket.

In America we have drawn a line between "philosophy" or speculation and the "scientific" realm of methodology, often narrowly conceived as what Paul Lazarsfeld calls "research techniques." An imperfectly understood positivism has encouraged us to consign theoretical endeavor to one or the other category, expanding them to exclude that broad and difficult area that mediates between truly speculative thought and the methods of scientific procedure. This has resulted in a lack of coherence and unity, as has been expressed in C. Wright Mills' description of the gap between grand theory and abstracted empiricism.

This tendency of American social and political science colors not only the kinds of original work that is done, but it provides an evaluative framework which interprets the contributions of others. An excellent example of this second result, and one which forms the core of this paper,

is the reception American political science and sociology has accorded the work of Arthur F. Bentley. Interpretations and evaluations of Bentley vary considerably, but the context in which he is placed does not. He is viewed as the father of American "group theory," a school whose contemporary members include most prominently the names of David Truman and Earl Latham. Both men have explicitly acknowledged their indebtedness to Bentley, and the aim of their writing has been the creation and extension of Bentley's vision--a group interpretation of politics.

Group theory is a sub-category of the broader theory we call pluralism, and pluralism is itself so much a part of American political thought and practice that we often seem unable to think in any other terms. For example it is not at all uncommon to find the group approach to politics described as development from Madison to Bentley to Truman, and the presentation is quite plausible indeed. My own dissatisfaction with this interpretation began with a reading of The Process of Government and The Governmental Process. I had anticipated discovering a relationship not unlike prophecy and fulfillment, but that expectation was rapidly disappointed. Part One of The Process of Government is subtitled "To Prepare the Way," and is devoted to a discussion of method and techniques of investigation in the social sciences generally. It is here that Bentley introduced the concept of process and juxtaposed it to other, antagonistic methods of investigation. It is in Part Two, where he gave examples of how his "tool" might be used in empirical research, that the term "group" becomes an important concept.

The Governmental Process summarizes and reformulates our knowledge of uniformities in group activity, but Truman evinces little interest in the kind of inquiry Bentley thought necessary to prepare the way. My reading of other group theorists convinced me that Truman is not alone in selecting

the second, more empirical section of <u>The Process of Government</u> as his
focus. Those political scientists who have accepted Bentley's teaching
seem to have made the "group" their central concept and allowed "process"
to become the general milieu in which the group "functions." As a conse-
quence of this shift, the <u>level</u> of theoretical focus has been altered from
the more philosophical to the more empirical plane.

One result of shifting the level of inquiry has been to center upon
the validity and utility of the group concept in empirical research. No
fault can be found with this, but it must not be concluded that Bentley's
contribution stands or falls with the fate of the group concept, nor that
the direction taken by other group theorists is necessarily congruent with
Bentley's intentions or teaching. Bentley was absorbed in problems of
epistemology, theory of signs, and the logic of scientific method--all fun-
damental, philosophical issues. It is this concern that prompted Earl
Latham's remark that Bentley was more interested in the application of
scientific methods to social science than in the problems peculiar to
political science.

It is important to understand that the message of Part One of <u>The</u>
<u>Process of Government</u> is and was intended to be revolutionary. Contempor-
ary political science, it charged, was barren and formalistic, and Bentley
continued to characterize it as animistic, sterile, ghost-ridden, and
static, but the indictment was documented less from political science it-
self than by examples drawn from various sciences of man. It is probably
this revolutionary character that induces us to "explain" the concept of
process negatively, <u>i.e.</u>, in terms of what Bentley rejects.

It is characteristic of American social science that the empirical
Bentley, the Bentley of groups and the demand for research into fact should
be remembered. But if we reorient ourselves toward Bentley's work by plac-
ing process at the center of inquiry, different questions as well as dif-

ferent lines of development appear. Process is a word that has found its way unobtrusively into the accepted vocabulary of political science, until we now speak easily and confidently of the legislative and judicial processes, the decision-making process, and even of the entire political process. We believe that process is a meaningful term, that when we say "the political process" or "the process of administration," we are saying something different, perhaps something more than "the political" or "administration."

We are encouraged to accept it as an advance in conceptualization or at least as a liberation from previous strictures. But as soon as one attempts to state the precise nature of the advance, or the kind of liberation, it becomes very difficult to do more than speak negatively or metaphorically. This paper is an attempt to explore the meaning of the idea of process, especially as it was developed by Arthur Bentley. Process can be considered on several levels and though my primary concern is with its application in social science I will, after a brief introduction to Bentley's place in American thought, begin with a discussion of the process idea in ancient Greek thought and in Nineteenth century German historiography and sociology. Bentley's work will form the core of the narrative; I will seek to orient the diverse themes about it. I am interested in presenting both an account of the historical development of the process idea and in analyzing and evaluating it as a concept.

As far as I am successful in this attempt, the paper constitutes an inquiry into that difficult area which lies between the philosophical and the methodological realms. I have tried to make each chapter focus on certain periods and questions, but the recurrent nature of many problems requires that they be presented in a variety of contexts. Thus the early chapters frame general questions which reappear in progressively narrower contexts.

A work of this scope is informed by so many sources that their acknowledgment would constitute a second bibliography, but two books merit special mention. I have found David Easton's The Political System a valuable summary statement of the current state and prospects of systematic political theory, and while I have disagreed with many specifics it has lent a very useful orientation to my thought. C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze's fine collection of essays, Society as Process, came to my attention too late for the text to reflect its merit. His careful analysis represents a splendid example of the kind of effort that has been so regretably absent from American social theory.

I wish to thank Peter Odegard, John Schaar, and Seymour Lipset for the contribution of their knowledge and advice. My colleagues John Gunnell and Matthew Stoltz have offered thoughtful suggestions on several crucial problems. I have benefited most from my conversations with Norman Jacobson who has patiently shared, sustained, and informed my interest in a difficult and frequently discouraging effort. Those errors and inadequacies which remain in the text are entirely my own contribution.

A grant from the Political Theory Committee of the Social Science Research Council made the preparation of this manuscript a much more fruitful and pleasurable experience than might otherwise have been the case.

Everyone knows how men who today have world-wide fame were neglected by their own generations, and how the favorites of one generation may be forgotten by the next.

Arthur F. Bentley

. . . Bentley has been working, and is still working, on that effort to solve the problem of human beings in organized society. . . . I can hardly believe that all this great concentration and devotion could have been expended for so long a time without a production which someday will be more widely recognized as of value.

Hutchins Hapgood

INTRODUCTION

Hutchins Hapgood's autobiography relates his meeting in 1893 with "a strangely vivid young man." Hapgood and his companion, newly graduated from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, respectively, were on the Atlantic en route to Germany for the enjoyment of that birthright of the well-to-do college graduate, his _Wanderjahre_. This was Hapgood's intention, at least, for though he had an interest in philosophy the trip appeared to him as a "romantic quest." His new acquaintance had a more serious purpose; Arthur Bentley was even then "passionately determined to solve the mystery of society."[1] The disparity of their intentions did not inhibit friendship, and they became roommates upon their arrival in Berlin.[2]

Bentley, in 1893, was as Victorian and inexperienced as his friend. He had migrated to Johns Hopkins University three years earlier after a public school education in Freeport, Illinois, and Grand Island, Nebraska, and something over a year at York College, Nebraska, and the University of Denver. He had graduated in June of 1892, having produced a thesis entitled The Condition of the Western Farmer as Illustrated by the Economic History of a Nebraska Township,[3] and had remained in Baltimore for a year of grad- uate work in economics and sociology. Bentley was attracted to Hopkins by

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[1]Hutchins Hapgood, A Victorian in the Modern World (New York, 1939), p. 84.

[2]Another tenant in the house was Celestin Bougle, later to attain prominence as Professor of Sociology at the Sorbonne and author of Les Idees egalitaires.

[3]Published in the Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science (1893).

the reputation of the economist Richard T. Ely, but Ely departed for the

University of Wisconsin the year after Bentley's arrival, and no one else

seemed to make much impression on the young man. Many years later Bentley

recalled this period.

> My situation had its amusing features. I went to Johns Hopkins
> University because Richard T. Ely was there, my goal being econom-
> ics, and indeed I have still fancied myself, until the last decade
> or two, an economist in the making. Ely left the university, I
> stayed, I don't know why. During my years of graduate study there
> was no faculty in economics, only a bright young instructor or two
> and a few lecture courses from the outer world. Political economy
> hung from the ankles of political science, and political science
> from the ankles of history. In other words I was on the loose.
> The university permitted me to secure my degree; again I hardly
> know why.[4]

This description of academic life at Hopkins tells us two important

things. First, it indicates the state of the social science that Bentley

was soon to condemn so passionately, and second, it explains the circum-

stances under which he could indulge and encourage his broad interests.

Intellectually he was, indeed, on the loose, but it is possible to discern

the beginnings of his life long preoccupations. E. A. Ross, just returned

from Germany and completing his doctorate at Baltimore in 1891-2 was "vivid

and interesting in conversation," but Bentley found in him no continuing

source of inspiration. Whether it was Ross, some other individual, or

simply the prevailing academic fashion that sent Bentley to Germany is not

clear; we do have his recollection that "At a guess my aim in the back-

ground was to find how to fit the marginal utility theories of Karl Menger

into a fully behavioral sociology."[5]

Upon entering Hopkins, Bentley was interested in economics, especially

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[4]"Epilogue," Richard W. Taylor, Life, Language, Law (Yellow Springs,
Ohio, 1957), pp. 210-1.

[5]Ibid., p. 211.

in labor relations. His work in his father's bank may have inclined him toward economics, but from the beginning he displayed considerable intellectual independence and a desire to "operate freely outside of the conventional controls."[6] In Ely's absence Bentley took courses from John Bates Clark and Simon Patten (of Columbia and Pennsylvania, respectively) but his independent reading of the classical British economists and of Menger seems to have been more influential. When Bentley speaks of his intention to "fit" Menger's marginal utility into a "fully behavioral sociology," it is well to recall'that "Sociology was just at that time being born in America and France, with companionate chirps from spots of Germany and Austria," and we must not imagine that he had our contemporary idea of "behavioral sociology" in mind. Ratner's statement of Bentley's motives is probably less liable to misinterpretation.

> Menger's theories interested him, but he was concerned to discover for himself the empirically verifiable materials that Menger was using, or should have been using in his theoretical constructions.[7]

Menger had published his Grundsatze der Volkswirthschaftslehre in 1871, and Bentley was probably most familiar with this book, but a second work which appeared in 1883 may also have claimed his attention, the Untersuchungen uber die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der Politischen Oekonomie insbesondere.[8] In his introduction to the latter Louis Schneider remarks:

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[6] Biographical details of Bentley's early life may be found in Sidney Ratner, "A. F. Bentley's Inquiries into the Behavioral Sciences and the Theory of Scientific Inquiry," in Taylor.

[7] Ibid., p. 28.

[8] The Grundsatze was edited and translated by James Dingwall and Bert Hoselitz as Principles of Economics (Glencoe, Ill., 1950). An abridged version of the Untersuchungen has been published as Problems of Economics and Sociology (Urbana, Ill., 1963), ed. Louis Schneider, trans. Francis J. Nock.

> For English-speaking economists, certainly, the _Grundsatze_ or _Principles_ has been the more important work by far . . . Neither economists nor sociologists working in the English language have paid any notable attention to the _Untersuchungen_.[9]

In large part this was the case because the _Untersuchungen_ is a highly theoretical and methodological tract, and a polemic against the historical school (notably Gustav Schmoller). As such it bore the ponderous trappings of German scholarly dispute and was difficult to fit neatly or comfortably into the American categories of social science. The point to be stressed is that it was the kind of inquiry exemplified in that book, the concern with collective life as a puzzle, an existence to be explained, which represents the sort of problem that was to occupy Bentley throughout his life.

The young Bentley's preoccupation with the mystery of human society had deeper roots than intellectual curiosity, however intense that might have been. During that year in Berlin Hapgood noticed "Bentley's passionate desire to discover the sociological ultimate revealed an infinite mental turmoil. He was an unhappy soul, bitterly critical of himself and his inability to reach the heights."[10] Despite his diligence and his obedience to the demands of German scholarship, Bentley's European experience produced neither happiness nor satisfaction.

> Bentley made those demands on himself with great intensity, and worked very hard, but on the whole unhappily. Sometime later, when he was in London, I got an eloquent letter from him about his passionate disappointment in not being able to solve the mystery of sociology. He had been wandering through the slums of London, and had seen such a mass of suffering human beings, he said, so unhappy that they didn't know they were unhappy; an objective impersonal misery that put him into a state almost of insanity. Ever since that time Bentley has been working, and is still working, on that effort to solve the problem of human beings in organized society.[11]

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[9] _Problems_, p. 3.

[10] Hapgood, p. 9.

[11] _Ibid._, p. 112.

Hapgood's observation is perceptive, though the suggestion that Bentley was motivated by a desire to alleviate human suffering through an improved social science is probably an exaggeration. The importance of these recollections is their revelations of the unhappiness and the passion of the young Bentley; he was a man capable of sustaining profound intellectual and emotional commitments.

In Berlin Bentley studied with Adolph Wagner, Hermann Grimm, Gustav Schmoller, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Georg Simmel. Simmel was the most important influence. Bentley was later to call him "Perhaps the keenest and most searching investigator society has yet had, undoubtedly the one with the greatest yield of permanently applicable knowledge."[12] It is characteristic of Bentley that he praised Simmel's "working attitudes," and attached most importance to his general orientation rather than remembering any particular substantive contribution. Another important influence was the Austrian conflict theorist Ludwig Gumplowicz, and the first outline of The Process of Government, drafted in 1905-6, bore the inscription: to "John Dewey, Georg Simmel, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Walt Whitman, and the many other makers of this book."[13]

Bentley's European education was terminated by the depression of 1893 which adversely affected his father's finances. Resuming his graduate studies at Johns Hopkins he adopted rather solitary habits, reading widely and independently in economics and sociology in English, French, and German. He received his doctorate in 1895, presenting a thesis entitled "The Units of Investigation in the Social Sciences." Bentley was very shortly to repudiate the mental and psychical categories on which that

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[12]Relativity in Man and Society (New York, 1926), p. 163.

[13]Ratner, p. 32.

paper was based, but it is more important to see that his interest in fundamental, methodological matters was already well formed.

His first and only academic position was as a docent at the University of Chicago, but Bentley had little success as a teacher. He later remarked that the result of his graduate study in Germany and at Hopkins "was to unfit myself for academic status."[14] Ratner tells us that Bentley tried to discuss French and German systems of sociology with a very few students but "All of them and Bentley agreed to discontinue the meetings after a few sessions."[15] Chicago had an impressive faculty at that time, including John Dewey, G. H. Mead, J. R. Angell, Wesley Mitchell, Thorstein Veblen, Franz Boas, and Jacques Loeb, but Bentley did not establish contact with them. He did attend Dewey's seminar for a time, and knew W. I. Thomas personally, but for the most part seems to have preserved his isolation from colleagues.

This lack of success and possibly also lack of interest in the academic profession soon terminated Bentley's association with the university, and in 1897 he became a reporter for the Chicago Times-Herald and the Record Herald. By 1903 he had advanced to an editorial position which he held until 1911, when impaired health forced his retirement to a farm overlooking Paoli, Indiana. He was then thirty-one years old. Part of the damage to his health was occasioned by the task of writing his classic, The Process of Government in about three years. The achievement was certainly remarkable, even though his position allowed him blocs of free time at the nearby Crerar Library in downtown Chicago. Bentley seems to have viewed his journalistic career as a useful, because flexible, position;

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[14]"Epilogue," p. 211.

[15]Ratner, p. 31.

the period was, he said, "a quiescent spot where I could operate freely outside of the conventional controls."[16] The newspaper "felt its deep obligation to editorialize, but did not want to hurt anyone's feelings, not even a Mark Hanna's," and "Under these conditions two hours a day for the newspaper was all I needed to give to earn my pay."[17]

The newspaper may indeed have provided him with a salary without making many demands on his time and energy, but it contributed something else equally important, a torrent of "fact," "raw data." "All the politics of the country, so to speak, was drifting across my desk."[18] This sense of the tremamdous activity of persons and groups taking place daily and hourly, men doing things, was as significant an experience as any book or teacher Bentley might have known. From his editorial desk in the heart of Chicago, Bentley could know the masses of the London slums and much, much more besides. If we try to imagine what the social world must have looked like from that chair, we gain a better understanding of how Bentley meant words like "activity" and "fact" in his scientific writings. It may also help us to understand why his vision of society sometimes seems contradictory. On one hand he insists on the "hardness" of brute factuality, but on the other he has a curious detachment from the activity; it is the journalist's perspective of a greatly expanded horizontal vision that seems to lack a "depth" dimension.

When his health was restored Bentley returned to his studies, publishing a steady stream of articles and four more books; the last, in collaboration with John Dewey, appeared in 1949. During the World War he became involved in the Red Cross organization in Indiana and finally served

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[16]"Epilogue," p. 211.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

on the state executive committee. His only active political experience
was in 1924 when he chaired Robert LaFollette's Indiana campaign commit-
tee and was a national committeeman of the Progressive Party.[19] Ratner
suggests that Bentley preferred the program of reformers like LaFollette
and Louis Brandeis to more radical analyses such as Veblen's, although he
professed admiration for the latter. Apparently he thought that small
businessmen, farmers and laborers could best improve their situation by
operating within the pluralistic framework of American politics. His ob-
servations were advanced in a manuscript of some hundred thousand words,
a study of American business which was entitled <u>Makers, Users and Masters
in America</u>. It was rejected by two or three publishers, and Bentley ap-
parently did not feel sufficiently interested in its publication to press
further. It is unfortunate that we do not have the only substantive
<u>political</u> study that Bentley ever did.

Bentley's life was rather uneventful, without those interruptions of
total warfare that bent and sometimes broke so many Twentieth century in-
tellectuals. Neither did he follow Hapgood and any number of other aca-
demic, literary and journalistic figures into bohemia or radical and reform
politics. The life of gentleman farmer and scholar does seem appropriate
to him, as does his decision to forsake the city for the halcyon charm of
Paoli. Indeed there is an interesting parallel between his personal life
and the direction of his scholarly inquiries. In both he avoided the con-
ventional in favor of a highly individual and personal style. It is true
that his newspaper career was shortened by ill health, but it is difficult

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[19]Ratner, p. 36.

to imagine him remaining for long in that profession--indeed it is more revealing to note that he abandoned the academy in the first place and entered the scarcely intellectual or prestigious world of the metropolitan reporter. Certainly the realization that he had unfitted himself for the teaching profession must have come quite early, and his renunciation of an assured if not distinguished position seems not to have been accompanied by regret. It is not airy conjecture to suggest an intimate relationship between the rejection of contemporary social science that constitutes Part One of The Process of Government and his desertion of the university.

If Bentley found himself unsuited to the conventional occupations of the intellectual and scholar, his thought and work defy the divisions within social science. He never belonged either socially or intellectually. He has been claimed as a political scientist for his first book, a sociologist for Relativity in Man and Society, a mathematician for Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics, a psychologist or social psychologist for Behavior, Know-ledge, Fact, and an epistemologist for Knowing and the Known, while Bentley thought himself an "economist in the making" for many years. In addition, he possessed an interest and knowledge of theoretical physics and frequently drew analogies from it. His books display a very impressive technical eru-dition, though it is employed in an off-hand, almost casual manner. Seldom does he give the impression of possessing a "core" literature, or of accept-ing and operating within the boundaries of a field. Instead we feel that he has gone to work on a problem, and will reach out anywhere for help and inspiration. This is not to say that Bentley was unaware or unconcerned with problems or concepts peculiar to a specific field, but his approach is usually oblique, and not that of the trained professional.

I have stressed the qualities of independence and individuality in both Bentley's intellectual and personal life as a preliminary to present-ing him as a true revolutionary. He saw himself as a pathfinder, a scien-

tific radical who would sweep away the intolerable tangle of fact, theory, and speculation which constituted the social science of his day, and rebuild it on tested, secure foundations.[20] Bentley was to struggle with the two vocations of critic and theory builder for most of his life, but in 1908 the former seemed the more imperative. The sad condition of social science appeared to him as less a result of the intractability of its subject matter, or innate limitations of human investigators, than the legacy of mistakes and stupidity from the past. Without an appreciation of the intensity of his belief, the genuine rage and scorn that boils within The Process of Government remains a puzzle.

We must not mistake the withdrawal to Paoli as a sign of any lack of concern with the fate of social science. The tranquility of Bentley's personal life may simply have prepared him to live in sustained intellectual turbulence. Very few men have been able to remake both the categories and rules by which their world orders social relations, and those which govern knowledge of those relations; Bentley chose to make himself as comfortable as possible with the former and to raze and rebuild the latter.

The revolutionary message of The Process of Government has suffered the fate of co-optation into a larger movement which Morton White has called "the revolt against formalism." White's study of American social thought extends to history, law, philosophy, and economics, and includes Charles Beard and James Robinson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Dewey, and Thorstein Veblen. Bentley, we might note, was born eleven years after John Dewey and four years before Beard; C. S. Pierce, William James, and Holmes were in their thirties. Although White does not discuss Bentley, his conception of

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[20] I take it that this is analogous to what Peter Winch has called the "underlaborer" conception of philosophy, The Idea of a Social Science (London, 1958).

what these insurgents sought to do has undeniable parallels to the demands

of The Process of Government.

> All of them insist upon coming to grips with life, experience,
> process, growth, context, function. They are all products of the
> historical and cultural emphases of the nineteenth century, follow-
> ing, being influenced by, reacting from its great philosophers of
> change and process.[21]

"Abstraction" broadly construed so as to include deductive logic was

a prime target of the revolt, but their objection struck primarily at what

might be called the hollowness of abstraction. White's phrase "coming to

grips with life" may be taken quite literally as indicating an almost

physical effort. "Life" meant "the way things are"; it meant all the res-

pect expressed in Pierce's remark: "Facts are hard things which do not

consist in my thinking so and so, but stand unmoved by whatever you or I

or any man or generations of men may opine about them." The vitalism of

Henri Bergson, and the organicism of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer

lent all the associations implicit in words like "growth," "context," and

"function." The demand for continuity, for "connectedness" was fulfilled

by an historical emphasis White terms "historicism," and defines as "the

attempt to explain facts by reference to earlier facts."[22] The search for

connection and relatedness in social phenomena extended "vertically" through

history's temporality while "cultural organicism" expanded inquiry "hori-

zontally" in a spatial sense.

> Holmes is the learned historian of the law and one of the heroes of
> sociological jurisprudence; Veblen is the evolutionary and sociolog-
> ical student of economic institutions; Beard urges us to view polit-
> ical instruments as more than documents; Robinson construes history

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[21]Morton White, Social Thought in America (Boston, 1957), p. 13.

[22]Ibid., p. 12. "Historicism" has many meanings and is often invol-
ved in ideological polemic. See for example the work of Karl Popper, Leo
Strauss, Karl Mannheim, Frederick Hayek, and Ludwig von Mises. White's
definition has an attractive simplicity but at the price of ignoring the
deeper-lying questions.

as the ally of all the social disciplines and the study of how things have come to be as they are; Dewey describes his philosophy alternately as "evolutionary" and "cultural" naturalism.[23]

These Americans were "empiricists" in the sense that they sought to ground their inquiry in experience rather than in a priori deduction but there is a much more important sense in which neither they nor Bentley were sympathetic to empiricism. Both Dewey and Veblen criticized such prominent members of the British empirical school as John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham for their adherence to associationist psychology and epistemological dualism. Dewey rejected the notion of discrete states of consciousness that was implied by Hume's analysis, and Veblen objected to the basis of Mill's economics.[24] In his essay, "On the Definition of Political Economy; and the Method of Investigation Proper to It," Mill had sought to distinguish economic science from more inclusive studies of social man by limiting its scope to the consequences of the pursuit of wealth.

> Political economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth, and aims at showing what is the course of action into which mankind, living in a state of society, would be impelled, if that motive, except in the degree in which it is checked by the two perpetual counter-motives above adverted to, were absolute ruler of all their actions.[25]

Mill used the phrase "would be if" as an heuristic device, explicitly stating that in fact man was not so simply motivated, but this did not save him from Veblen's critcism. Veblen would not accept the "counter-factual

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[23]White, pp. 12-3.

[24]See Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (Boston, 1955), Part I, Ch. I, and Part III, Ch. III. The papers published by John Dewey and Arthur Bentley as Knowing and the Known (Boston, 1960), are an attack on the dualism of empiricist epistemology.

[25]Quoted by White, pp. 22-3; Mill's position is more generally presented in A System of Logic, especially Book III, concerning induction. See Winch for a recent and critical commentary; and Veblen's extended remarks in the essay, "Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science," ed. Max Lerner, The Portable Veblen (New York, 1950).

conditional" as a methodological principle even though it greatly simpli-

fied certain tasks. In this refusal he reflected the American objection

to an empiricism that did not reflect things as they were. Empiricism

simply wasn't empirical enough.

The revolt sought the destruction of false or artificial boundaries

among the social sciences. Charles Beard expressed this attitude force-

fully.

> We are coming to realize that a science dealing with man has no
> special field of data all to itself, but is rather merely a way
> of looking at the same things--a view of a certain aspect of human
> action. The human being is not essentially different when he is
> depositing his ballot from what he is in the counting house or at
> the work bench. In the place of a "natural" man, an "economic"
> man, a "religious" man or a "political" man, we now observe the
> whole man participating in the work of government.[26]

Beard wrote these words in 1908, the year in which The Process of Government

was published. On the political level this revolt was associated with prag-

matism, pluralism, and the Progressive Movement, and Bentley's now famous

book was certainly a statement of these themes. Beard perceived the com-

munity of interest between group theory and the kind of inquiry he had

launched in his economic interpretation of the American Constitution, and

assigned Bentley's book to his Columbia seminar.[27]

The desire to "get behind" forms and appearance in social science had

a certain parallel in the expose of the Progressive muckrakers. When

Bentley spoke of activity and interest as the raw materials of political

science he echoed the "harsh reality" tone of his period. Richard Hofstader

has described the reality of the Progressives in these words:

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[26]Quoted in Richard Hofstader, "Charles Beard and the Constitution,"
ed. Howard K. Beale, Charles A. Beard (Lexington, Ky., 1954), p. 79.

[27]An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New York, 1961),
p. 12.

At bottom, I think, it had three characteristics: It was rough and
sordid; it was hidden, neglected, and, so to speak, off-stage; and
it was essentially a stream of external and material events, of
which psychic events were a kind of pale reflex. Reality was the
bribe, the rebate, the bought franchise, the sale of adulterated
food.[28]

Bentley's place in these larger intellectual currents must be conceded,

but to leave the matter there is to domesticate him by transforming the

revolutionary into the reformer. On the level of political action he may

indeed have remained a Progressive, but his vision of social science was

less a revolt against formalism than an attempt to permanently eliminate it.

Some political scientists sought to expand the scope of their discipline

beyond the narrow confines of institutional description of "government,"

and Beard wanted to dispense with political man; Bentley tried to dissolve

group, government, and man in the brute fact of the flux of process. In

this sense Bentley extended the revolt against formalism until it ulti-

mately became something else--a vision of a process universe.

We cannot gain an accurate perspective on that vision from social

theory alone; we must begin with a statement in abstract, quite philosophic

terms of the process idea. Ancient Greek philosophy, the watershed of

Western speculation, can provide us with a general statement of themes

which will underlie and occasionally emerge into discussion of more contem-

porary theory. The following chapter will be concerned with the birth of

sociology in late Nineteenth century Germany, the period of the great at-

tempt to divorce social science from the philosophy of history and to es-

tablish the former on independent epistemological and methodological founda-

tions. That chapter will attempt to bring the more philosophical formula-

tions of the Greeks "down" to the level of social theory, and to provide a

context for consideration of The Process of Government.

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[28]Ibid., p. 87.

I expect to show how Bentley's conception of process analysis was informed by these more philosophical considerations, and how his later work sought to transcend the use of the process idea in American sociology by developing a radical form of scientific investigation and statement called "transactional analysis," the "tool" which could express his vision. I will contend that American social science has chosen to emphasize secondary themes in Bentley's thought, and that contemporary systematic theory in sociology and political science has betrayed the revolution he sought to effect.

But the matter is not simply one of reinterpreting Bentley's work and his legacy, nor does the idea of process belong exclusively to him. Max Lerner, for example, lists Ward, Giddings, Small, Ross, Bentley, Ellwood, Dewey, Mead, Thomas, and Cooley as American scholars to whom the concept has been important.[29] The point is that the process concept emerged from Bentley's fundamental rejection of previous social theory, and to the degree that "We are all the children of Bentley,"[30] we have accepted or at least are concerned with the validity of that critical section. Unfortunately even those political scientists who have enthusiastically proclaimed their discipleship have been little concerned to apply Bentley's critical contributions to their own or their colleagues' work. The result of this selected incorporation of Bentley is that much of his critique of the social theory of 1908 is painfully relevant to the work of contemporary "Bentleyans."

I will argue that two distinct strains of the process idea emerged

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[29]"Social Process," ed. Edwin Seligman and Alvin Johnson, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1935), Vol. 14, pp. 148-51.

[30]John H. Schaar and Sheldon Wolin, "Book Review Essay," APSR (Mar., 1963), Vol. LVII, No. 1, p. 137.

from Nineteenth century German social thought, and that The Process of
Government contains both. The two versions are, process as group conflict,
and a somewhat more complex idea of the social process I will provisionally
designate as formal sociology.[31] Bentley incorporated both in his early
version of society as process, but his more mature books display an aware-
ness of the distinction and a determination to fuse elements of both into
his transactional synthesis. American sociology has divided between these
two versions, while political science has inclined decidedly toward the
group conflict camp. The post-war years have witnessed a considerable de-
gree of convergence within and between these two disciplines, as each seems
to have felt the need for some kind of general theory. In a later chapter
I will discuss this convergence (to which I have given the general name of
"equilibrium theory") and contrast it to the Bentleyan synthesis.

I believe that Bentley's final statement of transactional analysis of
a process universe is inadequate to its task, but I also believe that he
rejected the alternative course that contemporary equilibrium theories
have accepted because to have followed it would have violated the canons
of scientific procedure established by his critical thought. In this sense
his followers have embraced Bentley the system builder, and ignored Bentley
the critical genius. My concluding effort will be to suggest two possible
means by which systematic empirical theory might satisfy Bentley's critical
demands and yet proceed in something like its present form.

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[31]The latter is not to be confused with Morton White's idea of "for-
malism."

Socrates   But now, since not even white continues to flow white,
        and whiteness itself is a flux or change which is passing into
        another colour, and is never to be caught standing still, can
        the name of any colour be rightly used at all?

Theodorus   How is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of
        this or any other quality--if while we are using the word the
        object is escaping in the flux?

                                                Theaetetus

CHAPTER I

THE DISCOVERY OF PROCESS

The mutual existence of endurance and change has perplexed the
Western mind from its earliest ventures into the nature of reality.
The formulation of the problem that emerges from the dialogue between
Socrates and Theodorus in Plato's Theaetetus was not new to the Fourth
century B. C. Theodorus himself at a point earlier in the dialogue says
that these speculations are as old as Homer or possibly even older. It
is Heraclitus, the mysterious Eleatic who worked in the period around
the turn of the Sixth and Fifth centuries, whom history has credited
with the discovery of change and its expression in the succinct aphorism
"all things flow." Karl Popper has placed a high value on the importance
of this problem and its historical consequences.

> Heraclitus' discovery influenced the development of Greek phil-
> osophy for a long time. The philosophies of Parmenides, Democritus,
> Plato, and Aristotle, can all be appropriately described as attempts
> to solve the problems of that changing world which Heraclitus had
> discovered.[1]

Indeed, F. S. C. Northrop has argued with great force for the relevance of
Antiquity's natural philosophy to contemporary theoretical physics, and in
this he has the support of Erwin Schrodinger and Ernst Mach, among others.[2]

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[1]Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton, 1950), p.
15.

[2]F. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles (New York, 1931);
Erwin Schrodinger, "Nature and the Greeks," Schrodinger, What is Life
(Garden City, N. Y., 1956).

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A. N. Whitehead has found the notions of permanence and change intertwined

in the two lines of the hymn, "Abide with me;/Fast falls the eventide.",

and in that union "we find formulated the complete problem of metaphysics."[3]

Whitehead's formulation of that problem is powerful and subtle, but

the juxtaposition of "permanence and change" does not completely convey the

richness this discovery held for Heraclitus and his opponents, nor does it

indicate the multiple associations and implications acquired through the

centuries. Zeller's account of the pre-Socratic schools gives us some

sense of the idea's magnitude.

> But now a new problem arose from that of the primary substance which
> the Milesians had raised and tried to answer: in what way do the mul-
> tiplicity and variety of the individual beings arise from the One
> which is the basis of everything? This difficulty which up till
> then had scarcely been touched upon, now demanded a solution. The
> problem of the One and the Many, of Being and Becoming, of Rest and
> Motion became the centre of the discussion which was now carried on
> by the Eleatics and Heraclitus.[4]

A moment's reflection upon the variety and depth of these polarities, and

the implications for the special sciences in the form of methodological

imperatives, will suffice to induce at least a willingness to entertain

Whitehead's claim that "the complete problem of metaphysics" can be read

therein. The world of experience had impressed upon Thales the enduring

quality of substance, of stuff and extension, and this idea enabled

Permenides to deduce his great principle of being. But Parmenides achieved

his remarkable formulation by thinking through the troublesome legacy of

Heraclitus, the observation that things change.

Thales has been awarded the honor of designation as the first phil-

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[3]Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York, 1960), p. 318.

[4]Edward Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy (New York, 1955), p. 57.

osopher by virtue of his proclamation that "All things are full of gods,"

but this assertion has a positive aspect as well as the negative function

of emancipating speculation from anthropomorphism.[5] It indicated a will-

ingness to seek meaning in the immanence of nature, in the givenness of

the physically real.[6] The quest was for insight into the nature of endur-

ing substances and structures which made the cosmos what it was. "What

stuff is the world made of?" We should not wonder that the effect of

Heraclitus' teaching, when it came to be understood, was "terrifying."

"He visualized the world not as an edifice, but rather as the totality of

all events, or changes, or facts."[7] This constituted a formidable chal-

lenge to the infant natural philosophy; what if the fact of physical change

forced the conclusion that the cosmos was unstructured, that there was no

endurance, hence no substance, that there was, finally, no edifice? "The

cosmos, at least, is like a rubbish heap scattered at random." The thrust

is double-pronged, and forcefully demonstrates the physical basis of early

speculative thought. If it be true that nature yields our experience no

enduring substance, and the cosmos no ordered structure, then our thought,

our bold attempt to achieve immanent comprehension is halted before it is

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[5]See E. G. Zeller, Northrop, and also Henri Frankfort, et al., Before Philosophy (London, 1949), pp. 251-5; F. M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy (New York, 1957), Chs. III and IV; and John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (4th Ed., New York, 1961). His transition must not be exag-gerated, nor taken to imply that spiritual or supernatural elements were banished from Greek thought and replaced by something akin to a modern materialism. Rather, Thales' comment should be read literally; the gods were in nature, and not anthropomorphic beings standing behind and outside of nature. See Frankfort's specific warning that the early Greeks must not be seen as "scientists" but rather as speculative natural philosophers.

[6]Northrop, pp. 4-5.

[7]Popper, p. 15.

underway. Perhaps Western man may count himself fortunate that Heraclitus was not a solitary genius in a constellation of mediocrity. The genius of Parmenides, of Plato and Aristotle rose to his challenge, and in doing so they gave a permanent shape to the philosophical and scientific dialogue of twenty-odd centuries.

Although the physical basis of this thought is unmistakable,(i.e., the conviction that the real is the physical), it would be an error to read our modern dichotomies therein. Heraclitus was perhaps the first philosopher to treat at length "ethico-political problems," as well as those of nature, and Popper has made the suggestion that the turbulent political conditions of Ephesus decisively conditioned the philosopher of change to the idea of impermanence. Heraclitus is believed to have been an heir of the Ephesian aristocracy, and though he did not participate in public life he was a supporter of his class in its losing struggle with the democratic revolution.[8] It is less important here to speculate about effect of his political environment than to stress the link between natural and political philosophy, for if the idea of flux without structure was terrifying in the former it must have seemed disasterous for the latter. Heraclitus' reference to the cosmos as a "rubbish heap" might indicate that he was not unaware of the moral and political consequences of his belief.[9]

But history rewarded the Greeks with successors to Heraclitus who were capable of formulating alternative natural and ethico-political phil-

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[8]This suggestion is a part of Popper's general thesis of the link between his version of historicism and an organic, authoritarian political tradition. My inclusion of this reference in the text does not indicate acceptance of Popper's thesis.

[9]See Popper's citations of Heraclitus' condemnation of the Ephesian democrats, pp. 15-6.

osophies. Parmenides of Elea (540-470) represents the great antithesis to Heraclitus, not only in terms of the substance of his argument, but because he presented it specifically as a reply to the Heraclitean teaching.[10] Change, he said, could be explained by the principle of generation or by that of motion, but generation could not be reconciled with the principle of being. Being to Parmenides meant the space-filling substance, the stuff of Thales, which was opposed to non-being, or empty space; the "that which is," and the "that which is not." Being has no beginning nor end, for it could not have been created from non-being; it is continuous, indivisible, motionless, and unchangeable, since it must everywhere and always be similar to itself. Generation would require that this identity of being could not be held necessary.

The principle of motion founders on the same reef, but the argument is more detailed. Motion requires that nature or being, the what is, be capable of moving to where it is not, "into" non-being. This is manifestly impossible since it asserts that non-being can "be." Northrop has pointed to a subtlety in the argument that is perhaps not immediately apparent. Parmenides' point is not so much that the principle of motion needs an "empty" space in which to "put" being, but that it requires some intervening referent in order to distinguish one "atom" or position of being from another. This raises (and constitutes Parmenides' answer to) the question already asked by Anaximander: How can the apparently boundless continuum of the physical be discontinuous?

Parmenides' solution of the paradox posed by the discoveries of Thales and Heraclitus was to deny one of its elements, thus placing himself in direct opposition to Heraclitus. But despite this diametrical opposition

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[10]Zeller, p. 65.

of doctrine, they share at least two common characteristics; the first is
that both provide monistic solutions, and the second is that each rejects
the evidence of the senses as illusory. Parmenides made a further con-
tribution to the philosophy of being, an advance in a direction forbidden
by the nature of Heraclitus' thought. This contribution of Parmenides,
which was to appear later as Aristotle's cornerstone of logic, was the
principle of identity. The significance of the idea of being as it is
linked to the law of identity cannot be overstressed. Northrop puts the
matter this way:

> Unless meanings and ideas remain fixed, we cannot think, and unless
> this fixity applies to nature in some fundamental and approximately
> universal sense, thought cannot apply to nature and science is out
> of the question.[11]

We have spoken so far of the "discoveries" of Heraclitus, Thales, and
Parmenides much as we would of the discovery of a miracle drug or a new
element. In the case of contemporary scientific advances the steps which
lead to the discovery, or the assumptions or problems from which the in-
quiry proceeds, are usually clear to our hindsight. From a terminal point
of an investigation we can see what has been necessary to our advance, al-
though we are seldom satisfied that the account is sufficient.[12] But when
we inquire into the antecedents of the earliest scientific and philosophi-
cal ideas we encounter a more complex and indeterminate set of questions,
and yet we are no more entitled to dismiss these antecedents than we would
be to describe the work of Newton without a reference to Galileo.

> Philosophy, when she puts aside the finished products of religion
> and returns to the "nature of things," really goes back to that

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[11]Northrop, p. 7.

[12]Of course the choice of a "terminal point" remains conditional and
the next step forward may require abrupt re-appraisal, but this does not
preclude the making of the initial appraisal.

original representation out of which mythology itself had gathered shape. If we now call it "metaphysical," instead of "supernatural," the thing itself has not essentially changed its character. What has changed is, rather, man's attitude towards it, which, from being active and emotional, has become intellectual and speculative.[13]

It cannot be our task to give an account of those original representations, or pretend to summarize them in any adequate way, but more modest goals will still be of considerable aid. Specifically, grasp of the interconnections that ancient Greek systems maintained among such diverse elements as natural philosophy, religion, social structure, and ethical or political philosophy helps identify recurring themes in the most basic categories of Western thought. These diverse elements may be grouped in a dualism, or a polarity which both illuminate and enrich the history of subsequent philosophic speculation.

F. M. Cornford has neatly expressed a part of the polarity:

The term "Nature" (physis, natura) has had a long and varied history, . . . No philosophical term is more dangerously ambiguous. We seem able to distinguish, however, two main heads under which its shifting senses may be grouped: the static and the dynamic. Statically conceived, Nature means the system of all phenomena in time and space, the total of all existing things; and the "nature" of a thing is its constitution, structure, essence. But it has never lost its other, dynamic, side--the connotation of force, or primordial, active, upspringing energy--a sense which, as its derivation shows, is original.[14]

The Greek idea of destiny (Moira) is spatial; its original meaning was "part" or "allotted portion."[15] At one point it stood above gods as well as men, defining their respective spheres, or statuses.[16] Its subsequent

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[13]Cornford, p. ix. The reader should note Cornford's debt to Durkheim and The Annee Sociologique: "For our guide we take the theorem maintained by the new French school of sociologists, that the key to religious representation lies in the social structure of the community which elaborates it.", Ibid., p. viii.

[14]Ibid., p. 73. For the reference to derivation of the term, Cornford cites John Dewey's article "Nature," Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.

[15]Ibid., p. 16.

[16]Later the gods attain a degree of freedom from this "boundedness." Indeed, both gods and man seem to have stretched the limits of the possible from time to time.

meaning of "destiny" appears to have grown from a sense of spatial, or regional, essentially extensional fixity. When it became possible for the Greeks to conceive of events or things as capable of immanent explanation and understanding, there was no need to imagine the gods of Olympus present "within" each phenomenon of their respective spheres. As they were moved further back "behind" their respective realms, the doctrine of Moira assumed the character of a barrier to the human comprehension precisely because of the fixity element.

> The type of philosophy to which an Olympian theology will give rise will be dominated by the conception of spatial externality, as Moira had dominated the Gods; and it will tend toward discontinuity and discreteness. Originating in an essentially polytheistic scheme, it will be pluralistic. It will also move steadily towards materialism, because having no hold upon the notion of life as an inward and spontaneous principle, it will reduce life to mechanical motion, communicated by external shock from one body to another. It will level down the organic to the inorganic, and pulverize God and the Soul into material atoms.[17]

But the scientific tendency of philosophy could retain Moira if it could be made to apply to the material, space-filling aspect of physis, the fundamental stuff of the cosmos. The space measuring science of geometry proved a splendid tool with which to map out the contours of physis, but it was inadequate to the description of vital energy, non-extensional qualities, gods, and souls. Atomism, that remarkable doctrine usually credited to Leucippus and his great disciple Democritus, represents perhaps the fullest realization in Antiquity of this scientific tendency. It was the most enduring of the compromise natural philosophies which arose in the Fifth century as solutions to the antinomy of being and becoming, and has earned a place as one of the three great scientific theories of Greece.

The second strain Cornford discerns in the history of "Nature," the

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[17]Cornford, p. 123.

the "dynamic" conception is very different. Instead of the ideas of

polytheism and the rule of __Moira__, the mystical tendency in Greek phil-

osophy accepted the unity of nature and the rule of __Dike__, originally

meaning "way," but coming to express "righteousness" and "justice."

If __Moira__ had established boundaries, "justice" seemed to require that

the Olympians maintain those barriers, and exult the power

which preserved them. Thus Moira could become "necessity."

> In the mystical tradition ... the concepts of Time and Number
> (the measure of Time) hold the same predominate position
> /as extension and boundedness in __Moira__/ and the notion of
> Righteousness (__Dike__) replaces that of __Moira__.[18]

Perhaps the key difference can be seen in the mystical sense of __con-__

__tinuity__ which underlies __Dike__ defined as __way__. Cornford's interpretation

holds that the social structure of Dionysiac cult-society engendered

continuity in both spatial and temporal dimensions through promotion

of the common life of the group.[19] Individuals were transcended in time

by the continuing life of the community, and a universal church permitted

no impenetrable boundedness to be established. Thus __Dike__ is readily un-

derstandable as the "way through life," marked by such tribal practices

as rites of initiation or passage, and "sanctioned" or "proper" way

through life may certainly be called "righteous." Indeed the belief in

continuity of nature extended to a denial of any separation of man from

nature, and even to a belief in reincarnation (the denial of radical

separation between life and death).[20]

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[18]__Ibid.__, p. 160.

[19]__Ibid.__, p. 61 ff. Compare Nathan Leites' notion about the Russian Communist Party's role in "conquering" death, __A Study of Bolshevism__ (Glencoe, Ill., 1954).

[20]__Ibid.__, Ch. VI. There are a number of other interesting elements in Cornford's typology of the mystical tendency, such as the connections among the seasons, wheel symbolism, and the cyclical view of history, but we are concerned in the text with a select number of variables.

This is a very ancient and widely disseminated idea, that the fundamental stuff of nature is in some sense limited, and the ongoing of the cosmos must be understood as the progressive transformation of that stuff into ever shifting forms. Heraclitus' choice of the flame as basic stuff expresses this notion of a "thing" which "is" and yet is passing to another state.[21] It is, in terms of Cornford's polarity, the opposite tendency from the scientific atomists, but this does not mean that the mystical tendency was united, or in any way monolithic. Parmenides, the arch opponent of Heraclitus, may be included by these criteria in the camp of the mystics, because he followed Heraclitus in pursuing the consequences of his logic, his thought, to the point of denying the testimony of experience. The point to be borne in mind is that although the "scientific" and "mystical" tendencies arose from very different cosmologies, religions, or social origins, the substantive philosophical difference between Heraclitus and Parmenides, between the principles of being and becoming, was built into the dialogue carried on in the scientific tradition itself down to its Aristotelian reconciliation. As a consequence the scientific pole of Cornford's dichotomy becomes dominant in rather short order, but the kind of difficulties which persist within it, down to and beyond Aristotle, include many elements of the mystical philosophy, for example the notions of change, continuity, and time.

The atomic theory, as has been suggested above, was the most enduring solution to the problem of reconciling substance and change, perhaps primarily because it refused to deny the evidence of experience, or to follow the dictates of reason to assert the "primacy" of one term to the

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[21]See Burnet, p. 145. This introduces the "dialectic" element in Heraclitus which I have reserved for later consideration.

other. Instead, it adopted the rather straight forward course of search-
ing for a means by which to explain motion in terms of a referent other
than the that-which-moved, and this, in turn, required that something
other than Parmenides' "being" have an existence. That something other
was "space," conceived as possessing fixed properties, and remaining in-
dependent of substance or being. Since the ingenious idea of regarding
apparently substantive things as composed of microscopic, invisible par-
ticles, packed more or less tightly together, and in constant motion,
accounted for the permanence of our perception, the dilemma was resolved.
The kinetic atomic theory possessed exceptional power because it reconcil-
ed observations of nature with the relations of logical implication while
yet escaping the monism of Parmenides. It could not escape acquiesence
to the epistemological dualism between the universe as known by reason
(the atoms in motion), and by or in experience.[22]

But this solution to the dilemma did not recommend itself universally.
Before Heraclitus presented his challenge to the notion of substance other
minds had found it an unsatisfactory basis for thought. Pythagoras of
Samos is the name we have given to that curious figure whose genius in-
habited the region where mathematics and mysticism meet.[23] This seemingly
incongruous but by no means uncommon combination enables him to be class-
ified by many differing criteria; for example Cornford can see in him the

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[22]Northrop refers to the attempt to accommodate stuff and change as
the "physical theory."

[23]Very little is known of Pythagoras' life or his teaching; we have
no more than a crude guess at the dates of his lifetime. Our difficulties
are compounded by Pythagoras' aversion to written statement, and the oral
tradition is ill-suited to a coherent reconstruction of his teaching.
The guess at his lifetime is 572-497 B. C., R. G. Collingwood, The Idea
of Nature (New York, 1960), p. 50.

mystical elements of Dionysiac reformation and the doctrine of reincar-
nation existing beside hostile Appolline elements.[24] But the existence
of mystic elements can, no more than their presence in the thought of
Heraclitus and Parmenides, obscure the core of reasoned cosmological
speculation. Pythagoras' rejection of the notion of primary matter was
a consequence of his conclusion that Ionian philosophy could not distin-
guish this basic stuff from the void. If, he argued, the primary matter
manifests itself in such diverse forms as water, fire, and earth, then
it could not be defined in terms of its attributes. If no attributes
could be predicated of the primary matter, it was indistinguishable from
nothing, the void. Instead of forcing Pythagoras to the postulation of
space (as a related argument later led the atomists) in which to place
discrete bits of stuff, these considerations combined with his interests
in music and living organisms to produce a genuinely new view of nature.

He discovered that a particular musical tone could be expressed in
arithematical terms, and this realization was followed by further mathe-
matical inquiry into nature. The developing science of geometry and the
later empirical successes with a mathematical astronomy forcefully dem-
onstrated an astounding truth to the Greeks.

> The laws which brought several centuries of astronomical evidence
> into order, with a degree of precision which made accurate predic-
> tion possible, said not one word about physical objects. They
> referred instead to perfect geometrical forms, which Eudoxos warn-
> ed his contemporaries against regarding as physical, and to ideal
> arithmetical proportions.[25]

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[24]Cornford too encounters the problem of classifying a Pythagorean move-
ment, whose later development is very difficult to compare to the thought of
its founder. "Today, in spite of hard work by many generations of scholars,
'Pythagoreanism' is little more than the name of a fluctuating and shapeless
body of doctrine, some parts of which can be traced back as far as the fifth
century B.C., others as far as the fourth, others not farther than the early
centuries A.D." Collingwood, p. 49.

[25]Northrop, pp. 14-5.

This is to anticipate the story; for Pythagoras and his immediate follow-

ers, the discovery that the rhythm of a vibrating string as it inscribes

a determinate series of geometrical shapes produces predictable tonal in-

tervals, provided an alternative cosmology that was to receive its immor-

tal statement in Plato.

> The difference between the mathematical and physical theories of
> nature centers in the principle that the real is rational. This
> replaces the thesis that the real is physical, which is the dis-
> tinguishing mark of the physical theory. The principle that the
> real is rational must not be misunderstood. It means very much
> more than that an intangible account of natural processes can be
> given. In addition, it signifies that when such an account is
> gained, nature will be found to be made of ideal rational forms
> which only reason can grasp, rather than physical objects which
> can be observed or imagined. A mathematical equation comes nearer
> to the nature of reality than a physical atom.[26]

This brings us to the point where the "truth" of the theorem deriving its

name from Pythagoras may be accepted with complete indifference to the

properties of any existent triangle; it is the point at which Western man

embarked on his as yet unended quest for harmony of sense experience and

reason; the point, in short, from which Platonic forms are clearly visible.

It introduces also the notion of "form" as opposed to substance,

stuff, or content, for "we may imagine Pythagoras to have told his dis-

ciples: that it makes no difference what the world is made of, and that

what we have to study is the patterns and changes of pattern which this

primitive matter, whatever it may be adopts and undergoes."[27] Emphasis

lies no longer with a uniform, unchanging, enduring physis but with the

rhythm, the configuration, the form which it attains or assumes. Intel-

ligibility is not to be sought in comprehension of an immutable nature

of substance, but in design or arrangement. This alone yields a sense

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[26]Ibid., p. 15.

[27]Collingwood, p. 53.

of continuity or permanence, discontinuity or change.

The mathematical theory of nature entailed three consequences.[28] First, it assigned primary causal importance to relations, and held logical structure to be ultimate in nature. If such relations were fundamental, then our impressions of change and of physical objects given in sensation must be incomplete or inferior as knowledge of the ultimate.[29] The epistemological consequence is that the world of ultimate forms must be different in nature from its appearance. These two principles dictated the methodological conclusion that one could not proceed from the data of observation to necessary scientific relations, since the forms are in no wise "contained within" physical facts, but are merely "suggested" by them. "Dialectic" is the name of the method Plato employs to bring the world of forms within the comprehension of the reason.[30] It is not necessary here to discuss the immanent or transcendent nature of the forms, except to say that there seems to be a progression in the Dialogues from the former conception to the latter.[31]

The last of the three major scientific-metaphysical systems of ancient Greece evolved, as did the physical and mathematical theories, from an interest in a different part of nature. The study of medicine, or physi-

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[28]Northrop, pp. 15-6.

[29]It is important to note that Plato did not believe that we are deluded by perception, as some of the Seventeenth century rationalists contended. We know what there is to know of the perceptible world through the senses, but we cannot know the realm of ultimate form except by reason. Presumably if we desired simply to give a descriptive account of the sensible world, our perception would suffice.

[30]See Plato's discussion of forms in the Timaeus; also Socrates distinction between "true belief" and "knowledge" in the earlier Theaetetus, F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1951), pp. 140-1.

[31]Collingwood, pp. 55-72. Here it is argued that Plato began with an immanence conception expressed by the young Socrates in the Parmenides, but turned to a transcendent statement in the Symposium and the Phaedo. Plato's

ology and biology--in short the organism--is as old as the early Pythag-
oreans, and written treatises on the subject appeared long before Hippo-
crates;[32] Empedocles, the mystic scientist, made a profound study of or-
ganisms and offered an account of organic creation in atomistic mechanical
terms;[33] but the greatest biological tract of Antiquity was Aristotle's
Historia Animalium. His observation and classification of organic life
gave permanent direction to his more general philosophy of nature, espec-
ially the ideas of generation, reproduction, growth, and change. Aristotle
has often and vacuously been called the philosopher of common sense, but
there is a comparison with Plato in which the judgment is meaningful.
While Aristotle shared Plato's passionate conviction that a rational ac-
count of the world could be given, he would not accept a theory which found
only a shadow of reality in the sensible world; for him, if it was true
that substance assumed form, it was equally true that form required sub-
stance and could not be thought of as independent.

Aristotle's biological study forcefully demonstrated that the world
contained change and in organisms change took the form of generation and
decay. But the flux of things was not, as it had seemed to Heraclitus,
without order; the mind could analyze this flux, separate and classify it.
Although only particular things existed, and their forms were inextricable

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"mature" position was a compromise in which he distinguished between trans-
cendent form which was "pure," and an immanent form, more akin to the idea
of an object's "structure."

[32]Zeller, p. 53.

[33]Zeller, pp. 73-6. Northrop, pp. 17-8; Burnet, pp. 200-2.

parts of their being, reason and inductive science could distinguish them. Form is immanent. If, however, there is no transcendent realm of ideal form from which physical things "borrow" their characteristics, what accounts for the particular growth pattern which is followed? Aristotle's answer has been christened the principle of "potentiality," or teleology, and it grows out of his account of change.

Both change and endurance are genuine phenomena of nature, attributes of a fundamental substance, the "what is" that is distinguished from the "what is not."[34] Parmenides was correct when he asserted the proposition ex nihilo nihil, but wrong when he thought that being necessarily precluded change. The acorn may not be said to "be" the tree, nor the embryo the man, but each has the potential to become other than it is now. To Aristotle, as to the Greeks in general, the idea of potential entailed that there be an end in view; that the seed in some sense "know" the characteristics of a plant.[35] These two principles of immanent form, and of potential and actual being, are closely linked at the base of Aristotle's system, and their combination yields two further ideas: function and dynamism. The nature of an organism, its potential, strives toward the realization of its form, and in that progressive attainment a function emerges. As the eye comes to full attainment of its form, its specialized function of seeing is realized as a corollary. If we substitute "organization"

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[34]Aristotle rejected the notion of a void separate from bodies, and thus also Parmenides' argument that "something that is not" was needed to account for change or movement. See W. D. Ross, Aristotle (New York, 1959), pp. 89-90.

[35]As Collingwood points out, this is a lapse into anthropomorphism for which Aristotle has been repeatedly and justly criticized. But the principle of teleology may be formulated without this primitivism, and thus presented it is certainly not absurd.

for "form," and say, for example, "Organization implies and determines function," we have made a statement with a very contemporary sound indeed.

That fundamental substance of which matter and form are attributes must be "dynamic," in the sense of "not yet completed," or "becoming"; it undergoes change as the merging of its formal and material components progresses.

> This means, however, that the new more fundamental type of sub-
> stance must be conceived as a process or activity, for only as
> it expresses its own nature in a single synthesis can the merg-
> ing of its material and formal attributes take place.[36]

It is this idea that the real is becoming that lies at the heart of the third major natural philosophy of ancient Greece, the theory Northrop calls the "functional theory of nature."

As in the case of the physical or the mathematical theories, there are important epistemological and methodological consequences flowing from the functional theory of nature. In contrast to the mathematical view, functional theory holds that knowledge of reality is given in sensation, and not attained by entering into a world of transcendent form. Scientific investigation proceeds by abstracting certain elements from the sensible world and performing analyses of various kinds upon them. This method does introduce distortion, first by the act of interrupting the continuity of nature, and second by the criteria of selection employed, but this difficulty cannot be overcome if one aspires to more than description.[37]

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[36]Northrop, p. 20.

[37]The distinction between "description" and some other operation variously called "explanation," "understanding," is certainly not a settled issue. The reference in the text simply records that the Greeks did so distinguish. See, for example, Aristotle's discussion of types of causality, which has not been included here.

This review of the natural science of Antiquity touches questions which have haunted us all, but it may seem that the Greeks proceeded in what is somehow too _literary_ a manner to be relevant to contemporary science. What, it might be asked, can they contribute to elucidation of our muscular and mathematized sciences? Schrodinger recently reviewed the Twentieth century revolution in theoretical physics, noted the terrible difficulty of overcoming the dogmas of classical physics, and commented:

> Had the highly flexible and open-minded spirit that pervaded antiquity continued, such points would have continued to be debated and could have been corrected. A prejudice is more easily detected in the primitive, ingenuous form in which it first arises than as the sophisticated, ossified dogma it is apt to become later.[38]

The great historian of Antiquity, Theodor Gomperz, was even more forceful:

> Nearly our entire intellectual education originates from the Greeks. A thorough knowledge of these origins is the indispensable prerequisite for freeing ourselves from their overwhelming influence.[39]

But the detection of error is not the sole reason for the relevance of Greek philosophy and science to our contemporary problems. More profound is John Burnet's famous remark that science is "thinking about the world in the Greek way." Not only have the ancient Greeks established our fundamental patterns of thought, but they gave an enduring form of conceptualization to our puzzlement with experience. Aristotle's logic, for example, established rules of rational thought that were projected into the existential world and raised to the status of ontological principles. It was precisely the ontological aspect of the Aristotelian synthesis that

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[38]Schrodinger, p. 100.

[39]Quoted in Schrodinger, p. 101.

broke down under the impact of the new physics, the idealism of Whitehead, and the transactional analysis of Arthur Bentley. The great dichotomy expressed most abstractly as "permanence and change," more concretely as "substance and process," and perhaps eventually as "structure and function" informs and underlies the struggle of twenty-five centuries of scientists to account satisfactorially for matter and motion. Charles C. Gillispie's fascinating essay has demonstrated the enduring relevance to physics of similar formulations of Antiquity.[40]

But the natural philosophy of ancient Greece has a relevance transcending any particular science. As Gomperz and Burnet say, we still think very much as the Greeks thought, and this is why the dialogue summarized above is so meaningful to us. The next chapter will not discuss the re-emergence of the atomist school in Nineteenth century physics, but it will examine an important reaction to the success of that discipline: the resistance of German idealism to a positivist social science. The effort to create a science of man distinct from history raised all those questions about permanence and change, form and substance, nature and convention, but it placed them in a new perspective. The dialogue became more complex because it now asks not only which views of nature are the more satisfactory, but whether man and history are subjects open to study by the methods of natural science.

But although the distinctive voice of ancient Greece is muted, the old dichotomies and divisions remain; indeed they were sharpened and deepened by the positivist-idealist debate. It proved a much more complicated matter to talk about the conduct of abstracting analyzing operations in the

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[40] The Edge of Objectivity (Princeton, 1960), pp. 95-8.

realm of human experience than in that of nature. The idea of history
and society as process that emerged from the last decades of the Nine-
teenth century in Germany contained the germs of most of the fundamental
issues that inspired Arthur Bentley and frustrate and intrigue us today.

The object is, not "to know," but to schematise,--to impose as much regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require.

In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need in us that was the determining power: not the need "to know," but to classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation.

Frederick Nietzsche

Settembrini   And what about pure knowledge, what about science? What about the unfettered quest for truth? Truth, my dear sir, so indissolubly bound up with freedom?

Naptha   My good sir, there is no such thing as pure knowledge. . . . I believe, in order that I may understand is absolutely incontrovertible. Faith is the vehicle of knowledge, intellect secondary.

Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain

CHAPTER II

PROCESS IN THE HISTORICAL CENTURY

If it were necessary to name the most important philosopher of process since Heraclitus, we would probably have to choose Georg W. F. Hegel. Hegel placed process and movement at the center of his philosophy, and so pervasive was this idea that, as W. G. Runciman has recently remarked, even critics found themselves caught up in its comprehensiveness.[1] While Heraclitus' notion of process centered about change in nature, Hegel's stressed the dynamics of history. Hegel's philosophy is very largely responsible for our reference to the Nineteenth century as the "historical century."

Germany was the setting, in this period, of the great struggle to create social science. Albion Small's inquiry into this attempt led him to conclude:

> It was by no means purely a German movement; but the relations of the rapid developments in different divisions of social science to one another are more obvious in German scholarship than else-where, and they accordingly are most available for exposition of an evolution which followed parallel or converging courses through-out the Western World.[2]

It was to Germany, in the last decade of the century, that Arthur Bentley came to pursue his efforts to solve the mystery of society.

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[1]W. G. Runciman, _Social Science and Political Theory_ (Cambridge, England, 1963), p. 31.

[2]Albion Small, _Origins of Sociology_ (Chicago, 1924), p. 15.

I will try to do three things in this chapter: first, to indicate some principal intellectual currents of the period; second, to offer some examples of these currents as they appeared in early social science; and finally, to state the two versions of the process idea that were to be incorporated in Bentley's The Process of Government.

Nineteenth century Germany became the home of a belief in the supremacy of the idea as no other Western nation has. Romanticism, a retarded but fervent nationalism, the emergence of great idealist philosophers, and many other reasons may have been responsible for this. Hans Kohn has said:

> The Enlightenment was the first intellectual movement to sweep Europe as a whole. The Romantic Movement, which in many ways represented a revolt against the Enlightenment, was the second. Everywhere the restraints imposed by classicism were rejected, the free play of imagination was exalted, the unusual made a fetish and the genius a demigod. But in Germany as nowhere else romantic poets and thinkers influenced political and social thought.[3]

The consequences of this for political and social thought have been rather thoroughly explored by a number of excellent books and monographs, though there may be disagreement over the relative causal weight to be assigned various factors. Was the peculiar receptivity of the Germans due to: an absence of a political tradition? the relative detachment of German intellectuals from the main stream of national life and their isolation from positions of political influence? an authoritarian religious and political inheritance from Luther and the Pietist movement? the fragmented character of political authority? the influence of Vico, Shaftesbury and Burke? or, some elusive quality of national character?[4] Whichever one or

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[3]Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany (New York, 1960), p. 49.

[4]Most of these factors can be found in any thorough servey text. For treatments of some particular themes, see: Otto Butz, Modern German Political Theory (New York, 1955); Kohn; Richard Muller Freienfels, The German, His Psychology and Culture (Los Angeles, 1936); Hans Barth, "Edmund Burke and German Political Philosophy in the Age of Romanticism" in Barth, The Idea

or combination of reasons we choose, we will be led to recognize their

common result in turning the face of Romanticism firmly against the

Aufklarung.

> Following Herder, German Romanticism became largely a revolt
> against reason. In the view of the Romantics, reason had betrayed
> itself; the individual's endeavor to form a free and independent
> judgment in the face of political, intellectual and spiritual
> authority was a vaulting ambition that o'erleaped itself. So
> they protested against an attitude of mind held by them to be
> presumptious.[5]

This opposition between the Enlightenment and Romanticism manifested

itself in countless facets of intellectual life; a difference in primacy

accorded sense perception on the one hand and "ideas" on the other is

perhaps the deepest. From this dispute have arisen cultural, political

and philosophical barriers which down to the present day separate Germany

from much of Western Europe and America.

Whatever aspects of German intellectual life engage our attention,

we cannot ignore the towering figure of Immanuel Kant. Talcott Parsons

remarked that the Anglo-American world has read Kant as providing an an-

swer to Hume's critique of causality; Kant's solution was to bifurcate

nature into phenomenal and noumenal realms. Man understands the physical

or phenomenal world through ordering categories which are of an a priori,

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of Order (Dordrecht, Holland, 1960); John Dewey, German Philosophy and
Politics (New York, 1942); L. T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the
State (London, 1918); and H. S. Reiss, The Political Thought of the German
Romantics (Oxford, 1955), "Introduction."

[5]Reiss, p. 3. For a different view in which Herder and Romanticism
appear not as opposition figures but as continuations of the Enlightenment
see Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge (New Haven, Conn., 1950), Ch.
12. "There is no break in continuity, therefore, between the eighteenth
and the nineteenth centuries, that is, between the Enlightenment and roman-
ticism, but only a progressive advance leading from Leibnez and Shaftesbury
to Herder, and then from Herder to Ranke.", p. 224.

"ideal," character.[6]

> For Kant the Practical Reason fell definitely on the noumenal,
> not the phenomenal side of the line. This meant that man as an
> active, purposive being, an actor, was not to be dealt with by
> the sciences of the phenomenal world nor even by their analytical,
> generalizing methods. In this sphere man was not subject to law
> in the physical sense but was free. An intellectual apprehension
> of his life and action could be attained only by the speculative
> methods of philosophy, especially by a process of the intuition
> of total whole (Gestalten) which it was illegitimate to break down
> by "atomistic" analysis.[7]T

This conception of the human realm, not his contribution to the epistem-

ology of physical science, was Kant's important legacy to German thought.

Methodologically it meant that man cannot be known in his entirety by ob-

servation from the "outside," by viewing him as an object.

Post-Kantian German idealism departed from this dualistic tendency

and made the phenomenal world more than relative to the ideal; it came to

characterize the ontological nature of existence itself as in some way

"ideal." Kant's critical version of idealism could not accommodate the

great Hegelian system, and their differences cannot be minimized. Never-

theless, on the methodological plane their idealism combined to inhibit

the application of positivistic techniques to the study of man. These

were conceded to have validity and utility in the phenomenal realm, but

to be inapplicable to the spiritual nature of man, and this difference

became a commonplace of Nineteenth Century German scholarship.

> Hence the Germans came to draw a sharp distinction between
> Naturwissenschaft, or natural science, and the Geisteswissen-
> schaften, the "cultural sciences" or "sciences of the mind,"--
> including both what we would call history or social science.[8]

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[6]The word "ideal" does not entirely convey the correct meaning. For
a discussion of this and other difficulties in translation, see Carl
Friedrich, ed., The Philosophy of Kant (New York, 1949), Introduction.

[7]Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, Ill.,
1949), p. 475.

[8]Hughes, p. 186.

It is important to recognize at the outset that this distinction began as the reflection of an ontological difference; that is, that the subject matter of the cultural sciences was qualitatively different from that of Naturwissenschaft. Positivism's dictum that the goal of a science must be the formulation of general statements about behavioral uniformities ("laws") was seen as a particularly objectionable example of the failure to appreciate this central fact. General analytic theory was, in this form, deterministic and "reductionist." Determinism, as it appeared in the search for causal sequences, violated the principle of human autonomy. Reductionism was rejected because it implied the possibility of accounting for human behavior in physical, frequently biological, terms to the ex-clusion of distinctly human characteristics. The objection to reductionist practices rested not only upon a belief that they sought to dispense with distinctly human qualities, but that they undertook a separation, or a factoring out of some elements from the given whole.

It is, however, an error to imagine that in its opposition to posi-tivism, idealism encouraged a flight from empiricism. Instead, it insisted upon an empirical method appropriate to its own, particularistic, attitude.

> Hence, "idealistic empiricism" has not been a deterministic reifi-cation of systems of analytic theory, but has involved a repudiation of all such theory in favor of the concrete uniqueness and individ-uality of all things human. It is in this sense that "historicism" has been the predominate tendency of German social thought on an idealistic basis. Since the general analytic level of scientific comprehension is a priori excluded, things human can be understood only in terms of the concrete individuality of the specific histor-ical case. It is a corollary that all the important things cannot be known from a limited number of cases, but each must be known by and for itself. History is the indispensable road to fullness of knowledge.

The Kantian element of freedom and autonomy used as a critique of positiv-

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[9]Parsons, p. 477.

istic theory became an insistence upon uniqueness and individuality, and
a rejection of general theory. This strand of idealism found its most
influential spokesman in the historian Leopold von Ranke.[10] Although per-
haps in eclipse now, Ranke's reputation and impact were enormous; Gooch
has remarked of him:

> He was the greatest historical writer of modern times, not only
> because he founded the scientific study of materials and possessed
> in an unrivaled degree the judicial temper, but because his powers
> of work and length of life enabled him to produce a larger number
> of first-rate works than any other member of the craft.[11]

Apart from the magnitude of his scholarly work, Ranke "established"
the criteria of critical historiography: history must "divorce the study
of the past as much as humanly possible from the passions of the present,
and to describe how things were—wie es eigentlich gewesen."[12] This was
his "scientific" history, a quest for objectivity that, as Fritz Stern
has noted, was mistaken "for a kind of pretentious positivism."[13] This
misinterpretation was possible because although Ranke insisted upon treat-
ing particular facts as unique entities, he wished ultimately to place
these discrete phenomena in the context of a universal history; his dis-
ciples and critics forgot about this second point, possibly because Ranke
never found time to write his world history.[14] Hughes identified the "be-
wildering thing" about Ranke in these words:

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[10]See C. P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century
(Boston, 1958), Chs. VI and VII. Ranke's years included sixty of active
teaching and research (1795-1886).

[11]Ibid., p. 97.

[12]Ibid., p. 967.

[13]Fritz Stern, ed., The Varieties of History (New York, 1956), p. 55.

[14]Ibid., p. 55. He did, however, with what can only be termed an
astonishingly historical sense, undertake that task at age 86.

. . . In his more obvious guise, he was an ultra-conscientious
seeker after "facts"; tempermentally, he was a metaphysician--
if of a peculiarly vague and unsatisfactory sort; almost never
did he "reason" about history in an unambiguously communicable
fashion.[15]

Ranke's historiography may or may not be a satisfying or useful way
of conducting research, but the striking thing about it is its incompleteness.
We are admonished to treat historical facts objectively, describe them as
they happened, but we remain in ignorance of what such a fact is or how it
can be known. If the historian was to accept Kant's noumenal realm as in-
deed the locus of the unique, he had still to find a means of identifying
it. Ranke was not entirely without a recognition of this difficulty, and
his efforts toward its solution illustrate what Parsons considers "excellent
reasons" for the growth of the second strand in post-Kantian idealism.

This second strand may be designated as the Hegelian; it stressed, in
contrast to Kant's more subjective version, an "objective" idealism.[16] In
terms of our discussion here, the difference lies in the Hegelian treat-
ment of individual facts or existences as together partaking of, or express-
ing a central, common spirit (Objektiver Geist).

The result of this tendency was to arrange human activities in
relation to comprehensive "collective" or "totality patterns."
Historical attention was focused not on individual events or acts,
but on the Geist, which constituted their unity.[17]

The idea of a spirit pervading a particular cultural configuration was set
within a monistic idealism, "which in historical application required a
unified conception of human life and history as a whole."[18] History fol-

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[15]Hughes, p. 187.

[16]I am following here the analysis given by Parsons, pp. 478-87, an
account with which Hughes concurs.

[17]Parsons, p. 478.

[18]Parsons, p. 479. "History not merely ascertained as so much fact but
understood by apprehending the reasons why the facts happened as they did.",
R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York, 1956), pp. 113-4.

lowing a spiral development impelled by the dialectic was held rigidly distinct from nature, which remained a cyclical process without development. But the dialectic did more than provide the dynamism of historical progress; it also served as a "bridge" between particular epochs and the final unity in the Weltgeist.[19] Human history, Hegel insisted, is made by the actions of men, but those actions are limited by the conditions of the age in which they live.

Hegel retained the nature-history dichotomy (although it can no longer be said to rest on Kant's phenomenal-noumenal distinction), but with the notion of the spirit of an epoch he sought to connect the various unique events. The spirit idea also enabled him to suggest that a deeper insight (understanding) into history, beyond the establishment of this or that as fact, was both necessary and possible. Hegel's system, in particular his monism, was subjected to criticism and revision throughout the Nineteenth century, but the idea of the spirit as expressing and ordering a unique cultural or historical pattern remained vital.[20]

The focus of German philosophical attention remained upon the notion of the "spirit," and upon the search for a means by which these elusive entities could be identified and known. It is essential to keep in mind that these two operations, the identification of cultural patterns (or historical periods, I do not here distinguish them) and the means by which

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[19] Ibid.

[20] There were, however, difficulties in the attempt to dispense with the unifying elements in Hegel's metaphysics while retaining his Geist. Specifically, how was one age to gain an understanding of one past unless the former's Geist "included" or in some way touched that of the latter? Oswald Spengler was bold or desperate enough to deny that such understanding was possible, but the school of Wissensoziologie has struggled harder if not more successfully with the dilemma. See Parsons, pp. 479-80; Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York, 1940); and Raymond Aron, German Sociology (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), pp. 55-65.

they might be investigated, are inextricably connected. Idealism's

elaboration of an attitude toward these questions is best seen in opposi-

tion to that of the positivistic tradition, but before turning to that

comparison this summary point should be made. Although we are often

tempted to contrast a totalistic, or holistic, approach to historical

interpretation such as the Hegelian with a painstaking, narrow gauge and

fact-oriented empiricism--for example the Rankian--both "schools" may be

accommodated within German Idealism. This does not mean that there were

not conflicts between them, but it does require that we see the picture

of conflict as much more complex than that of an empirical positivism

versus a holistic idealism. Unquestionably that opposition did and does

exist, but a number of key epistemological and methodological issues cut

across the schools so defined.

Traditional German objections to positivism (and many other aspects

of the Enlightenment) have been expressed in the dichotomy between "mechan-

istic" and "organic" ideas about society and history.[21] This juxtaposition

usually implies a congeries of methodological, substantive, and ethical

elements, but it seems always to denote two distinct means of relating

parts to wholes.

> At one pole or extreme is the "mechanistic" case, where all the
> important "properties" of the concretely functioning parts can be
> defined independently of their relations to the other parts or to
> the whole. Above all, it is the case where the part can, in fact,
> be concretely separated from these relations and still remain "the
> same." Thus we can take a steam engine apart and actually examine
> its pistons, record their size, shape, tensile strength, etc. . . .

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[21]These dichotomous terms seem to be as difficult to clothe with pre-
cise meaning as they are to do without. In all events, they are in very
common use. T. D. Weldon's States and Morals (New York, 1947) relies
heavily upon them; see especially pp. 30-61. Karl Popper, The Poverty of
Historicism (Boston, 1957), links the distinction to his critique of
"historicism." The author prefers Parsons' more restrained discussion,
The Structure of Social Action. In the broad terms in which it usually
appears, the dichotomy remains metaphorical.

Now precisely in so far as a whole is organic this becomes impossible. The very definition of an organic whole is as one within which the relations determine the properties of its parts. The properties of the whole are not simply a resultant of the latter. This is true whether it be an organism or some other unit, such as a "mind," a "society" or what not. And in so far as this is true, the concept "part" takes on an abstract, indeed a "fictional" character. For the part of an organic whole is no longer the same, once it is separated factually or conceptually from the whole.[22]

The question is not whether such a distinction is true or even useful, for the relation of part and whole is a profound subject in itself;[23] we are concerned to indicate the character that the dispute between nominalists and holists assumed. Paraphrasing Ernest Nagel's formulation as a question we may ask if it is true that "there occurs in nature an important type of individual wholes (which may be physical, biological, psychological, or social) that are not simply 'aggregates' of independent members, but are 'organic unities,'" such that they resist reduction to and may not be fully "expressed" as the sum of their components?[24]

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[22]Parsons, p. 32. Note that this version does not deny the possibility of analyzing the organic into component parts, if these components be understood as fictional constructs without empirical referrents. Thus, "precisely in so far as the phenomena are 'organic,' the more elementary the unit the more 'abstract' or 'empty' its concept becomes.", Ibid., p. 33.

[23]See Ernest Nagel's stimulating article, "Wholes, Sums, and Organic Unities," ed. Daniel Lerner, Parts and Wholes (New York, 1963), particularly his discussion of "organic wholes," pp. 146-52. Nagel's distinction between "The questions whether a given system can be overtly constructed in a piecemeal fashion by a seriatim juxtaposition of parts, and the question whether the system can be analyzed in terms of a theory concerning its assumed constituents and their inter-relations." (at p. 149) is a useful extension of Parsons' mention of "factions." Compare their respective treatments of the holistic nature of melody, Parsons, p. 483.

Although generally critical of claims of the organicists, Nagel concludes: "The upshot of this discussion of organic unities is that the question whether they can be analyzed from the additive point of view does not possess a general answer.", p. 152.

[24]Nagel, p. 135. On the matter of reduction in the physical sciences, see Ernest Nagel, "The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences" in ed. Robert C. Stauffer, Science and Civilization (Madison, Wis., 1949). See also the discussion of the part/whole issue in quantum theory by Edward Purcell, "Parts and Wholes in Physics" in Lerner.

The difference is not only between the respective units with which

a science works (units of observation, description, and so forth) but also

between opposing ideas about what is involved in "explaining" or even gain-

ing knowledge about social reality. As Parsons points out, to Western

European positivism this conception usually involved variation, change,

and this in turn involved the notion of succession in time. John Stuart

Mill's influential Book III of A System of Logic (first published in 1842)

distinguished between the phenomena of nature related to one another by

simultaneity and those related by succession.[25] The law of causation oper-

ates within the latter realm.

> The Law of Causation, the recognition of which is the main pillar
> of inductive science, is but the familiar truth that invariability
> of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact
> in nature and some other fact which has preceded it . . .[26]

Temporal succession is also implicit in Bertrand Russell's remark that "if

there are causes and effects, they must be separated by a finite time-

interval."[27]

> Karl Lowith has said:

> To "explain a phenomenon means to the positivist mind no more and
> no less than to establish a connection between single phenomena
> and some general facts, the number of which continually dimishes
> with the progress of science.[28]

To Comte, Mill, and their followers, the ideas of causality and explanation

were intimately related, and it does not matter here whether causality be

understood in its pre-Humian sense, or in more cautious contemporary terms.

Morris Cohen put that more cautious view this way:

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[25]J. S. Mill, A System of Logic (London, 1961), Book III.

[26]Ibid., p. 213.

[27]Bertrand Russell, "On the Notion of Cause," ed. Herbert Feigl and
May Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York, 1953), p. 390.

[28]Karl Lowith, Meaning in History (Chicago, 1949), p. 70.

But the whole tendency of modern experimental as well as theoretical physics is to eliminate the metaphysical notion of matter as <u>ultimate</u> substance, and to find the element of permanence--without which there would be no science--in the mathematical relations. Thus Helmholtz, who in his youth thought that "the final aim of physical science is to find the ultimate unchangeable causes of the processes in nature," became satisfied later that the principle of causality meant nothing more than that natural phenomena happen according to law.[29]

"Laws" then are at least statements about recurrent patterns of behavior, and "to explain an event is simply to bring it under a law; and to explain a law is to bring it under another law."[30] As P. W. Bridgman has remarked, when we have made the elements of a situation "so familiar that we accept them as a matter of course, . . . our curiosity rests."[31]

In contrast to the positivistic notion of explanation and causal relationship, idealism sought a reality in which the elements are a "meaningfully" related complex.[32] Parsons offers a number of examples to illustrate this type of relatedness: artistic form, as might be found in the symphony, a poem or painting, and logical form, as in the relations among propositions composing a scientific theory.[33] Note that the nexus of the

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[29]Morris R. Cohen, <u>Reason and Nature</u> (Rev. Ed., Glencoe, Ill., 1953), p. 225.

[30]John Hospers, "What is Explanation?", ed. Anthony Flew, <u>Essays in Conceptual Analysis</u> (London, 1956), p. 98. In response to the objection (of Norman Campbell) that to answer the question "Why does A do B?" by assertion "All A does B," is to prompt the further query "Why does all A do B?" Hospers argues that one may offer a uniform law as an answer to a specific inquiry, and it is not the less legitimate because it fails to provide an answer to a second, more general question (pp. 101-2).

[31]<u>The Logic of Modern Physics</u> (New York, 1960), p. 37.

[32]Parsons, p. 482. The German term for this complex is <u>Sinnzusammenhang</u>. Compare also the "structural" emphasis of Gestalt psychology; Parsons gives Wolfgang Kohler's "requiredness" as an example.

[33]The analogy to a musical composition is used not only to illustrate the difference between causal and ideal relations, but also that of nominalist and holist analysis. See the illuminating remarks on this analogy by Ernest Nagel, "Wholes, Sums, and Organic Unities," in Lerner, pp. 143-4.

relationship need not be "logical," in the sense in which we ordinarily understand that word; it may be "symbolic" even to the extent that that word can mean illogical or non-rational.

With this understood it is immediately apparent that the relation so defined lies at a far different level than that inhabited by causal relationships. The ideal relationships are not dependent upon, or do not involve, succession in time; indeed, they are atemporal.[34] Mill acknowledged such types of relations, but he had imagined them confined to the realms of number and space.[35] The type of connection peculiar to ideal relationships is some sort of distinctive ordering of components, an ordering which must be grasped as a totality. Just as an ancient language may not be deciphered without a "key," or a means of relating the isolated symbols which compose the alphabet, particular cultural units cannot be "built"up" out of individual events alone. "This fact undoubtedly constitutes one of the basic reasons for the 'organicism' of German social thought, its hostility to any attempt to break down the concrete whole analytically."[36]

The distinction between these two types of relationships, the ideal and the causal, involved more than different conceptions of the part-whole relation; it meant that two opposing kinds of accounts of natural phenomena could be given, "explanation" and "understanding." The positivistic notion of explanation has already been mentioned; it is helpful here to re-emphasize

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[34]Parsons, p. 482. As he points out, this does not mean that ideal relations do not have an origin in time; only that they do not require antecedent and consequent states.

[35]J. S. Mill, pp. 210-1. Mill did think that a number system could apply equally to cases of simultaneity and succession, but the truths of "space" (geometry) applied only to the former. The text is correct since although number may be applied in either realm, only its truths and those of geometry can hold independent of succession.

[36]Parsons, p. 484.

that the causal or explanatory method "gave an account" of particular phenomena in terms of other phenomena (prior or contemporary) considered on the same level. As indicated this idea became that of sequential uniformity. But the ideal relationship, because it inheres at a different level, required that a further and qualitatively different effort toward its discovery be made. This is the method of understanding, or in its Germanic reference, Verstehen.

Verstehen is one of the most difficult concepts in all social science and history, in part because it is used in a variety of ways by both advocates and detractors, but primarily because it pushes the query "What is meaning?" very close to the realm of the unexpressable. Max Weber has given perhaps the most sophisticated and thorough statement of Verstehen as both an epistemological and methodological principle, but his is by no means the only and certainly not the earliest formulation. That latter distinction probably belongs to Wilhelm Dilthey, whose Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (the first volume of a projected but never completed comprehensive historical critique) appeared in 1883. The meaning of Verstehen as an epistemological and methodological principle ranges from a synonym for intuition, to definition as "sympathetic understanding," and "imaginative reconstruction."

The attempts of German sociologists and historians to absorb the contributions of idealist and romantic philosophy and to apply them at the methodological level reached a high degree of sophistication and energy during the period of roughly 1880-1920. The tide of positivism was running high all about them, and the task of maintaining the distinctive character of the Geisteswissenschaften while avoiding the excessive subjectivism of the romantics was, from any point of view, an heroic one. The men who accepted this challenge were not speculative philosophers of the stature of

a Kant or a Hegel, and their efforts had to be directed more toward goals of synthesis than of creation.

Their very concern with the integrity and uniqueness of the cultural or human studies required them to descend the hierarchical chain from speculative philosophical discourse to forge transitional links in the murky realm of epistemology and methodology, links which could finally be made secure in the substance of history and society. We do not possess in English words or phrases that are adequate to describe either the subject area under discussion here, or to describe the type of endeavor that inquiry into it constitutes. Rather, we have a conception of the "top" or (speculative) philosophical level, and of a secondary, more or less derivative, level of "methodology."[37] This lack of a vocabulary indicates the substantive division that Anglo-American social theory has made, in which that vast transitional or "in between" area has been divided and part assigned to "philosophy" (and thus transferred out of the realm of social science), while the remainder is consigned to an expansive "methodology" which encompasses everything from epistemology to such "scientific method" procedures as sampling.[38]

I have tried to indicate, in very brief fashion, some of the main aspects of Germany's divorce from the main currents of Western historical and philosophical thought. Idealism and Romanticism alike found sustenance in Kant's critical idealism, in particular his distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal realms. Hegelians and post-Kantian idealists, as well as

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[37]C. W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York, 1959), especially his distinction between "grand theory" and a microscopic empiricism. Mills made a somewhat more moderate but essentially similar distinction in "Two Styles of Research in Current Social Studies," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 20, Oct., 1953.

[38]For a brief but penetrating discussion of the relations among theory, philosophy, and methodology, see Parsons, pp. 20-7.

the anti-rationalist romantics, extended the distinction between nature and history as a barrier to positivism and its use of the methods of natural sciences. Geisteswissenschaften were presumed to resist application of those principles, and to require study by non-deterministic and non-reductionist techniques. Positivism was believed to endorse not only determinism and reductionism, but to entail atomism and mechanism. The idealist camp split into two wings; the Rankian, which stressed the painstaking collection of unique happenings, and the Hegelian, which sought the unifying spirit of an age or culture.

These two wings of idealism differed on the issue of the proper units of investigation and observation, that is, whether the unique happening or the equally unique configuration of happenings should constitute an historical entity (although as we have seen, Ranke was not without an inclination toward the Geist idea). Both, however, resisted positivism's attempt to treat happenings in causal sequence; a tendency which appeared to idealists as atomism linked "mechanically." Thus, the two issues of the proper units of observation, and method of explanation (or "giving an account of"), were joined in both positivist and idealist camps. On the idealist side, the question of units appears to have been the more basic. Once the notion of the uniqueness of an event and a configuration or complex was accepted, the principle of causality could hardly give an adequate account of either phenomena, if for no other reason than that temporal succession was irrelevant.[39] The relations "within" unique events or complexes were "meaningful" rather than causal.

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[39] There was, of course, the rock of uniqueness itself, upon which causal determinism foundered.

If the nature of the relationships within historical and cultural entities were of a different kind than those encountered in **Naturwissenschaft**, wherein a causal account was regarded as "explanation," then a different kind of account must also be given of meaningful relations. After considerable difficulty the concept of **Verstehen** emerged as an alternative to the notion of explanation. The point to be emphasized is that the part/whole dichotomy, itself a corollary of the regularity/uniqueness polarity, compelled idealism to establish the third and methodological dichotomy between explanation and understanding. The central difference seems to be the conviction on the part of the anti-positivists that history, culture, society, and "man" in the largest sense, are by their nature unique and undetermined, and thus must be located in some realm other than the phenomenal.

This basic conviction, and the epistemological and methodological consequences summarized above, affected virtually every field of German social science, especially jurisprudence, economics, and sociology (of course including history). With the completion of this statement of the general philosophical background, we can turn to a consideration of developments within the embryo social sciences themselves.

Talcott Parsons probably spoke for the majority of his colleagues when he remarked, "I for one would not hesitate to label all the theoretical endeavors before the generation of Durkheim and Max Weber as proto-sociology."[40] Albion Small referred to the date of 1870 as the beginning of sociology, but added that the period 1800-1880 must be considered a

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[40]"The Prospects of Sociological Theory," Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), p. 349.

developmental one for various of the social sciences.[41] For him, the decisive break between the historiography of the periods prior to and after 1800 is symbolized by what he called the awakening of the "critical" spirit. In this awakening he discerned a drive toward "objectivity," particularly in the works of Savigny, Eichorn, Niebuhr, and von Ranke; we will be particularly concerned with the first.

At the dawn of the Nineteenth century German political and legal thought were closely joined, and it was through this union that Romanticism and Natural Law theory came to a confrontation within the field of jurisprudence. Carl Friedrich von Savigny was the foremost exponent of the historical school of jurisprudence which, in opposition to Natural Law theory, held that the basis of law is custom, and that a nation's law grows "organically" through usage, belief, and incremental additions by jurists who have an awareness of the particular cultural pattern expressed therein. He developed this view in a pamphlet (Of the vocation of our age for legislation and jurisprudence) published in 1814 in answer to the proposal of Anton Thibaut that a sweeping codification of German law be inaugurated.[42] The particulars of the Thibaut-Savigny controversy are not of interest here;

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[41]Origins of Sociology (Chicago, 1924), p. 13. The essays in this volume appeared serially in the American Journal of Sociology, Jan., 1923-Nov., 1924, under the title, "Some Contributions to the History of Sociology." It might not be amiss to quote Small's statement of his thesis, since it constitutes a premise of my own efforts:

> The book sustains the main thesis that during the nineteenth century the social sciences were half-consciously engaged in a drive from relatively irresponsible discursiveness toward "positivity" or "objectivity," and that, at its time, the initiation of the American Sociological Movement was as truly a linear continuance from the previous tradition of social interpretation as was any other of the tendencies which varied the technique of historiggraphy, or economics, or political science. (P. v.)

[42]See H. S. Reiss, ed., The Political Thought of the German Romantics (Oxford, 1955), pp. 38-9.

what is important is that it raised in Savigny's mind the question of the relation of past and present. He gave the answer of the historical school in this passage:

> /For the historical school_7 there is, from the point of view of human existence, nothing absolutely individual or independent. Rather, that which we regard as an individual when seen from nearby, will be nothing more than a part of a larger whole. Thus every human individual is necessarily presented to our thought as a member of a family, of a people or of a state; each age of a nation ____ as the continuation and development of all past ages. Every other method of seeing it is incomplete, and by itself is false and pernicious.[43]

Small adds in a revealing comment that "this paragraph is sociology quite up to date."

Four basic propositions about the nature of law and society emerge from Savigny's arguments: the conception of social life as in some way "organic"; the insistence on the "rootedness" in history of any present organism; a denial of the efficacy, indeed the possibility of change transcending the peculiar essence of the organism; and a commitment to the holistic study of society. In a word, the particular discovery of Savigny was the <u>continuity</u> of society; continuity in terms both of space and time. This discovery offered a clue, comparable in magnitude to Darwin's notion of evolution, to post-1814 historians and social scientists. Small suggests the term "gradualism" to express "the reality common to physical and social causation." "Little by little the conclusion gathered the force of demonstration in social science that, whatever may prove to be more particular principles of human relationships, <u>gradualism</u> rather than <u>catastrophism</u> is the universal manner of social cause and effect."[44]

The interest in continuity and the belief in the importance of his-

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[43] Quoted in Small, p. 58.

[44] Small, p. 62

torical context inspired a suspicion of abstraction that is well illustrated by the economics of the period. "German economic theory from 1870 to 1870 was predominately an attempt to transplant English 'classical' economics to German soil."[45] Classical economics meant, primarily, the teaching of Smith and Ricardo. It was presented in both England and Germany during this period as a "final economic doctrine," i.e., as a completed science. Until about 1850 English ideas remained dominant, but after that date, and more rapidly after 1870, the Germans began to introduce significant revisions in theory. The single most important factor in this change was the growing awareness of the ethical and psychological presuppositions underlying Smith's science, and a realization that these were not as immutable—as rooted in the nature of man—as had been believed. The self-interest motive of the economic man was particularly vulnerable. "The perception was near at hand that economic groups are not self-sufficient entities, but phases of the human intercourse which proceeds through formation of instrumental groupings to serve the diverse purposes of identical bodies of persons."[46]

"Interest" was, after all, a psychical factor, and "When the protagonists of self-realizing physical law admitted a psychical accomplice into their plot, they had to leave the door open for the possible entrance of other psychical agents."[47] Most prominent in the developing "psychological" economics was the Austrian school, including Menger, Bohm-Bawerk, Wiener, Sax, Philippovich, Schaffle, and finally (that favorite of Robert Hutchins) Zukerkandl. The attempt of these men to found a science of economics might

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[45]Ibid., p. 135.

[46]Ibid., p. 151.

[47]Ibid., pp. 145-6.

be reduced to the following proposition: "The phenomena of the market are at the same time phenomena of the mind, and they must be explained accordingly. To that extent the Austrian economists began the development of modern sociology."[48]

The particular nexus between economics and sociology lay in the idea of value. The Austrians had "made it impossible thenceforth to be satisfied with a conception of value which makes it a quality residing in things; value must be thought of as a relation between appraisable goods, on the one hand, and appraising mind on the other."[49] In economic terms this meant the quantity of labor involved in production was abandoned as the measure of value and replaced by the notion of value in use.

Of the Austrian school Carl Menger is the most interesting figure, especially in his disputes with Gustav Schmöller in the famous Methoden-streit. These exchanges took place in 1883 with the publication of Menger's Untersuchungen uber die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der Politischen Oekonomie insbesondere,[50] which was answered the same year by Schmoller's Zur Methodologie der Staats-und Socialwissenschaften.[51] Generally, it may be said that Menger's attack on the historical school was a plea for re-

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[48]Ibid., p. 172.

[49]Ibid., pp. 176-7. See also the excellent discussion in Joseph Schumpeter, Economic Doctrine and Method (London, 1954), especially Ch. IV, "The Historical School and Marginal Utility."

[50]An abridged version edited by Lewis Schneider and translated by Francis J. Nock was recently published, Problems of Economics and Sociology (Urbana, Ill., 1953).

[51]Other salvos followed; see Schumpeter, p. 170. Some caution is necessary in evaluating this dispute; it was conducted polemically, but the heat may have implied a greater difference than actually existed. On the whole, the economist Schumpeter is inclined to minimize its importance while such sociologists as Small and Parsons take a more respectful posture.

storation of theory, which he conceived as the formulation of general

types of action ("forms of manifestation of social phenomena") and the

"laws" of their succession.

The phenomena of nature lend themselves to analysis under the cate-

gories of the individual and the typical, and the methods of history are

appropriate to the former just as those of more theoretical social sciences

must be applied to the latter. "We understand a concrete manifestation in

specifically historical fashion (through the history) by bringing to our

consciousness the concrete circumstances under which it came into being."[52]

> We understand a concrete phenomenon in the _theoretical_ way (i.e.,
> on the basis of the corresponding _theoretical_ sciences) when we
> comprehend the same as a special case of a certain regularity
> (According-to-law-ness) in the sequence or in the coexistence of
> the phenomena; or, in other words, we arrive at consciousness of
> the ground of the existence and of the pecularity of the nature
> of a concrete phenomenon by learning to recognize in it solely
> the exemplification of a regularity of phenomena . . .[53]

Menger's distinction will be readily recognized by students of German phil-

osophy as a variant of the nomothetic-idiographic dichotomy, but we must be

wary of oversimplifying the parallels. Certainly a strong sense of differ-

ence between the unique and the recurring is basic throughout to both, but

that distinction is the beginning rather than the end of sophistication.

For example, while Menger's account of the different methods is familiar,

he refers to "understanding" in both, thus declining to reproduce the no-

tion of _Verstehen_ as opposed to causal "explanation." More important still

is his apparent belief that natural phenomena—men, institutions, etc.—

may be viewed from either the historical or the theoretical point of view;

that is, that the difference in perspective is _not called for_ by some

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[52]Menger, quoted in Small, _Origins_, p. 209.

[53]_Ibid._, p. 210.

existential dichotomy but remains the choice of the investigator. We will return to this theme below in the consideration of Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert.

Menger's polemic insisted that the historical school had so preoccupied itself with the task of particularistic description that it substituted "historico-statistical" material for theoretical concepts. The reaction against an oversimplified, formal character of classical economics had produced its own version of sterility. As it was addressed to the excesses of some members of that school Menger's assault had a considerable degree of merit, but Schmoller's defense was moderate in position if not in tone.

He denied Menger's radical separation of historical and theoretical method and argued that the two were complementary. Description is the necessary preliminary stage to the creation of a general theory, and the categories of the typical must be subjected to persistent modification by further factual inquiry. A "complete description" would entail a comparable structure of categories to which particulars would be correctly assigned, and which would include a complete survey of possible causes.[54] This formulation, while failing to consider some of the more difficult problems of the "serendipity pattern," presents a good summary statement of what most contemporary social scientists would probably say in reply to Menger.

Schumpeter, in a paragraph warning us against overlooking the great differences between the "historical schools" of the early and late Nineteenth century, suggests that at least for the purposes of economic science this debate illustrates a considerable degree of convergence.

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[54]Ibid., pp. 219-20.

Already at this time $\overline{/}$ Schmoller $\overline{/}$ recognized not only that some
of Menger's critical observations were justified but also how
essentially similar the causal nexus in social science and natural
science is; he also described the explanation of social phenomena
in the form of cause and effect and in the form of laws--for him
at this time both coincided--as the aim of scientific effort. In-
deed we find even the far-reaching proposition that all perfect
science is "deductive," that is, that the state of ideal perfection
is only reached when it has become possible to explain concrete
phenomena completely with the help of theoretical premises.[55]

Against Schmoller's assertion that historical studies furnish the

"stuff" of theory, Menger argued that this view imagines history to speak

for itself.

The most complicated phenomena are predominately the outcome of
contact between the economic endeavors of individuals. Under-
standing of these latter, and of their reciprocal relationships,
is consequently elemental. The history of economics does not
furnish this factor of intelligence, especially not the psycho-
logical motivation of economic details.[56]

While Schumpeter's remark that actual discussion of principles in-

dicated a considerable common ground of agreement seems justified, it

remains that in both jurisprudence and economics, as well as within his-

toriography itself, a dispute over method was conducted in terms of "theory"

as opposed to a particularistic, "historical" orientation. In our discus-

sion of the Thibaut-Savigny controversy, we noted the four propositions

which Small found to emerge from the latter's development of historical

interpretation. Schumpeter suggests six comparable positions assumed by

the historical school near the close of the century.[57] I will simply list

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[55]Schumpeter, p. 170. He is referring here to Zur Methodologie. On
the idea of the "perfect science," compare the recent statement in Talcott
Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge,
Mass., 1959), especially Part I and pp. 47-52. I have already indicated
the differing values placed on the Methodenstreit by the economist and
sociologist; interested readers will find Louis Schneider's "Introduction"
to Problems of Economics and Sociology one source for further study.

[56]Small, p. 229.

[57]Schumpeter, pp. 176-80.

for purposes of comparison: First, there is the relativistic point of view which holds all "generally valid" rules of economic policy suspect. Second is the idea of the unity of social life and the inseparable relation of its elements--a position favoring a holistic approach. The third point of view stresses human irrationalism; that is, it believes in a multiplicity of motives only a small proportion of which might be considered "logical" or "calculated." An "evolutionary" perspective is the fourth principle, and it means simply that change is accepted as a natural attribute of the subject matter. Fifth is the interest in "individual correlations," or the concern to learn about "concrete events and conditions" and their causes, rather than more general causes of events. Finally, there is the organic point of view resting upon a physiological analogue; apart from exaggerations and misunderstanding, the analogue suggests that "economics cannot be split up into an agglomeration of independent economic individuals and that economic phenomena are not merely the resultants of individual components."[58]

The next phase of the development begins to assume a more familiar "sociological" character; indeed Small termed it "sociological economics." Albert Schaffle (1831-1903) is the first figure to be mentioned. Schaffle is usually remembered as an extreme proponent of the organismic analogy, especially for his Bau und Leben des Socialen Korpers, a seven-volume work which appeared between 1875 and 1878; however, his posthumous work, Abriss der Sociologie (1906) attempted to escape from the limitations of the biological analogue.[59] The extent of Schaffle's commitment to organicism

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[58]Ibid., p. 179.

[59]Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science (Washington, D. C., 1952), p. 684; and Phillip P. Jacobs, German Sociology (New York, 1909), p. 19.

is of less interest to us here than is his conception of sociology as the integrative, generalizing, and theoretical branch of the social sciences. Although his writings are marred by inconsistency the trend of his work is toward a belief that the analyses of personal motives and purposes conducted by the various special sciences can attain a new, overall statement in the discipline of sociology.

Schaffle rejected classical economic theory but he did accept or at least work with various aspects within that school: "He was not only tolerant of the historical, the ethical and the psychological movements in economic theory, but he was even recognized by some of the leaders in each of these movements as in part a co-worker in developing their respective methods."[60] Despite this eclecticism he found economic theory inconclusive and set about to reconstruct it. Specifically, he rejected as a starting point the assumption that economic phenomena could be interpreted in and of themselves, and insisted that a more comprehensive statement of "interconnections of human phenomena in general" was a necessary preliminary to determining anything about specifically "economic" phenomena.[61]

The point is that Schaffle's concept of economics required that he "show that economic phenomena are something more than economic phenomena, i.e., to expand surveys of men engaged in production and consumption of wealth, into surveys of men carrying on the whole complex of purposeful activities into which they are urged by the entire range of their wants."[62] This broadened conception of economic theory clearly placed the utility principle at the very center of attention, but in so doing it opened up two

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[60]Small, p. 296.

[61]Ibid., p. 297.

[62]Ibid., p. 303

distinct possible uses of that highly useful idea. One would have been

to press the question, "Utility for what?" and to "attempt to put into

that highly abstract concept 'utility' the concrete content which had

constituted the substantial aim of as many different types of purpose-

groups as could be identified."[63] This was the course later followed by

Gustav Ratzenhofer. It would have overcome or at least balanced the ab-

stract character of the utility concept by what Small calls "the funda-

mental method of correlating human phenomena."

Small's meaning becomes somewhat clearer when that method is set

over against the alternative employment of the utility principle which

Schaffle chose. Despite what has been said above about his desire to get

at the actual activities of men, Schaffle formulated these in the abstract

terms of the biological analogy instead of "trying to exhibit . . . social

phenomena as they have been organized into concrete situations, in the

course of trying to realize specific objective purposes, or 'utilities.'"[64]

The organic metaphor itself is not the difficulty, but insofar as it in-

duced Schaffle to use the vocabulary of "means" (such words as "organiza-

tion" and "structure") rather than "ends" ("wants," "purposes," "interests")

the focus of inquiry was shifted away from its potentially most productive

level. "Thus the newly empowered desire for objectivity was misguided into

a merely varied type of subjectivity."[65]

A helpful way to consider Small's summary of Schaffle's contribution

is to revert to that central idea of "continuity." "Sociological economics"

progressed in Schaffle's hands insofar as he insisted upon a "horizontal

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[63]Ibid., pp. 303-4.

[64]Ibid., p. 304.

[65]Ibid.

continuity," i.e., the interconnectedness of phenomena considered as events occurring on the same level, but he failed to establish the same kind of continuity in a "vertical" dimension, as might be accomplished with the linkage of "ends" to "means." This analogy presents continuity in a spatial sense, and its use here should not obscure the strong temporal sense Small gives to the term in his discussion of Savigny.

This idea of the interconnection of phenomena, or continuity, which Small makes virtually the single criterion of sociology, rings rather hollow in the ears of a generation which has accepted the notion so completely as to make it virtually tautalogical. Whether it appears as adequate criterion is less important than are subsidiary, perhaps derivative, ideas of what sociology ought to be about. Small's formulation of the continuity idea emerged from his discussion of social causation--in this case, an argument for incremental change--and it would seem to be true that this position has historically been associated with an acceptance of multiple causation, with--in Isaiah Berlin's phrase--the fox rather than the hedgehog. If this be true, it is interesting to read in Carlo Antoni's recently translated study, From History to Sociology, that "the problem of the relationship between all the categories, that is, of the unity and continuity of the life of the spirit, really came into prominence only after the Marxists had affirmed the dependence of all other categories upon the economic. The sociological interpretation of history is based upon the transition from one category to the others."[66]

Certainly, "Sociology has grown out of the philosophy of history,"[67] and no figure in Nineteenth century Germany was more central to this move-

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[66]Subtitled "The Transition in German Historical Thinking" (Detroit, 1959), p. 151.

[67]Nathan Rotenstreich, Between Past and Present (New Haven, Conn., 1958), pp. 153-4.

ment than Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey set himself the task of providing a
comprehensive, philosophic basis for all of the fragmented and specialized
sciences of man, the Geisteswissenschaften. His great rivals for leader-
ship in this attempt were Wilhelm Windelband and Henrich Rickert of the
Baden School of Neo-Kantianism. We will be interested in these three
figures primarily as they sought to provide an epistemological basis and
a distinctive methodology for the human sciences.

Basic to Dilthey's epistemology is the relation among lived experi-
ence (Erlebnis), its expression (Ausdruck), and its understanding (Verste-
hen).[68] Knowledge begins with the fact of consciousness and the experi-
ence "contained" therein; in contrast to Kant, the intellect does not order
experience but discovers order within it. "Instead of life and mind being
phenomenal objects constructed by the thinking subject, thought itself is
merely something that goes on in the course of life, and is governed at
every point by the ever-shifting confrontations of the living self and the
surrounding world."[69] Dilthey's position places epistemology on a par
with empirical sciences, most importantly psychology, rather than holding
it aloof, "above" or "behind" the experiential, as did Kant's.[70]

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[68]H. A. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (London, 1952), p.
116. I am indebted to Mr. Hodges for much of the following discussion.
Although relatively little of Dilthey's work has been translated into
English, there is evidence of a growing recognition of his importance.
In addition, see: H. A. Hodges, Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction(London,
1944), which contains fragmentary translations; Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern
and Meaning in History (New York, 1962); R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of
History (New York, 1956); Carlo Antoni, From History to Sociology (Detroit,
1959); Raymond Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History (Boston,
1961); H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York, 1958); Jose
Ortega y Gasset, "Wilhelm Dilthey and the Idea of Life," Concord and
Liberty (New York, 1946); and Maurice Mandelbaum, The Problem of Histor-
ical Knowledge (New York, 1938).

[69]Hodges, Philosophy, pp. 30-1. (If not otherwise indicated, refer-
ences to Hodges are to this volume.)

[70]In their Knowing and The Known (Boston, 1948), John Dewey and Arthur
Bentley insist that logic and epistemology must be treated within a behav-
ioral (read "experiential") framework instead of themselves standing apart

The act of consciousness (Erlebnis) is distinguished from the content of that consciousness (Vorstellung). Human acts (our primary area of concern) are presented to us as physical facts, but we are able to recognize and explore the mental life that lies behind them. We _infer_ that another human being has a structure similar to our own, and we impute ours--that with which we are familiar--to the other. Thus, to the degree that we can recognize a similar mental structure, for example through linguistic symbols, we are able to _understand_ another mind. The "structural system" performs a double function: it is the object I am to understand, and it is the means by which I understand. _Verstehen_ applies to past events in two ways: Experience and understanding are lived in a temporal order; that is, they are bound up with one another. The intelligible order, however, does not coincide with the temporal order, and it is possible to grasp the deeper, underlying "attitude" (Verhalten, Stellung) of a period without having experienced its particular aspects.[71] We need not stop with experience nor even with understanding, but we can pass beyond them to discursive thought. Unlike Bergson, who imagined that because mental life was a "continuous flux" it could not be grasped as given by any means but intuition ("concepts," by which Bergson intended mathematics or the constructs of physical science, must distort the content of consciousness), Dilthey assigned thought a role in life equal to experience and understanding.

The methodological consequences of the doctrine of _Verstehen_ can best be approached by contrasting the procedures of the natural and the social (Dilthey used the phrase "moral and political sciences," or "historical

from such inquiry.

[71]Hodges, pp. 122-3.

sciences"). Physical nature, the subject matter of natural science, is different in kind from that of social science; there is no mental life behind it. Causation is the moving principle in nature, but because men have consciousness they are "free" of necessity: "instead of quantities of energy we have relations of significance and value."[72] (This distinction raises special problems for the investigator, since as an actor he pursues certain notions of value and significance also—though, for the moment, this is a secondary issue.) The data of physical science appear as homogeneous units that permit of precise definition and clear statement of relationships, but—and here Dilthey gives the argument an unusual twist—those units are quite abstract because they are constructions out of our experience with nature. Whereas physical science has had to search out the "real unit" of matter, social science has enjoyed the advantage of having its unit of investigation, the individual, actually given in experience. This is the reason that the latter was able to attain a state of "classical perfection" at a much earlier date than its naturalistic counterpart.[73]

But this advantage has its accompanying disability, namely that the individual units, though readily perceivable, are unique, and the attempt to generalize about their common features is defeated by their infinite variety. The natural sciences are able to establish a hierarchy of laws in which the "lower" level theories "support" the "higher."[74] This

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[72]Ibid., p. 165.

[73]Ibid., p. 164.

[74]Dilthey could not know of the phenomena of "emergence" which has induced some contemporary philosophers to question the hierarchy of physical science. See Ernest Nagel, "The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences," Robert C. Stauffer, Science and Civilization (Madison, Wis., 1949); and Abraham Edel, "The Concept of Levels in Social Theory," Llewellyn Gross, Symposium on Sociological Theory (White Plains, N.Y., 1959).

cannot be done in the social sciences wherein the units and components

of theory are mutually interdependent. For example, the most abstract

political theory often contains a programmatic or "ideological" element

of particular relevance to a given political situation.[75] This conclu-

sion required Dilthey to reject Comte's idea of the hierarchy of the

sciences, or studies of man.

Until now we have not discussed collective terms in social science,

e.g., nations, cultures, etc., Before examining Dilthey's approach to

those matters we should look at Wilhelm Windelband and his great dis-

ciple, Heinrich Rickert of the Baden School. Their distinction between

Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften appeared as the chief rival

to Dilthey's teaching. Windelband (1848-1915) began the dispute in 1884

in an address at Strassburg entitled Geschichte u. Naturwissenschaft. In

it he attacked the idea that the distinction can be made to rest upon a

difference in subject matter, arguing that historical or cultural discip-

lines necessarily involve substantial elements of the physical universe,

e.g., geography, climate, etc. Unlike Dilthey, Windelband proposed a

distinction resting upon two different methods of inquiry, the nomothetic

and the idiographic.

A subject can be studied either with the intention of establishing

general principles or laws (nomothethic method), or of describing (usually

minutely) individual facts (idiographic). This purely formal division

cuts across any which might be based on the nature of phenomena. "Nature"

and "history" become whatever is studied by the natural and historical

methods.

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[75]See my previous remarks concerning Hegel and the sociology of
knowledge.

"Nature" is defined as whatever can be studied nomothethically,
and "history" as whatever can be studied idiographically; and so
we find that nature and history are coextensive, and that every
fact is in one aspect material for natural science, and in an-
other aspect material for history.[76]

Natural science has no interest in individuals, change, or movement; it
seeks the general--the lawful or regular--and change, insofar as it can
be given a "changeless" statement. Windelband did not contend that in
practice history must become "a gallery of disconnected portraits," for
connections and causes will have to be traced; but this should be done
after the fashion of previous historians and not on the basis of some
new science (such as Dilthey's psychology).

Windelband's position was developed and systematized by Heinrich
Rickert (1863-1936), an associate of Max Weber, and it was through the
writings of Rickert that the nomothethic-idiographic distinction impress-
ed itself most forcefully on the next generation of German sociologists.[77]
Windelband had used both the formal criterion discussed above and a second
argument based upon the idea that history involves the study of value
while natural science has no concern with it. Rickert maintained both,
but he placed greater emphasis upon the latter, and for our purposes here
his argument can be discussed as it presents the problem of historical
selection. He clearly perceived that any decision to single out for study
this or that event or period required that it be valued for some meaning;

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[76]Hodges, pp. 226-7.

[77]"Rickert's study Ueber die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen
Begriffsbildung has exerted a considerable influence on Weber in clarify-
ing his methodological approach towards the problems of the social
sciences.", J. P. Mayer, Max Weber and German Politics (London, 1956),
p. 38. That volume has not yet been translated into English, but a
shorter essay, Kulturwissenschaft u. Naturwissenschaft (1898) is avail-
able as Science and History (New York, 1962).

but he firmly rejected the argument that this selection can only be an entirely subjective, personal judgment of the historian. History itself can provide an immanent criterion in the actual values of the actors themselves. Of course the welter of events exhibits a multiplicity of value systems, often in conflict, but the historian should have no difficulty in perceiving that, for example, the French Revolution was an event of importance. It is not the business of the historian, qua historian, to choose between Robespierre and Burke, but rather to recognize in their diverse attitudes toward the event the common significance each attributes.

By directing the hisforian's attention toward generally shared values, the accusation of subjective, even eccentric, choice can be answered.

> The aim of the scientific historian is to avoid this subjectivity, and it can only be achieved if the value-standards which he employs are generally recognized throughout his own society, and over considerable periods of time, not necessarily to be obvious and ineluctable, but at least to be such as a reasonable man may fairly entertain. Such standards are to be found in the general cultural tradition of a civilization.[78]

Rickert puts the argument this way:

> The fact that cultural values are universal in this sense is what keeps concept-formation in the historical sciences from being altogether arbitrary and thus constitutes the primary basis of its "objectivity." What is historically essential must be important not only for this or that particular historian, but for all. To be sure, in the concept of historical objectivity there is still a problem from the standpoint of philosophy. However, we can disregard it in this connection. Here we are concerned only with the empirical objectivity of history, i.e., with the question whether the historian confines himself exclusively to the sphere of the factual, and in this regard it must be clear that empirical objectivity is secured in principle also with regard to the universality of cultural values. That certain goods within a cultural community are universally valued or that the members of the community are expected to promote and preserve whatever embodies these values and

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[78]Hodges, p. 243.

thereby to further culture is a _fact_ that can be established just as well as any other fact, and this is enough to satisfy the historian.[79]

History must be concerned with the general insofar as it is to be guided by generally accepted values; "Nevertheless, the essential antithesis between the generalizing procedure of the natural sciences and the individualizing procedure of history remains unaffected."[80] This line of argument will be familiar to social scientists from the methodological writings of Max Weber, especially the essay "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy."[81]

Dilthey answered the Baden School in a series of essays culminating in his posthumously edited _Critique of Historical Reason_. He repeated his belief in the consciousness, the mental life, as the basis of the distinction between natural science and history, and proceeded to draw a further distinction between physical facts as they exist "naturally" and as they are brought into being by mental activity. In their latter state the physical facts are expressions of life: "They proceed from life and are themselves an incident in its development; their structural affinities reach out beyond them into the past and the future, and their whole es-

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[79] Rickert, _Science and History_, pp. 97-8.

[80] _Ibid._, p. 98. Rickert continued to combine the two distinctions of method and value into a typology of science: (1) non-valuing and generalizing (physics); (2) non-valuing and individualizing (biology, geology); (3) valuing and generalizing (sociology, economics); and (4) valuing and individualizing (history).

[81] In Max Weber, _The Methodology of the Social Sciences_ (Glencoe, Ill., 1949). The two other essays in this collection are also pertinent. For an unusually comprehensive treatment of this subject from the standpoint of "scientific value relativism" see Arnold Brecht, _Political Theory_ (Princeton, 1959), particularly pp. 215-31. The degree of Weber's indebtedness to Rickert is the subject of some disagreement.

sence as data for historical knowledge lies just in this their reference beyond themselves."[82] Dilthey sometimes referred to these expressions or "objectifications" of mind by the Hegelian phrase <u>objecktiver Geist</u>, but he explicitly dissociates himself from Hegel's meaning.

When he mentions these objectifications Dilthey emphasized their dynamism: "The reality expressed in them is an active reality, a living, changing process."[83] This recognition recalls our earlier point of difference between Dilthey and Bergson, i.e., the latter's belief that conceptual thinking could not reach or express the flux of experience. Dilthey distinguished between the self-identity of a concept, <u>qua</u> its nature and function as concept, and variability of the <u>content</u> of a concept. We must indeed be wary of devising concepts which represent their content statically, but it <u>need not</u> be the case that they do so. "It is the business of the human studies, since their object is a ceaseless process, to develop concepts of process and activity, and no concept which does not express this should be allowed in the human studies at all."[84] Interestingly enough, in the work of a philosopher of culture or history Dilthey compared this task to that of those mathematical disciplines which seek to express change.

To assert that history must be examined by dynamic concepts is a long way from accomplishing that task, or even from showing us how it might be approached. It cannot be our task to detail the means by which Dilthey constructs an entire historiography from this point, but we should

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[82]Hodges, p. 263.

[83]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 265.

[84]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 266.

proceed far enough to see how his idea of a "dynamic system" stood as a

reply to the philosophers of the Baden School, and leads eventually back

to the doctrine of Verstehen.

The process of life, he began, is composed of related experiences:

"Each particular experience is referred to a self of which it is a part;

by virtue of structure it is bound up with other parts into a system."[85]

As with "order," the dynamic system (Wirkungszusammenhang) arises from

experience. It is "contained in its enduring products," but is not to

be regarded as "completed" for this would entail capitulation to static

concepts. A "Wirkung" means "the process whereby any fact or event exerts

influence" within life; motives, perceptions, simple or complex processes

which lead to others may be considered Wirkungen. These are in some

sense causal processes, but as is clear from our previous discussion,

Dilthey insisted upon a distinctive form of causality (non-mechanical,

value selecting) within the historical realm.

The individual may be considered to constitute a Wirkungzusammenhang,

though in broader perspective, "The individual is the point of inter-

section of various cultural systems, and a member of various societies,

each of which is a 'permanent vehicle of activity,' and has within it-

self 'communal goods, and rules to regulate their realization,'"[86] In-

dividuals, societies and cultures together constitute even broader

Wirkungzusammenhang, such as notions. These are the stuff of history,

as they unfold or develop through the temporal order.

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[85]Quoted in Hodges, Ibid., p.a271.

[86]Ibid., p. 268.

The historical world is a whole composed of lesser wholes, a
dynamic system whose parts are also dynamic systems, and the
human studies are all to be conceived as singling out particu-
lar dynamic systems within the all-embracing whole for closer
study. We can thus single out individuals, ourselves or others;
or we can fix upon some historical process, e.g., the change in
German literature from the Aufklarung period to what followed,
and anlyze the factors contributing to it; or we can start with
one of the objectifications of mind, "works which set loose from
their creator, bear their own life and law in themselves," and
proceed to understand it and the sources from which it came.[87]

At this point we can raise the question of selection, to which

Rickert addressed his considerable efforts, and inquiry of Dilthey how

he would identify a supra-individual entity? His answer is that the

principle of selection is immanent in the events of history themselves,

for every dynamic system is also a meaning-system (Bedeutungzusammenhang);

unity lies in the single value pursued, realized or destroyed, and in the

relation between means and ends themselves.

Rickert too believed in the immanence of historical criteria and

sought to avoid the skeptical consequences of subjectivism by distin-

guishing between the values of the historian and those of the historical

actor. Dilthey viewed society (or supra-individual entities) as the means

by which the individual mind realizes its possibilities, and the histor-

ian may apply to these larger systems the same categories as to the in-

dividual mind. But may we proceed to apply these categories in the same

fashion in both cases? What is the social or collective equivalent of

the individual? As Dilthey asked, "Certainly all is interaction of mental

units, but along what road do we find mind, where individual mind is not?"[88]

His answer is found in the common elements of any structural system:

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[87] Ibid., p. 269.

[88] Ibid., p. 289.

> For because each individual is in himself a structural whole,
> this experience which he shares with other members of his system
> will, in obedience to the law of mental structure, either be or
> give rise to, a movement of his will towards the future; and as
> this movement arises in every member of the system, it must
> appear in the system as a whole, which may therefore be said
> in a certain sense, to entertain purposes and realize ends.[89]

The more inclusive dynamic systems are man writ large.

When therefore we speak of the "purpose" or "spirit" of a dynamic

system, or of the historical period of which it is a part, we are cer-

tainly speaking metaphorically, but, "in a certain sense," literally also.

Because of the link to human agency we may also speak of understanding

a dynamic system or a historical period; we grasp its meaning. There is,

however, no meaning in history as a whole—no trend, overall movement, or

emergent value pattern in the totality; and this denial distinguishes

Dilthey from Rickert, Comte, and Hegel.

Unquestionably, Dilthey made a great contribution to the understand-

ing of history and those methods appropriate to its study. He did not,

however, perform a comparable service to the social sciences (with the

possible exception of psychology) and was, indeed, hostile to them inso-

far as they were conceived in a Comtian sense. It was Georg Simmel who

undertook to establish the special social sciences, and particularly

sociology, on a basis complementary to but distinct from history. Simmel's

work, and to a greater extent Max Weber's, demonstrates the convergence of

several streams of historical and philosophical thought, but both men pro-

ceed from a commitment to a distinct, sociological perspective; they are

no longer historians or philosophers reflecting upon society but social

scientists formulating a discipline.

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[89]Ibid., p. 290.

One cannot help approach the work of Georg Simmel with some trep-
idation.[90] It is not only that he wrote as a philosopher and historian
as well as a sociologist that is disturbing, but the peculiarly elusive
quality of his work is more difficult still. This quality is remarked
upon by almost every one of his commentators, though they characterize
it variously. To his opponents he is superficial, unclear, unsystematic,
inconsistent, even "artistic" in the pejorative sense of that term. His
admirers speak of his brilliance, versatility, perception, and artistry.
If these assessments can be said to meet at all, it must be on the ground
that Simmel was an unusually perceptive observer of society who preferred
to express his thought in a form of discourse we might call "philosophical"
if by that word we also understand a distaste for the systematic.

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[90]The literature on Simmel has increased markedly in recent years;
although the only extensive collection of his work is still Kurt Wolff,
The Sociology of Georg Simmel (Glencoe, Ill., 1950), additional fragments
and essays are now available. In 1955 two new translations, one by Wolff
and the other by Reinhard Bendix appeared as: Georg Simmel, Conflict and
the Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe, Ill., 1955); four years later
Wolff edited a collection of critical essays plus translations entitled,
Georg Simmel, 1858-1918 (Columbus, Ohio, 1959); Nicholas Spykman's The
Social Theory of Georg Simmel (Chicago, 1925), long the definitive com-
mentary, must now make room for Rudolph Weingartner's thorough Experience
and Culture: The Philosophy of Georg Simmel (Middletown, Conn., 1962).
As is indicated by the respective titles, Weingartner is less concerned
with the purely sociological writings of Simmel. More general treatments
will be found in many of those volumes cited above, notably Aron, Mandel-
baum, Collingwood, and Rotenstreich. Theodore Abel's Systematic Sociology
in Germany (New York, 1929), is helpful, but I am not certain that his
treatment of the important form/content dichotomy is adequate. The May,
1958 edition of American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXIII, No. 6, is a
memorial issue dedicated to Durkheim and Simmel, and contains some essays
of interest, though overall it disappoints. Finally, mention should be
made of Lewis Coser's The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.,
1956), an attempt to reformulate some of Simmel's propositions in the
light of contemporary findings of political science and sociology. Use-
ful bibliographical compilations will be found in Weingartner and Wolff,
The Sociology.

Our interest in Simmel is two-fold: first, in his enunciation of a

purely formal sociology, and second, in the influence he exerted on Arthur

Bentley, as we have previously observed. But in order to intelligently

present his sociology and provide some idea of his relation to his con-

temporaries, particularly Dilthey, we must at least glance at his ideas

of "life" and history.

Simmel's philosophy is concerned with reconciling two classical

polarities, being and becoming, and the one and the many.

> In the structure of Simmel's attitude, the poles of becoming and
> the many have precedence. The traits of the world which seem to
> impress him the most profoundly are its changeability and its
> multiplicity. The pre-philosophical mind of Simmel sees the
> world as a flux. Nothing is, nothing is still; everything moves
> continuously. Yet, though all is in flux, what appears is not
> a single homogeneous, viscous stream flowing at an unvarying
> pace. On the contrary, there is an attractive shimmering of a
> myriad different qualities; for the fleeting moment that they can
> be discerned, not one seems like another. Nor is the pace of the
> flow measured and even. It is marked by a rhythm of great ir-
> regularity.[91]

But this is not the totality of Simmel's vision.

> Pitted against Simmel's vision of the instability and particularity
> of things is the requirement of fixity and unity. As a flux, the
> world is unknowable and uninhabitable. Without stability and rest,
> without order and structure, without being and the one, there is
> no objectivity.[92]

To place emphasis on the flux in Simmel's philosophy is to call

attention to the tradition of Hegel, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Dilthey, as

it tried to deal with the phenomenon of change. Change appeared as an

especially acute problem to Bergson and Simmel, although each chose a dif-

ferent coordinate for special attention. Matthew Lippman has suggested

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[91]Weingartner, p. 183.

[92]Ibid.

that while Bergson was fascinated by <u>time</u> and the movement of the ob-
served, Simmel is absorbed with <u>space</u> and the stability of an object.
"Bergson contemplates duration as an observer, standing idly on a bank,
might watch a river sweep by: the observer is more or less fixed, the
object flows on. Simmel views it as one might examine a cathedral:
while one walks outside it, around it, within it, or looks down upon
it, it evolves."[93] Dynamism for Simmel is found in the observer's vary-
ing perspectives; the object exists as a condition of "infinitely varied
experiences." "Individuality is a characteristic of the experiential
transaction involving subject and object, although usually, in our con-
fusion, we attribute it now to the one component, now to the other."[94]

The "flux" of which Weingartner speaks is the flux of experience;
while Simmel admits the existence of <u>an object</u> of which we gain experience,
"there is a tendency in Simmel to permit the object to become remote, a
kind of Kantian <u>Ding an sich,</u> whereas the real objects of knowledge be-
come the structured relationships of our experience."[95] But are there
such relationships in our experience? Laying aside for the moment the
distinct viewpoints of time and space, the agonizing question each anal-
ysis poses is of how to find ways, "to decipher the rhythm of the flux
and to distinguish phases of relative rest without denying its unceasing
motion. There must be room for similarities, relatedness, and structure—
without a repudiation of the conviction that the world is rich and var-
iegated."[96] This is nothing else than the question to which Parmenides

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[93]Matthew Lippman, "Some Aspects of Simmel's Conception of the In-
dividual," Kurt Wolff, <u>Georg Simmel: 1858-1918</u> (Columbus, Ohio, 1959),
p. 121.

[94]<u>Ibid.</u>

[95]Lipman, p. 121. There is also, as with Kant, epistemological dualism.

[96]Weingartner, p. 183.

and Heraclitus gave their opposing answers, but the intervening centuries had precluded acceptance of either alternative. For Simmel, at least, the craftsman must work with both permanence and change, and the task becomes--in Weingartner's words--"that of a sculptor who attempts to mold statues in a medium that is always on the point of melting."

While he is not, strictly speaking, a "life" philosopher like Nietzsche or Bergson, neither is he adequately described as a neo-Kantian, nor yet as a pragmatist. Simmel remains one of those intriguing figures (Karl Mannheim is another) who stand at the crossroads of philosophy and seem to face in a number of directions. He has been mentioned at various times as a member of all three schools, but no single school confines him.[97] It is as well to begin with his conception of life, as with any more formal part of his philosophy.

Life, to Simmel, is motion and process continually pushing beyond itself. Like Bergson, he distinguished living from non-living phenomena by the continuousness of the former and the discontinuousness of the latter. Continuousness in time means that any "moment" somehow "contains" small segments of both past and future. In physical nature we speak of a "present" that is neither past nor future. This continuous process which is life, pulse, energy, and movement "creates" and brings into being what Simmel calls "more-life"; but it also creates the "more-than-life," or phenomena which are set off (set free) from itself. The phenomena of more-than-life cannot be defined in terms of processes, for though they are the "products" of life, they have attained an independent, objective status which "confronts" life's processes as external structures. In this

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[97]Nicholas Spykman lists Hegel, Kant, Nietzsche, Bergson, and the pragmatists as sympathetic on one or more points, pp. 4-6.

confrontation with life, the more-than-life (which Simmel, following Hegel, sometimes called "objective spirit"), is re-assimilated into experience through selective perception.

Readers familiar with the Hegelian and Marxian doctrines of alienation will recognize the germs of a similar line of thought in Simmel, but we cannot consider them here.[98] We must proceed to what is perhaps the most important part of Simmel's philosophy, at least for the elaboration of his sociology, the form-content distinction. A little earlier Simmel's key problem, that of understanding change, was presented in the context of its appearance to Dilthey and particularly to Bergson. The following rather lengthy quotation from Spykman introduces the notion of "form" and indicates the manner in which Simmel sought to escape the same dilemma:

> Life as process, continuous and essentially dynamic, creates the non-temporal forms, discrete and essentially static. These forms, once created, confront life, obstruct its free, unhampered flow, and try to shape it according to their norms. Out of this tension life's eternal dialectic is born. The processes of life create forms and embody themselves in structures. The forms of life, although the product of its processes, yet limit and define them. But life eternally transcends its self-created forms in order to find embodiment in new and better forms. These successive discrete forms direct and modify the ceaseless flow of life until, no longer capable of giving it adequate expression, they are superseded in turn by other forms. This is the eternal dialectic inherent in life itself. For life is not only a continuous process and, as such, relative in relation to the forms and structures; it is also, as process, at the same time creator of these forms and therefore more than either.[99]

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[98]Weingartner, note, pp. 83-4; and the remarks of Kaspar D. Naegele, "Attachment and Alienation: Complementary Aspects of the Work of Durkheim and Simmel," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXIII, No. 6, May, 1958. See also the interpretations of the "philosophical Marx" in Eric Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York, 1961); Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge, Eng., 1961); and the rebuttal by Sidney Hook, "New Introduction," From Hegel to Marx (Ann Arbor, 1962). Daniel Bell's "Two Roads from Marx," The End of Ideology (New York, 1961) is a useful introduction to this argument.

[99]Spykman, p. 20.

Form can be viewed as a "circumference" within which content "merges
Into a unity." It lends the feeling of coherence (Bundigkeit) through
the establishment of relationships. Life and experience are always a
combination, a unity of form and content; there may be motion, but it
must be something that is moving. Need or dissatisfaction causes men to
differentiate elements out of the unity, and the kinds of choices which
are made are the consequence of our own prior stream of life experiences.
Need is a guide to those differentiations we make, and to the kind of per-
ceptions we select; in this ordering of experience the split between ob-
server and observed occurs. When this has happened, there is no longer
any possibility of exhaustively determining the number or nature of the
splits that can occur in different men at different times.

Simmel's use of form must not be confused with either the Platonic
conception of ideal forms or the Kantian a priori. Simmel does seem to
use the terms "concept" and "a priori" as alternatives to "form"; but for
him, like Dilthey and unlike Kant, the ordering principles dwell in ex-
perience and are thus subject to change.[100] We may speak of "world forms"
such as religion, art, or philosophy, but Simmel, remaining a pluralist,
insisted that they cannot meet and there can be no "world of worlds."
Form is a kind of perspective, but even as perspective it is capable of
exercising constraint. "Reality" is the most important world form to the
life process. It is psychological rather than ontological.

This discussion of the form-content dichotomy has indicated, on a
philosophical level, the direction in which Simmel proceeded; but we are
still some distance from seeing its use as a sociological tool. To reach

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[100]Weingartner, pp. 58-60. He suggests at an earlier point that
Husserl's distinction between "quality" and "material" might be an ana-
logue.

that point we must examine his idea of history, and particularly his use of the _Verstehen_ concept in relation to history. Simmel did not follow Dilthey in distinguishing natural from cultural or historical science on this basis, nor did he treat _Verstehen_ simply as a method. Instead it appears solely as an event, an experience of the bringing together of two contents. Dilthey's conception of "inner" selves conducting some kind of exchange was too mechanistic for Simmel, to whom the operation was a way of perceiving a "thou." "_Verstehen_ is the function; the thou is the substance. Both are the same, differently expressed."[101]

This brings us back to the familiar problem we have seen emerge before; how does one construct a unit in history without losing the sense of flow, continuity, and relatedness? Simmel frankly admitted that the creation of a character is circular, in that we employ our knowledge of particular contents to construct a whole which, in turn, is made to hold the particulars together. In practice we proceed to modify our character as new attributes are discovered, but this does not remove the implications of relativism contained in the admission of the "creative" role of the historian. We seem to require a single character to "contain" the narrative, and that character lends ultimate coherence to the particular contents from which it is composed. These contents, however, do not "point beyond themselves," as both Rickert and Dilthey thought they could be made to do.

Simmel saw quite clearly that the Nineteenth century had produced at least one philosophy of history with a sociological orientation, that which we now call encyclopaedic sociology, but he was also sure that this is not

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[101]_Ibid._, p. 109.

yet a well grounded social science, in part because of its historical elements. History must concern itself with the particular contents; and as such it must retain, in some fundamental sense, a commitment to uniqueness. Various special social sciences select contents on the basis of their subject matter, economics, jurisprudence, etc., and may attempt to generalize about them. What does this leave for "sociology," except the role of the all-encompassing master social science? But this alternative was ruled out by Simmel's perspectivism which denied the possibility of knowledge of the whole. His answer was that sociology, per se, must study the forms of sociation, abstracted from their content.

We have already seen how life, or experience, appeared to Simmel as movement and process, and it should seem natural that he apprehends the nature of society as "interaction." The strong note of nominalism that persists in Simmel's social theory must not be forgotten; society is sociation. Men come together with other men in behaviors that, studied over time, yield regularities or patterns. Frequency of occurrence is one criterion by which we may gain our ideas of unity, but it is not adequate to view them completely from the "outside." He seems to feel that sociation required some degree of awareness on the actor's part that he is taking part in a unity.[102] "Conflict," for example, must be interpreted as a state of mind and not simply as a behavior pattern.

But such considerations are not, for Simmel, the province of a formal sociology, nor should they be interpreted to indicate a belief in some variant of instinct or drive theory of motivation. He was very critical of such concepts, first because they were not explanatory, and second

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[102]F. H. Tenbruck, "Formal Sociology," Wolff, Georg Simmel, p. 69; Abel, p. 32.

because they implied some sort of discrete states of consciousness--ideas at variance with the manner in which he conceived life and experience. Instead he suggested that motivation be thought of as activity which, beginning in nerve enervations, has the psychic consequences of volition.[103] With this reservation, however, we must recognize that to Simmel a distinct part of the unity of sociation (i.e., when certain components "are in a more intimate interchange of energies with one another than with any outside agent"), is reciprocal influence.[104] Such matters are the province of psychology, social psychology (a field Simmel viewed with some suspicion), or physical science, but cannot be treated by formal sociology.

It is perhaps time to offer some examples of form and content as they occur on the sociological level. Content is the simpler idea, if only because it is so inclusive; Simmel described content in these words:

> Content may be of an objective kind, the production of a work, the progress of the mechanical arts, the domination of an idea, the success or failure of a political combination, the development of language, of customs, etc., or it may be of a subjective nature and concern the innumerable sides of personality which through socialization find stimulus, satisfaction and development, now towards a refinement, now towards a deterioration of morals.[105]

Elsewhere, Simmel referred to it as the "body" or "material" of the social process. "In short, it is the totality of material and non-material culture and of cultural activities that Simmel designates by the term content."[106] Forms are classifiable under various headings, but the following list is representative: slavery, law, honor, the stranger, the teacher, the family, political parties, hierarchy, stability, conflict, and subordination.

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[103]Weingartner, pp. 19-20.

[104]Spykman, pp. 26-7.

[105]Quoted in Abel, p. 21.

[106]Ibid.

It is now possible to give more concrete meaning to the relationship of the two: for example, the decision of disaffected members of a political community might result in a decision to form an opposition political party. Given a certain measure of success in recruitment they might make the further determination to introduce some elements of hierarchical organization. The resulting stratification, particularly the creation of a leadership group with values and perceptions different from the rank and file, might inhibit militancy, or at least alter original programmatic goals. This would be an instance of the form exercising a constraint upon the content; for while it would be nonsense to try to envision the hierarchy as "existing" without the members of the party, or to contend that human agents were absolutely incapable of effecting change, it would be a comparable folly to ignore the fact that so long as the hierarchy persisted, certain kinds of organization would be necessarily precluded.

To "abstract" form in this manner is to engage in an imaginative act, or, as F. H. Tenbruck has phrased it, we abstract not from the phenomena of content but from its perspective. "'Abstracting' must be understood in the radical sense of extracting from reality or extricating from reality something which is not a directly observable and common element in it."[107] This interpretation, which takes Simmel's distinction as more of an analogy than a well-honed analytic tool, seems well suited to extract the best from the temper and spirit of the man's work.

Simmel sometimes speaks of the forms as akin to geometrical forms, sometimes as artistic forms, and later in life he drew occasional organic

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[107]Tenbruck, p. 75.

analogies. As noted above, the dimension of space was very important to

Simmel's thought and on the whole, the geometrical sense probably domin-

ates. E. V. Walter argues that the organic analogue appears more prom-

inently in his discussions of historical materials (content, unique),

while geometrical and, interestingly enough, architectural terms (e.g.,

pyramid, sphere, apex, etc.) dominate the sociological. Walter is led

to criticize the Bendix translation of "Die Kreuzung Sozialer Kreise"

as "The Web of Group Affiliations"; a literal rendering would be the

"intersection of social circles."[108]

> On the contrary, an accurate rendering of Simmel's thought would
> convey that a "web" stretches out and connects, whereas a "circle"
> closes off and excludes. Simmel's sociological constructs are not
> clusters of organismic tissues but architectonic structures, and
> his "circles" are closed perimeters which separate one area from
> another. His social forms are not expressions of organismic vi-
> tality but mechanical structural devices which place limits on life
> to keep its fluctuating elements under control, and there is no
> point in imposing organismic prejudices on an architectonic system.[109]

The great weakness of the geometric analogy is that the forms are never

exactly the same since the contents must vary. The sociologist's problem

might be compared to that of a geometrician who is asked to analyze a

crudely drawn figure by a theorem, but even in this analogue, the proof

could be assumed to be correct even if the figure were imperfect; "The

sociologists, however, may not make the corresponding assumption; the

isolation of truly pure sociation out of the complex total phenomenon

cannot be forced by logical means."[110]

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[108]Simmel, The Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe, Ill., 1955), trans-
lator's note, p. 125. Bendix regards the literal phrase as "almost mean-
ingless."

[109]Ibid., p. 153.

[110]Simmel, "The Problem of Sociology," Wolff, Georg Simmel, p. 324.

Simmel proposed what he called the "method of causal resolution" as the means to achieve that isolation. It is to be contrasted to three other methods: empiricism and observation; formulation of epochal configurations; and systematic conceptualization of variables within an empirical system.[111]

> In the method of causal resolution, by contrast, the course of inquiry is not determined by the elaboration of techniques to be executed, by the interrelation of phenomenon with all the other phenomena in some integral whole, or by the application of universally valid analytic concepts. The course of inquiry depends, rather, on the particular perspective and interests of the investigator, and on the cause or causes of whatever he happens to isolate as a problem. . . . A phenomenon may be studied in order to learn what changes in the preceding situation brought it into being; or of what "material" it is composed, or what end or function it serves, or what comprises its form or essence.[112]

Simmel's own interests lay primarily in the last, but the point of particular interest here is his mention of the purposes of the investigator. This conception, so similar to Rickert's "values," Simmel combined with a conviction that regularities did, in fact, exist as frequencies of occurrence. Max Weber's belief in a value-free social science, for which he was certainly indebted to Rickert, contains Simmelian elements also, particularly in the probability aspects of the ideal type.

Weber spoke of "tendencies toward," for example, community, and the ideal type could be given a statistical statement as the probability that this or that social form will emerge given particular "contents."[113]

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[111]Donald Levine, "The Structure of Simmel's Social Thought," Wolff, Georg Simmel, pp. 24-5.

[112]Ibid., p. 25.

[113]The literature on the ideal type is voluminous. Weber's discussions may be found in the essay "'Objectivity' in Social Science," Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), and "The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology," Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glencoe, Ill., 1947). See also the commentaries of Abel, Systematic Sociology; Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual

Weber's procedure resembles the "method of causal resolution" in its combination of empirical and conceptual elements. "The mutual dependence of the Ideal Type of facts and of the facts on the Ideal Type is one of the chief innovations of Weber's theory."[114]

It is, certainly, an "innovation," but not without parallels to formal sociology; Nathan Rotenstreich has given us a cogent analysis of the means of "separation" or "abstraction" employed by the two approaches:

> In formal sociology the separated element is arrived at through an abstraction from the material context, such as the forms of rule and obedience, and establishes itself as an independent domain, that is to say as the sociological domain proper. In this theory there is a clear-cut distinction between the material-historical domain and the formal-sociological. Weber's system does not offer a clear-cut -duality of this kind, however, but rather a comparison. This feature is methodologically expressed in the emphasis on the one trait of the given historical phenomenon, by way of which sociological concepts qua Ideal Types are formed. The Ideal Type is meaning only; the historical contents are both facts and meanings. The stress is not on the formal elements but on the meaningful one which is inherent in the facts themselves. The formal element as formal is merely constructed; the meaningful element is separated from its full context and is not sheer construction. Weber's position has a rather nominalistic touch, whereas formal sociology has in a way a more realistic bias. This difference accounts for a further one: Formal sociology stresses the clear-cut difference between the material and the formal, while the theory of the Ideal Type has rather to recognize the gradual transition from what is both fact and meaning to what is meaning only.[115]

The ideal typical approach stresses meaning and tendency rather than form, and thus it does not envision a structural "level" or stage "above" that of action. "We do not therefore find in Weber's system what is as a matter of fact the central sociological category, i.e., the category of a

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Portrait (Garden City, N. Y., 1962); Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, Ill., 1949); and Don Martindale, "Theory and Ideal Type," Llewellyn Gross, Symposium on Sociological Theory (White Plains, N. Y., 1959).

[114]Rotenstreich, p. 170.

[115]Ibid., pp. 174-5.

social framework."[116]

For both the ideal type and formal analysis the sociological datum is historical, but where the former finds meaningfulness of action, the distinctive element for social science, the latter proposes to extract the formal component. As we have seen above, Simmel knew what we would now speak of as an interaction within an action system of ego and alter, in which communication results in mutual modification of behavior, motives, purposes, etc. (indeed, he discussed Verstehen at some length), but he did not regard such a model as sociological. What is sociologically relevant in interaction was not to be discovered in analysis of individuals. Not only would that attempt introduce content into formal sociology, but Simmel did not believe such a conceptualization capable of explaining the persistence of society.

Hugh Duncan raised this point in terms of a communications model, and he located the nexus of the difficulty in the question of whether we should view the individual or the role as sociological datum. Interaction in a physical field requires the location of points or agents "which are internally modified by, and in turn modifiers of, the process which affects them."[117] Can the problem be solved by divesting the individual of his capacity to communicate intelligibly, by replacing his "depth" with concepts of role or status which are not predicates of himself? Park and Burgess, writing in 1926, were aware of the alternatives, but they permitted "interaction" to remain mechanistic. For them,

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[116]Ibid., p. 177.

[117]Hugh Dalziel Duncan, "Simmel's Image of Society," Wolff, Georg Simmel, pp. 112-3.

. . . interaction became process, and processes such as imitation and suggestion were but "mechanisms of interaction." Simmel's "being for, with, and against one another" was transformed into "social forces," such as competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation.[118]

As Duncan observes, this question plagued Freud, Dewey, and G. H. Mead who saw that if mind is social it must arise in communication, but "communication cannot be a process which somehow passes through one individual to another, for in such passage the individual is meaningless."[119] We may choose to talk about roles, but they must be internalized before they can affect behavior.[120]

The difference between interaction and process conceptions has been generally overlooked by social scientists. One of the exceptions is a monograph written in 1909 by Philip Jacobs which discerned three answers to the question, "What is Society?": (1) A unity, either mechanistic or organic; (2) An aggregation of groups; (3) "A social process, a constantly changing equilibrium."[121] For our purposes the first conception is of minor interest; Schaffle, Paul Barth, and Ferdinand Tonnies are examples of a belief in the existential unity of society.

The distinction between conceptions of society as an aggregation of groups and as a social process is much more important. Jacobs suggested

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[118]Ibid., p. 113.

[119]Ibid., p. 114.

[120]The other side of this contention is presented by Mulford Q. Sibley: "It has frequently been charged that the behavioralist is not fully aware that classifications of political behavior must be in terms of concepts which are meaningful to the agent as well as to the observer.", "The Limitations of Behavioralism," James C. Charlesworth, The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science (Philadelphia, 1962), p. 78. The reader will recognize the relation of warnings of this kind to the works of Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert, discussed above.

[121]Philip P. Jacobs, German Sociology (New York, 1909), pp. 30-1.

Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838-1909) as perhaps the prime example of the group

theory approach. Gumplowicz presented a comparatively narrow notion of

society as groups of varying permanence which are formed about interests.

There interests are mutually antagonistic, and it is through struggle and

conflict that the groups are formed and develop. Society is at any one

time, a kaleidoscope of such groupings (it is hardly possible to speak of

permanence in relation to these alliances); each striving for mastery over

the others. The state, in this view, represents the organized control of

the minority over the majority.[122] An Austrian, Gumplowicz was deeply im-

pressed by racial and cultural units as a basis of societal division, and

Der Rassenkampf was perhaps his clearest statement of this thesis. This

emphasis on struggle led him into a denumciation of the organic (in our

present terms, the "unity") metaphor, especially as presented by Schaffle

and Lilienfeld: "Social science can never 'obtain a basis as real as that

of natural science' until the fantastic view that 'society' is an 'organism'

has been thrown overboard and all biological analogies have been cleared

away."[123]

Jacobs perceived that the process conception was distinct, but he

was not very successful in elaborating it.

> It is one thing to view humanity as an accumulation or aggregation
> of groups, even if within the groups sufficient room for associa-
> tions be allowed. It is quite different to consider it as an as-
> sociation, with the fundamental element in the process being not
> the group, but the association and the interrelation fo the mem-
> bers of the groups.[124]

This is a very acute passage and it is amazing in view of his acquaintance

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[122]Compare Franz Oppenheimer, The State (Indianapolis, Ind., 1914).

[123]Ludwig Gumplowicz, The Outlines of Sociology (Philadephia, 1899],
p. 35.

[124]Jacobs, p. 31.

with Simmel that Jacobs did not press the distinction further, particu-
larly since he also saw that this third concept permitted one to hold
parts of the two prior conceptions in common. This surprise is, however,
a function of the considerable advantage of hindsight.[125]

Clearly the second sentence constitutes the cutting edge of the dis-
tinction, but it does not go far enough. If the "group" be abandoned as
the basic unit of society, and the association of even two members (for
example, "alter and ego") be taken as a substitute, we have still not
reached the ultimate reaches of the alternative. English does not pro-
vide entirely adequate tools for that ultimate expression, but we might
gain some indication by contrasting the phenomenon of "association" to
that of "associating." Bendix has remarked upon:

> /¯Max_7 Weber's tendency to treat all concepts of collectivities
> or enlarged social aggregates as convenient labels for tendencies
> of action. Wherever possible, he avoided nouns, and hence the
> "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (Whitehead), by using verbs
> or "active nouns," though there is no English equivalent for the
> latter. This approach even applied to the two terms used in the
> title, **Wirtschaft** and **Gesellschaft**. Instead of using the term
> "economy," Weber entitled a major part of his book Basic Sociolog-
> ical Categories of Economizing Activities (Soziologische Grund-
> kategorien des Wirtschaftens). And instead of "society," the
> text speaks of "societal tendencies of action" (Vergesellschaftung)[126]

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[125]Jacobs' monograph was prepared as "partial fulfillment" of an
academic requirement and consisted in large part of translation. Since
his vocational objective was apparently ecclesiastical rather than soc-
iological, his discernment appears the more remarkable.

[126]Reinhard Bendix, **Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait** (Garden City,
N. J., 1962), p. 476. In his note, p. 476, Bendix notes that Weber, by
rendering Tonnies' distinction between **Gemeinschaft** and **Gesellschaft** as
Vergemeinschaftung and Vergesellschaftung, "characterized these differ-
ent types as collectivities that emerged from given tendencies of ac-
tion rather than existing with a fixed set of attributes."

The linguistic aspects of this matter can better be treated in a later chapter, but I raise them here as an additional aid to the understanding of Jacobs' third category.

Another way to put this distinction might be to ask the reader to take the phrase "group interaction", dismiss the idea of "group," and try to imagine society (and consequently the subject matter of sociology) as the remaining "interaction." Jacobs thought that Ratzenhofer could be distinguished from Gumplowicz on this basis, and he offered the following assertion of the former in support of his contention. "Society is no cross section or average phenomenon (Durchschnittserscheinung) but a process of all individual phenomena, in which the law of human reciprocal relations is fulfilled."[127]

The introduction of Jacobs' classifications brings us to the conclusion of this review of general themes in Nineteenth century German social science. I have attempted to describe some of the principal themes in Nineteenth century German historiography and philosophy, particularly as they relate to the epistemological and methodological foundations of social science. The legacy of Kant and Hegel has been related to the development of an anti-positivist conception of meaning and relation in the Geisteswissenschaften, which presented various "idealist" answers to questions about method and units of investigation. The developing idealist interpretation of human phenomena emphasized the unique, rejected the notion of causality in the sense in which it was thought to apply to nature, and suggested the method of Verstehen as fundamental to

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[127]Ratzenhofer, quoted in Jacobs, p. 32. The task of sociology is then "To discover the fundamental tendencies of social evolution and the conditions of the general welfare of human beings.", pp. 43-4.

historical and social science.

Within the special fields of jurisprudence and economics, romanticism and the historical spirit were stressing complementary themes such as the continuity of human existence, the interdependence of its parts, and the gradualism of "development." This perspective required the rejection of "theory" (this was especially true of economics) in favor of "description," and the endorsement of an extreme particularism. Yet there was great tension among these ideas, as Ranke's thought well illustrates. In brief the problem was this: If events in the noumenal realm are unique in themselves and their interrelations with other events, and must, consequently, be studied in their particularity, how is a complete and futile nominalism to be avoided? The solution of positivism and of the empiricists, to connect events in a sequential, causal chain, had been denounced as "atomistic" and "mechanistic," but was the sole alternative to hold atoms unique but in no way related? That would have been a pyrrhic victory indeed.

The answer was to try to bring the idea of Verstehen "down" from the speculative plane, and "up" from the psychological, and adapt it to the task of describing "persons" on the historical ("periods") and the social scientific ("cultures") level.[128] This was the task Dilthey and Rickert tried to accomplish in history, and Simmel attempted for sociology. In part this is an explanation of the perplexity felt by many students of German historical thought at what seems such a confusion of nominalism and holism. In a sense, the most ponderous edifice of idealist thought can be seen "from top to bottom" as composed of unique entities or configurations (i.e., as nominalistic), but each "level" may also be considered

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[128]See Rotenstreich's remarks on history and the "sociology of culture," and Raymond Aron's discussion of Alfred Weber, German Sociology (Glencoe, Ill., 1957).

a unity of its parts, a <u>Sinnsuzamennhang</u> (holistically)—itself an element of a higher identity.[129]

However, this solution raised a host of problems turning about the immanence of these relationships as opposed to their creation by the investigator. Weber struggled manfully with this question but did not entirely escape Simmel's perspectivism. A point to be re-emphasized is the inseparability of the questions, "What is the proper method of study?" and "What is the appropriate unit of investigation?"; to employ some variant of the doctrine of "understanding" was to face the question of what it was that was to be understood, and to inquire into the latter was to discover that the prerequisite was some kind of relatedness. Dilthey's remarks about the "givenness" of the conscious unit in the human sciences as opposed to the "constructed" unit of the natural indicates his awareness of this intimate link.

The attempt to distinguish a sociological realm while remaining true to the "historical" view of life entailed that the ideas of "becoming" and "function" be exalted over their polarities "being" and "structure." Rotenstreich has expressed it this way:

> On the one hand occurrence appears as opposed to being, just as function is thought to be opposed to substance. Hence the sociological theory on this view rejects every approach to social existence which looks at society as at a static object existing independently of and beyond the historical process in its perpetual change. On the other hand the concept of occurrence or function is opposed to the concept of a self-consistent collectivity existing independently of the concrete relations between individual human beings. Society is conceived of only as the network $\underline{/}$ networking? $\underline{/}$ of the various relations between individual human beings. Thus there is no clear difference made between two sets of opposite concepts: substance versus function and collectivity versus individual human beings. The term occurrence is taken as covering both processes and individuals. In any case the idea of social substance is rejected as

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[129]Compare A. N. Whitehead's nation of "concrescence."

a legitimate sociological idea because it connotes both the status
of a being and a status of a collectivity independent of individuals.[130]

Rotenstreich continued to call this a "confusion," and referred to its

"epistemological naivete"; certainly we are not in the presence of a

"luminous clarity," but what has been said above should serve to indicate

that there are at least implicit links between the paired concepts.

The key idea is the concept of "process," as it is used to describe

the content of experience, life, and history. As Bergson, Dilthey, and

Simmel all saw, there is a tension between the movement, richness and energy

of this subject matter, and its expression in fixed, static, or substantive

concepts. If the content be conceived as process, then the question of

how such materials may be "separated" or "collected" into identities is

most urgently presented. This is not naive. Rotenstreich does indicate

a serious ambiguity when he notes that both individuals and processes tend

to be subsumed under the category of occurrence. This is again analogous

to Jacobs' distinction between "interaction" and "process" as the basic

conception of society. Naivete does not lie in the perception that the

conceptualizations of subject matter, the method appropriate to its study,

and the choice of units of investigation or observation must somehow re-

late to one another; the confusion results from failure to successfully

and consistently elaborate those relationships.

Finally we have seen how these converging efforts emerged in the dis-

tinctly sociological perspectives.[131] of Simmel and Weber, wherein two

solutions were proposed to the problem of the entanglement of life and

science, or--in more familiar terms--history and sociology. Weber's

theory has been the more important of the two, at least for contemporary

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[130]Rotenstreich, p. 140.

[131]I am aware that Rotenstreich's indictment of Weber for failing to

American sociology and political science, but we will be less interested in weighing the specific contribution of either than in tracing the absorption of elements of both.

In the following chapter we will again be concerned with Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, and with Simmel and his successors in the school of formal sociology, as they were influential in the thought of Arthur Bentley and Albion Small.

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provide a supra-historical or "sociological" referrent in his ideal type was not refuted in the text. All I mean by this phrase is that both Weber and Simmel, unlike, for instance, Dilthey, were committed to creating a distinctly sociological view of man; their measure of success is not at issue here.

Philosophy can exclude nothing. Thus it should never start from systematization. Its primary stage can be termed "assemblage."

A. N. Whitehead

We now raise the question whether there is a concept which can reveal the common structure of philosophy and politics. We believe this concept to be the idea of Prozess.

Hans Barth

CHAPTER III

TO PREPARE THE WAY: THE CRITICAL BENTLEY

Every political scientist knows that Arthur Bentley described <u>The</u> <u>Process of Government</u> as an attempt to fashion a tool. Few political scientists have noted the heading of Part One of that volume, "To Prepare the Way." On the very first page Bentley warns us that the attempt will take him far beyond the subject of government. "If in this prelim-Inary task I use many words and seem a long way from the processes of government which are my subject-matter, it is because I feel the need of making sure against misinterpretation later."[1] In the summary of the first section he describes what he has done in these words:

> I have written the preceding chapters to prepare the way for the chapters that are to follow. I have wished to make it clear why the method of interpreting society which I am about to set forth is justified, and why the irruption into it of any unassimilated factors of the kind I have been criticizing would only serve to distort it.[2]

Between these two quotations lie three chapters, entitled, respec-tively: "Feelings and Faculties as Causes"; "Ideas and Ideals as Causes"; and "Social Will." If read as a unit these chapters constitute a critical essay on causality in social science, and by extension they present a conception of what may and may not be expected of such investigation.

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[1]Arthur F. Bentley, <u>The Process of Government</u> (Evanston, Ill., 1949), p. 3.

[2]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 165.

"Preparing the way" is for Bentley in these opening chapters much more
a matter of "clearing" or even "sweeping away" a series of erroneous
practices and doctrine. The task appears to him not as a matter of hew-
ing a path through virgin land (as Freud's must have seemed to him) but
rather as that of leveling a forest of human error. The fashioning of
the tool had, at least initially, to await completion of this essentially
critical, and in that sense, negative task.

These two projects, the preparation and the fashioning, could not
ultimately be held separate, for the critique not only set forth the
limitations of social theory, but, with these established, a possible
and fruitful way forward would open.

We are given indications of the nature of Bentley's concerns in the
very first sentence: "The most common way of explaining what goes on in
society, including of course the processes of government, is in terms of
the feelings and ideas of the men who make up the society."[3] A few lines
later we read that the "old fashioned feelings and ideas which make up
the whole of interpretation much of the time" require attention "before
our real work can begin." These feelings and ideas "are irresponsible
and unmeasurable," they actually block explanation; their "false pretenses"
must be "annihilated" before any interpretation can be made. Bentley
states his intentions in such blunt terms that their very radicalism es-
capes notice. The extremism of his proposal is emphasized and not di-
mimished by this passage:

> I may say now as well as later that I have no care for the fine
> discriminations which psychological terminology draws between
> motives, feelings, desires, emotions, instincts, impulses, or
> similar mental states, elements, or qualities. If I separate

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[3]Ibid., p. 3.

such factors from ideas and ideals it is solely for convenience
in discussing two ill-defined types of social theory. It is not,
I repeat, psychic process that I am going to discuss, but social
life, which from the point of view of functional psychology appears
as content. The material is the same, but fine discriminations in
psychological terminology used as criteria for classifying the
content are not merely useless but positively harmful.[4]

Psychologists might well be offended by this sweeping disregard of
their painfully created distinctions, but this is not the most important
point. Bentley lumped all these elements together, proclaimed that they
represent the commonest means of explaining "what goes on in society,"
and then almost casually announced that it is necessary to annihilate
their pretensions! Other men may certainly have consciously set out to
accomplish similar tasks of destruction or redirection of prior thought
(e.g., Marx's proclamation that henceforth philosophy will change the
world), but it is difficult to recall one who did so without expressing
a sense of the drama and import of his intentions. One is reminded of
Thucydides' casual remark that "nothing on a great scale, in war or other
matters," had occurred prior to the Peloponnesian War.[5] For Bentley the
past contained something "on a great scale," and that was error and con-
fusion.

One might well inquire how it is that a means of explanation or in-
terpretation so common and general in application for so long could be at
the same time so wrong-headed; surely there must be a pragmatic justifica-
tion simply in endurance? Bentley met this objection immediately by pro-
posing a distinction which remains basic throughout his work: the distinc-
tion between "everyday speech" and the demands of scientific explanation.

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[4]Ibid., p. 4.

[5]Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (New York, 1951), p. 3.

For most of us all of the time, it is quite sufficient to re-
gard human beings as "persons" who possess qualities or motives
which are phases of their character and who act in accordance with
these qualities or this character, under certain conditions of life
in which they are placed. Much of the time we subordinate the con-
ditions or ignore them entirely. Indeed the greater conditions are
never known to us. . . .

We put the main weight then upon the character, or the motives,
of the actors in the social drama. A man is kind, or violent, or
careless, or "smooth," or stupid, or dishonest, or tricky, or in-
sincere, or clever, or trustworthy; or, more generally, good or
bad, wise or foolish. These are his qualities. They designate
"him." They are put forth not merely as habits of action, labeled
by us, but as his very personality. All of this in the current
life of one man, judging the others around him. Out of material
of this kind we have built up many theories of the causes of man's
activities in society.[6]

For our daily purposes, our immediate needs, such interpretations

serve us "fairly well"; if they prove mistaken in this or that instance

we revise them, "changing not their character but the proportions of their

mixture." That is, we decide that this person has a little less honesty

in proportion to his avarice than we had previously imagined. In these

respects, Bentley said, everyday speech may be adequate, but when it is

extended into the realm of science, when it seduces the unwary or uncrit-

ical investigator by encouraging an exaggerated sense of its explanatory

power, it is pernicious.

Everyday speech habits fall short of providing a basis for scientific

explanation in many ways, and it is worth our time to examine the various

arguments Bentley levels against them. The first is a logical one. Ima-

gine, he says, a situation wherein, to the cheers of onlookers, a man en-

gaged in bullying a boy is knocked down and put to flight by a stranger.

"I turn to my friend and ask: 'What made him do it? Why do they praise

him?' 'He is a big-hearted fellow,' he answers. 'It is sympathy for

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[6]Bentley, pp. 4-5.

others. He's a credit to our civilization."[7] In this form of "explana-

tion," Bentley continues, the stranger's <u>act</u> is observed, described as a

sympathetic one, and then a <u>quality</u> of sympathy is attributed to the per-

son as a motive "standing behind" the overt action. The approval of the

crowd and the choice of "sympathy" as the quality are immaterial; the act

might be disapproved and labeled malignant in a different time or place.

Bentley's point is that the "explanation" is a tautology not unlike the

argument that men always act freely because (unless physically constrained)

they "could" have acted differently.

The second objection is closely related to the first, but it takes

a more empirical turn. What, asks Bentley, does "sympathy" mean beyond

its application in this particular act? How, for example, do our friend's

sympathetic qualities direct him in the matter of child labor, human pov-

erty, or abysmal factory conditions? More generally, how can we apply

these "qualities" to the multifaceted beliefs and behavior of whole cul-

tures or civilizations? This explanation in terms of qualities breaks

down when asked to provide more general answers.

> What I wanted to know was why this particular kind of "sympathy,"
> concretely, is manifested in our social life today; why "sympathy"
> expresses itself in this form of protecting a boy who is merely
> being hectored or tormented without serious hurt.[8]

Everyday speech, when it cannot ignore this difficulty, solves it

by making numerous <u>ad hoc</u> distinctions and modifications.

> When my friend said that sympathy had moved the man to his act,
> he did, then, but restate in other words the very question I had
> asked. We cannot really put the question--put it, that is, in an
> intelligent form--without broadening it out so as to make it an
> inquiry about the existence of the particular form of sympathy
> in the particular society, manifesting itself with greater or less

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[7]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 5.

[8]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 6.

vigor through the various members of that society. We cannot avoid
the difficulty merely by positing sympathy as such, and then limit-
ing it or modifying it in special cases to correspond with external
conditions. That is the method of popular speech, but it is arbi-
trary and artificial; it uses sympathy as the hypothesis for explan-
atory purposes, and then modifies the hypothesis to meet the needs
of every particular case brought up for explanation.[9]

In this passage there is an additional criticism of careless or actually

corrupt application of this method through endlessly "distinguishing"

one's way out of difficulty, but this criticism is subordinate to the

more general contention. Qualities, unless we can get them stated in

such terms that they can distinguish among a multitude of behaviors

throughout the culture or even cross culturally, without reducing our-

selves to selective application of the quality to each particular situa-

tion, are of no use in scientific explanation.

The question to be answered is why men change their choice of actions

(for example, displays of sympathy) in various times and contexts. Qual-

ities of sentiment and feeling, even if they are not prey to the previous

objections are at present (and probably also in principle) beyond direct

observation and control.

Whenever anybody steps forward with any method by which he can
show that there actually exists at one time more of one of the
psychic qualities, the "stuff," than at any other time, it will
be perfectly legitimate to take it into account. So long as such
"stuff" is used in explanation of the forms of our social actions
on no better ground than that we assume changes in the "stuff"
from the mere fact of the changes in the modes of action, then
it is no explanation.[10]

In lieu of establishment of this measure of control, explanation in these

terms remains but rough description at the level of everyday speech.

These arguments constitute his critique of feelings and faculties as

causes, but Bentley does not permit the matter to rest with them. The

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[9]Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[10]Ibid., p. 18. Bentley leaves open the possibility that someday such
direct control of faculties and feelings might be achieved. Despite his

habits of everyday speech are not only inadequate but they inhibit devel-

opment of superior forms of explanation by two principle corollaries:

animism, and what Bentley calls the "billiard ball" notion of the social

process. Before looking at these in detail it is well to remind ourselves

that Bentley meant the phrase "feelings and faculties" to include an en-

tire range of "mentalisms," even the more respectable notion of intelli-

gence. Intelligence, just as "luck," and "original sin," promotes an

animistic, or as Bentley is later to call it, a "self-actional" idea of

causation. It emerged from the error of circularity described above,

but the emphasis of animism deepens that error by reifying the "soul

qualities."

> If we are going to infer a soul quality from the social fact and
> then use the quality to explain the fact, we put ourselves on a
> level with animists in the most savage tribes. A branch falls.
> It was the life in it or behind it that threw it down. Thunder
> peals. It is the spirit speaking.[11]

The particular virulence of animism is the encouragement it offers to

scientists and philosophers to rescue everyday speech patterns by in-

genious and subtle argument, but the hopelessness of their attempts is

apparent. Even the great empiricist Aristotle sought to account for the

institution of slavery by referring to the psychic qualities, or soul, of

the individual slave.[12] Animism, then, is both a corollary and an exten-

sion of the circularity fallacy.

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quite apparent skepticism he must not be understood to foreclose it in
principle.

[11]Ibid., p. 19.

[12]Bentley was later to locate in Aristotle's logic the root of an
even more fundamental error.

The "billiard ball" image completed this tapestry of error by pro-
viding a substantive vision of social causation. These personal qual-
ities, reified and endowed with self-actional powers, "are looked upon
as a sort of 'thing' acting among other 'things' in the social world."

> They are a sort of "stuff," different, or not different, as one
> likes, from the material "stuff" of the world, but in either case
> interacting with the latter in series of events that can be linked
> together, with each event in the series explaining the other that
> comes after it. For example, Tom sees the bully maltreating the
> boy. The bully act is there first. It knocks against Tom's
> "sympathy." The sympathy makes Tom act in a particular manner.
> The bullying is stopped by the impact. Brain states, or soul
> states, forming this "stuff"--it is all one in the practical
> explanation.[13]

Bentley was later to distinguish the self-actional from the interactional
in considerably sharper terms, and to contrast both with a "transactional"
viewpoint. It is important that we be sensitive to Bentley's use of words
like "environment," and "process" in relation to notions of causality.

Before passing on to an examination of what Bentley might call "the
errors at work," we might pause to review what he has not said. He has
not contended that no such things as feelings "exist," nor has he maintain-
ed that men do not differ in their respective intelligence and character.

> I am not insisting that there is no difference in "brain power,"
> if that phrase may be used, between men. I am not saying that such
> differences can never, in some respects at least, be taken into
> account; it would be foolish indeed to erect a verbal barricade
> against the future.[14]

It is as explanatory tools that the psychical qualities of individuals
must be found inadequate and pernicious; Bentley does not present himself
as a materialist, nor even as a debunker of the efficacy of ideas. Crit-
icism seldom strays from his central concern with any hypothesis, namely

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[13]Bentley, p. 17.

[14]Ibid., p. 15.

how adequate is it as an account of collective human behavior? This is not the point at which to begin a discussion of what Bentley thought such an account should be, but that question may profitably be kept in reserve.

Albion Small's work, especially his General Sociology (1905), provided Bentley with his first example of the misuse of psychical qualities in social analysis. This criticism is particularly interesting because General Sociology was very strongly influenced by Gustav Ratzenhofer, whom Bentley himself admired. As will emerge below, Bentley's determination to distill and salvage what he considered to be Ratzenhofer's genuine value from its accompanying dross presents in embryo an enduring dualism in his social theory. In his Preface, Small announced a proposition that Bentley must have warmly embraced:

> Our thesis is that the central line in the path of methodological progress, from Spencer to Ratzenhofer, is marked by gradual shifting of effort from analogical representation of social structures to real analysis of social processes.[15]

The idea that human association might be seen as a process, he continues, has been familiar to philosophers from the time of Hegel, "but hardly in a realistic sense."[16] For Small, the task of sociology was the study of _the_ social process, a whole rather than the fragments selected for particular analysis by more specialized social sciences. On occasion sociology and other of the sciences of man may study the same phenomena, and in these instances the difference becomes one of emphasis.[17] The terms of

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[15]Albion Small, General Sociology (Chicago, 1905), p. ix.

[16]Ibid., footnote, p. 3. Presumably it had been familiar as an "analogical representation."

[17]Thus Small accepts what Germany knew as "encyclopaedic sociology" which, with individual variations, regarded sociology as the master, generalizing discipline. In this sense, it was also the view of Comte and Spencer. See Raymond Aron, German Sociology (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), p. 1.

the relationships within the process become the terms of the integrated science, but these relationships are not simply those of proximity in time, space, or series: "They are relationships of working-with, of process."[18]

So far we might imagine Bentley to have thought that Small was treading the path of rectitude, but all too soon his foot slips, and he falls heavily: "All action that goes on in society is the movement and counter-movement of persons impelled by the particular assortment of these feelings which is located in each."[19] Sociology begins with individuals feeling wants or desires; it takes men and wants as "finished products" as opposed to biology and psychology which are concerned with their "making."

> Before science that is properly social begins . . . analysis of individual traits must have taken into account all the pecularities of individual action which betray the individual impulses or springs of individual action which are the units of force with which social science must deal.[20]

The "push," the dynamic element in collective behavior lies "in" the individual's want, desire, or interest, and this, projected into a human environment and multiplied by the number of other individuals present accounts for social action. Social arrangements and institutions are the result of the operation of these individual wants, and to further explicate this relationship Small composed tables of individual desires which, raised to the power of social forces, could lead us on to the "arrangements" of society. Starting with individual endowment plus physical environment, he proposed to "construct" society.

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[18]Small, General Sociology, p. 18.

[19]Ibid., p. 480.

[20]Quoted in Bentley, p. 31.

The nature or number of personal wants or desires listed by Small
is immaterial here, as is the propriety of including any one or more of
them on a "basic" list. The issue is not that familiar query about the
degree of modifiability by environmental factors of any such list of
fundamental human drives. Bentley's point is simply that Small's, or any
other comparable attempt, to "go behind" collective behavior in search
of individual desires or motives is useless as a means toward a deeper
understanding of society. Small's enumeration of "subjective" individual
desires were to be "matched" with a corresponding number of "objective"
satisfactions or situations which might be viewed as the result of the
former.[21] These satisfactions are necessarily described in highly gen-
eralized terms, and an enormous range of variation is permitted, for
example, the "social instincts" may be satisfied by situations ranging
"from wolfishness to brotherhood." Sociological investigation must pro-
ceed to a parallel examination of both the situations and their instinc-
tual "causes."[22]

> At all events the appropriate order of procedure, from a sociolog-
> ical point of approach, is analysis of social situations, in con-
> nection with analysis of purposes of the persons involved in the
> situations, to the end of arriving at generalizations of regular-
> ities and uniformities of sequence between types of social sit-
> uations and types of human volitions.[23]

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[21] Bentley referred here to the lists of personal wants and satis-
factions appearing in Small and Vincent's Introduction to the Study of
Society; see Bentley, pp. 28-9.

[22] I do not distinguish here between "drive," "motive," "volition,"
or "desire," though I am aware that much controversy attaches to the
use of any of them. Bentley's criticism did not distinguish, and this
account attempts to follow his usage where possible.

[23] General Sociology, p. 649.

When the individual drives are matched to their situational conse-
quents the tool will be complete as far as classification is concerned,
but it will still lack analytical power. Small was very well aware that
a "society" in the real world is a complex of both situations and drives
existing in diverse intensities and degrees of devdopment. To remedy this
deficiency Small proposed to assign coefficients to the drives in order
to "measure" quantitative variations among them; these variations taken
as a particular compound or configuration produce a qualitative change in
the satisfactions. This method of measurement is variously called an
"algebra" and a "calculus" of desires.

There is no need to repeat Bentley's general critique of the use of
psychical faculties in social exploration; their application to such an
unwieldy apparatus is quite clear. Much more interesting is the fact
that Bentley's conception of social theory is in many ways similar to
that of Albion Small. If this is true it will require us to look with
some skepticism on Bentley's assertion that he has offered a criticism
of Small purely, or primarily on "sociological grounds."[24] It is "Pro-
fessor Small's theory of social causation" which is under attack, but it
is a relatively small segment of Small's social theory that is questioned,
specifically use of the individual, and his drives as causal agents. It
is unprofitable to dispute with Bentley over his use of the term "sociolog-
ical," but it would not be without purpose to contend that his objections
to Small's "individual" as ficticious, to the use of that individual's
faculties in causal analysis as tautalogical, and to the very conception
of social forms as capable of analysis in individual terms, are at least
as much epistemological or philosophical as purely sociological.

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[24]Bentley, p. 37.

If we consider The Process of Government and General Sociology from the specifically sociological perspective, several interesting parallels are apparent. Both Bentley and Small speak repeatedly about "social processes," and make serious efforts to distinguish their intended and recommended procedures from predecessors and contemporaries. This similarity finds expression even in their respective analogies; for example Bentley:

> If we take all the men of our society, say all the citizens of the United States, and look upon them as a spherical mass, we can pass an unlimited number of planes through the center of the sphere, each plane representing some principle of classification . . .[25]

Compare Small:

> Human desires are not so many mathematical points. They may rather be represented to our imagination as so many contiguous surfaces stretching out from angles whose areas presently begin to overlap each other, and whose sides extend indefinitely.[26]

In their respective developments of the process theme both men found it useful to criticize Spencer, though Small was the more restrained. Another point of similarity is the centrality accorded the idea of "interest"; the concept is ambigious, and we certainly would not be justified in ignoring the deep differences in its usage, but neither may it be forgotten that interest did not then hold the status of almost the commonplace in social theory that it has come to assume in our time.

Closely related to interest is their common emphasis on the "group" as a tool of analysis. This is overpowering in Part Two of The Process of Government, and almost equally pronounced in Small, particularly when he is attempting to shift attention from study of the social process of "social processes." Finally, both men are strongly influenced by Gustav Ratzenhofer;

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[25]Ibid., p. 207.

[26]General Sociology, p. 446.

Part Four of General Sociology, a very large segment of a ponderous work,

is devoted to an extended commentary on Ratzenhofer, and Bentley, in a

paragraph praising his contribution, remarks that Small's formulations

are "frequently a decided improvement on Ratzenhofer himself."[27]

More detailed analysis would confirm and even extend the similarities

indicated above, and would, consequently, invite the question of why

Bentley felt the necessity of placing his criticism of Small so promin-

ently in The Process of Government. A part of the answer probably lies

in Bentley's desire to avoid empty "verbalism," and to emphasize always

the working value of any theory; the question he invariably addresses to

a construct is, "What can you accomplish with it?" This conviction that

sociology must be firmly anchored in practice might have been weakened if

presented without reference to existing theory. But there is a deeper

reason, the full extent of which can only be indicated at this point;

namely, Bentley's commitment to what might be called a methodological

monism.

The preliminary but unmistakable introduction of this conviction

appears in Bentley's discussion of the subjective-objective dichotomy in

Small's tables of "desires" and "satisfactions." We have already seen

the argument that a causal account based upon this sort of dichotomy is

worthless because tautalogical, but Bentley is willing to extend his

critique a bit further.

> There are no desires nor interests apart from content. There are
> no nerves which carry feelings inward without at the same time
> carrying ideas . . .; there are none which carry ideas without
> at the same time carrying feelings. You never can make a feeling

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[27]Bentley, p. 476.

> all alone explain an act--not even in the simplest case imaginable.
> And the ideas bring the whole outside world into the reckoning.[28]
> (Emphasis added.)

The last sentence is of supreme importance, and if one sentence could be

selected to illustrate both Bentley's objection to traditional social

theory and the greatest obstacle to its reconstruction, it would be this.

He has emphatically not said that there are no such things as "ideas" or

"feelings" (although he does refer to those words as "crude"), nor has he

claimed that they are in some way reducible to physical expression as

"electrochemical impulses" or what have you. (He later specifically re-

jected that possibility.) The argument is that there is no way to take

mental constructs, isolate them from their physical, biological, or what

have you context, and then set them over against or behind the milieu that

remains.

This is not the same as the tautalogy argument for it goes toward a

substantive conception of the phenomenal world that does not permit cer-

tain kinds of bifurcation of nature. That world, if not quite a seamless

web, exhibits continuity and, for lack of a better word, interpenetration

of phenomena. The fundamental mistake of Small and other sociologists,

is the introduction of a false sense of "boundedness," of planes of cleav-

age or separation that possess no relation to the natural world. Bentley's

polemics are repeatedly directed against thinking in terms of what he

variously calls "bunches," "bundles," "clots," and "stuff," and against

that pernicious dichotomy between the "subjective" and the "objective."

This argument is most clearly put in Bentley's analysis of Rudolph von

Jhering's two works, Der Zweck im Recht and Geist des romischen Rechts auf

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[28]Ibid., p. 37.

den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung.[29] In contrast to his view

of Small and Herbert Spencer, Bentley considered von Jhering's thought to

be "patiently powerful" and free of the obvious confusions so apparent in

the former authors. "Der Zweck im Recht must be reckoned with, page for

page, by everyone who seeks to understand the process of government and

the function of law in social life."[30] Precisely because of this regard

for von Jhering Bentley found his ultimate failure the most damning indict-

ment of this approach to social theory.[31]

Jhering set himself the task of explaining the possibility of society

by linking individual action to social utility through the concept of

"Zweck." (Bentley regarded this word as untranslatable and continued to

use it in his analysis. He offered these partial substitutes: "purpose,"

"aim," "end," "object," "intention," "teleology.") "Zweck" does not mean,

indeed is specifically distinguished from, "interest" (Interessen) in or-

der that it may serve as a vehicle for the transcendence of "interest"

narrowly construed. Zweck was used by Jhering to apply to a variety of

conditions or situations; for example, it indicates "the satisfaction the

action gives" to the individual actor. In this usage it might be consid-

ered a "cause" of that action or a "need" for which the action is a ful-

fillment. Thus although Zweck is not at all identical with Interessen

there is always some element of the latter in any action. In addition to

this meaning Jhering also spoke of the Zwecke of institutions such as the

church and the state, and even of the society itself. The problem of

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[29] Ibid., footnote I, p. 32.

[30] Ibid., p. 57.

[31] The following account is a summary of Bentley's interpretation of
von Jhering. The point is less whether Bentley read him correctly than
how he read him.

social theory is to understand how the individuals can be linked to each other and to institutions, ultimately to society. In Bentley's words:

> We have found "Zwecke" (and "Interessen") scattered through all the individuals in the society, where they are, so to speak, on a common level, that is alike in quality or kind. We have found "Zwecke" also running in an ascending series--on different levels, so to speak--becoming ever more and more objective. The problem is to harmonize them in all three lines: to harmonize the "Zwecke" with the "Interessen"; to harmonize the "Zwecke" and the "Interessen" of many individuals with one another; to harmonize the objective "Zwecke" with the subjective.[32]

"The foundation" and, one might add, the problem "of society lies in the process by which one man's 'Zweck' is bound up with the interests of all."[33]

It must not be imagined that the subjective-objective distinction is the same as that between the individual and society. There are classifications of individual _Zweck_ which may be considered "objective" and social _Zwecke_ can be interpreted "subjectively," for example, as individual motives. Individuals possess both egoistic and social _Zwecke_, and these are distinguished by the test of whether an actor has only himself or others in mind. When this rather involved classification has been set out, it remains that for Jhering there remained some more general sense in which the subjective-objective dichotomy corresponds to the individual-social, better perhaps would be individual-institutional division. In brief, it seems that he regarded the collective _Zwecke_ as more objective and the various individual _Zwecke_, considered perhaps as motives, as the more subjective. The more inclusive, the more general _Zwecke_ appear objective almost in the sense of "projected out from" man.[34]

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[32]Bentley, p. 65.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Marx's notion of alienation is a possible analogue; however some form of this idea is very commonly found in German social theory. Compare

This somewhat detailed examination of von Jhering's conceptual apparatus is a necessary preliminary to fully illustrate Bentley's criticism. Jhering's difficulties begin, he argues, with the separation of Zweck from action.

> It is the "Zweck" indeed that is the main thing; the action is merely the means to the "Zweck," which means--at this stage of his progress--the satisfaction. This is radically different from asserting that all action is purposive, with purpose strictly as process, because of the very separation which he establishes between the action and the purpose. It is on this separation that his system is built up. It is in this separation that his unsolved, and insoluable, puzzle problems lie.[35]

Much of the speculation about Bentley's own use of the terms "interest," "activity," and even "group," virtually interchangably could be terminated by a reading of this passage. When he speaks of understanding "purpose strictly as process," he is arguing that any attempt to distinguish among such words as interest and activity leads necessarily to an analytic chasm which then devours all our energies in the attempt to bridge it. Von Jhering's error is akin to Small's attempt to "match" a table of interests or drives to their social "results" or "satisfactions." Just as there can be no "form" apart from "content," "purposes" may only be known as they appear in and as action. What we have is an "attempt to state life in terms of 'Zweck,' instead of 'Zwecke' in terms of life facts."[36]

The subjective-objective dichotomy is the direct result of this initial error, as is the individual-social division. Jhering's ultimate failure is the presentation of a "fictitious and hence insoluable problem."[37]

Rudolph Weingartner's discussion of alienation in Georg Simmel's work, Experience and Culture: The Philosophy of Georg Simmel (Middletown, Conn., 1963).

[35]Bentley, p. 63.

[36]Ibid., p. 89.

[37]Ibid., p. 90.

Individual and social might properly have been taken as points of view, and the subject matter examined in its entire range from both, but if taken as concrete entities they prove impossible of reconciliation. In the following passage Bentley illustrates the difference in these words:

> _[_Jhering_]_ never learned to posit the simple answerable question: "How are these masses and groups of men doing these things in these ways?" which is the only scientific question. He always asked: "What is there hidden in these men and in other men which makes them be doing these things which I, or somebody else, can easily think they ought not to be wanting to do?" He asked: "Why are these men doing these things and not some other things?" and not, "How are these processes of men working?" He asked, "Why does a society of men set up certain laws and then why do these men obey these laws?" and not: "How do these socially and legally organized men function along? What are the various elements in their functioning? And how do these elements fit into one another and condition one another?" He might as well have asked why is gold gold and not silver, and why is silver silver and not gold, instead of simply studying all the gold and silver phenomena under as many conditions as possible, and trying scientifically to make out their similarities as distinguished from their differences.[38]

"Scientific" enterprise inaugurates its inquiry with the word "how," rather than the "why" of speculative or what have you alternatives. "How" introduces queries demanding responses which will provide us with knowledge about the state of our subject matter, i.e., description. When we have answered the "only scientific question" we will have offered a complete description. There is nothing more science can do.

Fairness to Bentley demands that something more be said about this matter of description, lest his position be rejected out of hand as trivial or superficial. When he talked about offering an account of how men and groups are functioning together he was proposing a most difficult undertaking, because his conception of description was so demanding. A full account of what Bentley meant by "description" must await a discussion of the concepts and vocabulary he developed as means to its achievement, but

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[38]Ibid.

it may be indicated there that his expectation far exceeded even our contemporary abilities.

Jhering and Small fell prey to a common error which, because it is so basic, resulted in a misdirection of all their subsequent efforts and a magnification of that fundamental mistake--the separation of feelings from content.

> The trapdoor that lets the sociologist through into this pit is to be found at the spot where the complicated interest groups, differing in individual adherents as we actually find them in society intercept one another. Tom the miser, and Jack, the spendthrift, go into partnership, and therefore the partnership is an outside thing caused by miserliness in one and extravagance in the other, and the metaphysics begins.[39] (Emphasis added.)

In fact, Bentley continues, we have Tom and Jack themselves members of numerous interest groups and through which membership they reflect "phases" of the social world about them. In the partnership, those groups intersect one another, and this is all that need be said. What a science of society needs to do is to uncover and trace the interests "across" society. There is no room for any conception of an outside or inside, subjective or objective "realm" apart from Tom and Jack.

The trap is composed of two mistakes which follow from one basic error. First, the sociologist introduces a "vertical" division in which social action appears as the result of deeper-lying forces, motives or drives; second, the conceptual separation of the partnership from the actions of Tom and Jack invites what Whitehead called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Both mistakes result from the temptation to segment the stuff, the raw material of sociation--the process. Contemporary readers have pretty well understood and accepted Bentley's argument against reification, but they have not remembered that he warned of the opposite mistake. His analyses of Marx and Ludwig Gumplowicz illustrate both

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[39]Ibid., p. 37.

points.[40]

Bentley rejected Marx's use of "class" as a descriptive tool:

"Marx's theory of classes, then, was poorly representative of what was happening, because he made his classes too 'hard and fast,' or in other words because the particular groups which he called classes were abstractions."[41] The point is not simply that "class" was tied to a program of political action (although that itself was a disability), but rather that his classes were far removed from the operational level, too rough a measure, "too crude a form."

Gumplowicz's notion of groups was more versatile and varied, and thus constituted a superior descriptive tool. For example, his "classes" do not come into being until one group has been conquered and subjugated by another, and when they are formed Gumplowicz used a number of indices for their description. These characteristics marked, for Bentley, a distinct theoretical advance, but he was far from satisfied with it. While Gumplowicz's groups "are concrete in the sense that they are composed of so many different people who can be gathered together in physical separation from other groups," they were, precisely for this reason, too concrete for Bentley's taste.[42] "They are not groups as I have used the word in early chapters."[43] Perhaps because he was preoccupied with more primitive group antagonisms, especially those in which violent conflicts occur,

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[40]Bentley thought that the group interpretation of society originated in the Nineteenth century; its "starting point for practical purposes" is the work of Karl Marx.

[41]Ibid., p. 469. (Emphasis added.)

[42]Ibid., p. 470.

[43]Ibid.

Gumplowicz was inclined to see his individuals as occupying spatially discrete spheres.

The specific failure in Gumplowicz's system was that he found men acting in certain ways, which he was content to specify as group action; what he should have done was "to make the further analysis into the under-lying specific interest groups which they represent."[44] Bentley would have made his point less ambigiously had he simply referred to the "inter-est" instead of the "interest groups," for what he clearly meant is that observable activity is the clue by which we may discover the underlying interest. Once that has been done, we may then proceed to talk about a "group" advancing an "interest." Unless we take this additional analytic step we become prisoners of mere appearance, because our concepts are frozen into a static universe in which each individual is assigned to and circumscribed within distinct group spheres.

It is probable that Bentley's very determination to be clear and to avoid mentalisms and ghosts defeated him on this point. At all costs he would not risk the appearance of discussing an interest ghost separated from activity. "The interest is just this valuation of the activity, not as distinct from it, but as the valued activity itself."[45] In his con-cern to guard against one misinterpretation he invited another, no less pernicious: namely, the impression that he will be guided entirely by appearance, or that interest is the exact equivilent of activity. If this were the case Bentley could not distinguish group classifications based upon such incidental physical characteristics as hair color from political

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44Bentley, p. 470.

45Ibid., p. 213.

groups, nor could he warn against accepting a group's expression of its own intentions or values. To proceed in that manner would be to abandon reason and analysis in favor of pure experience, and that, despite some of his interpretors, is not at all what Bentley had in mind.

Mere appearance, words, and even deeds, can deceive, and the mind of the investigator must remain alert to that possibility. But to say that observable activities or behavior are not of themselves sufficient does not mean what they are not necessary, indeed indispensible. Activity, behavior, is the raw material but Bentley, no more than any other serious student of history or society, believed such materials capable of speaking for themselves. He meant to say that when we have found the interest, it will be seen to manifest itself in certain activities, and nothing more; in this sense we may refer to either "interest," "group," or "activity" as the same phenomenon differently stated. Much of the difficulty in understanding Bentley's idea comes from his strenuous exorcism of ghosts which led him to write as if the universe exhibited chunks of activity bearing the labels "farm bloc," and "minority vote."

> If we cannot take words for our test, and if we cannot take "bedrock truth," one may say we are left swinging hopelessly in between. Quite the contrary. The political groups are following definite courses. They may appear erratic, but hardly ever to anyone who is in close enough contact with them. The business of the student is to plot the courses. And when he does that—it is the course of only a single step, not of a whole career, that he can plot—he will find that he has all together, the group, the activity, and the interest.[46]

In addition to the "over-concreteness," there was a second failure of Gumplowicz's theory. That was its inadequate treatment of "psycho-social phenomena" which were distinguished from the purely "social."[47]

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[46]Ibid., pp. 213-4.

[47]Gumplowicz, Outlines of Sociology (Philadelphia, 1899), especially pp. 155-62.

The former category included language, religion, and law and was set over
against group processes per se. The trouble, from Bentley's point of
view, was that these former are not treated or conceptualized in terms of
the latter; rather, they occupied "an awkwardly nondescript position" as
it were "between" the concretely sociating group and the concrete indivi-
dual. These psycho-social phenomena were not given adequate ontological
status but, more importantly, they could not be accommodated methodologi-
cally within Gumplowicz's system. The result was that ideas continued to
intrude into his group analysis, sometimes as causal agents, sometimes as
"undigested lumps of matter in his system." "When Gumplowicz gives the
'idea' itself such potency as he does, he merely indicates one spot at
which his theory is not adequately elaborated."[48]

This second criticism should by itself have sufficed to forestall
the careless judgment that Bentley dismissed the potency of ideas; instead,
he rejected Gumplowicz's conceptualization precisely because it could not
deal with ideas when they are important.

> He $\underline{/}$Gumplowicz$\underline{/}$ gets around them $\underline{/}$ideas$\underline{/}$ for the most part
> mainly by rejecting them as unimportant products of group action
> on the individual, and when he finds cases in which he cannot
> thus reject them, he has trouble in handling them, or rather he
> makes no pretense of handling them, but swallows them raw.[49]

Gumplowicz's theory is "cold and remote" in its failure to get beyond the
surface or appearance of the Austrian group alignment at the same time that
it remains "focused too closely" on the existential groupings as they ap-
peared at one moment of historical time.

The line of criticism Bentley advanced recalls Simmel's dichotomy of
form and content. In those terms we would say that Gumplowicz had confused

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[48]Bentley, p. 471.

[49]Ibid.

the categories and that this may explain why Bentley found him simultaneous-
ly "remote" and yet too "concrete." Bentley was unquestionably well acquain-
ted with Simmel and had read him with considerable admiration. He praised
Simmel's "mental power" and "delicacy," comparing both qualities favorably
to those of Gumplowicz; Simmel's studies were characterized as "brilliant"
and "of the greatest value." But with all this appreciative comment, the
Bentley of 1908 found Gumplowicz's work superior in "its main practical
value in the matter of group interpretation."[50]

"Practical," as should now be apparent, was a "hurrah" word for
Bentley, but it assumed, especially in its application to Simmel, richer
connotations. Simmel's analyses were depreciated for being "psychic,"
and "thin"; his interpretation of the lie was "stated more as a psychic
curiosity than as a piece of powerful pushing human life," his notion of
society failed to show "its tremendous cohesiveness as a mass of immense
human pressures."[51] It is this sense of power, movement, and the surging,
striving aspect of human life that was lacking. This is the Bentley of
the Progressive movement and the group struggle school, who insisted that
reality is hard, mean, and dangerous; perhaps even nasty and brutish. It
is almost as though he found the delicacy of Simmel aesthetically incon-
grous with his view of reality.[52] "Curiosity," we might observe paren-

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[50]Ibid., p. 472.

[51]Ibid., pp. 474-5.

[52]Bentley's own language is far from elegant; groups "grind together"
and ideas refuse "to lie down together." The crudity of his prose may be
complementary to the examples of social man he adopts: street brawls, pros-
titution, machine politics, and the corruption of urban government are
favorites. Sometimes these subjects are introduced as an attack upon
grossly optimistic notions of man's progress, but even here Bentley's con-
tempt for the hypocrisy implicit in such comfortable judgments is apparent.
See, for example, Hutchins Hapgood's recollections of the young Bentley's
reaction to the slums of London in the mid-1890s, A Victorian in the Modern
World (New York, 1939), p. 112. Bentley's passion, his anger and scorn,

thetically, is his view of an emotion peculiarly attributable to a man such as Simmel, but it is not usually associated with the "practical."

The psychological roots of Bentley's reaction can not be divorced from the substance of his critique. Some years later Bentley expressed his objections more specifically: "One thing Simmel seems to lack, the forcefulness, the energy, pointed to by Ratzenhofer's interests, by Durkheim's exterior constraint."[53] The absence of the "practical" in Simmel is a consequence on the methodological level of his failure to incorporate a sense of constraint or power into his vision of society. Gumplowicz, for all his bluntness, indeed perhaps because of it, came closer to a grasp of reality.

But despite their obvious differences, stylistically and otherwise, Gumplowicz and Simmel stumbled over the same obstacle, namely ideas. Bentley, in 1908, saw Simmel's difficulty as an inability to keep his psychology distinct from his social analysis.

> Simmel has traced the group lines, and endeavored to make clear many of the typical forms in which group relations occur. But here is his defect. He has done this in terms of a psychology which is itself not simple process, but is too often a content which intrudes with crude persistence into all his analysis; . . .[54]

In this passage Bentley certainly seems to agree with the criticism common among sociologists that Simmel could not, in his empirical work, maintain the form-content distinction. Theodore Abel subsequently made exactly that

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are manifest on several levels: they are directed against the existential organization of society, as well as the discipline that pretends to study it, and his prose style reflects, in its very crudity and forcefulness, his rejection of the niceties and inhibitions of convention.

[53]Relativity in Man and Society (New York, 1926), p. 165. This sentence might serve to illustrate Bentley's casual regard for construction of the English language. It is, I think, barely a sentence.

[54]Process, p. 472.

point.[55] However, in a paper published in 1931 Bentley rejected this line of criticism as it had been applied to Simmel, insisting that the form-content dichotomy had been misunderstood.[56] This is an important shift in attitude to be discussed again below. Bentley's point in 1908 was that Simmel used words like "hatred," "envy," and "desire" at a juncture in his social analysis somewhat comparable to that at which Gumplowicz resorted to such usage, i.e., when he was in need of causal or explanatory agents. This required that Simmel introduce ideas an entities, "undigested mass," predicates of individual actors, in sum that he duplicate Gumplowicz's error.

The concluding comment in The Process of Government provides a further indication of the degree to which Bentley's life and personality had become intertwined with his theoretical critique of Simmel.

> Taken as a bit of the general social activity itself, Simmel's work then represents the social world more as it appears to the individual engaged in the process than as it appears from a point of view which gets away from that of the acting individual and looks upon the process as proceeding theough him. Even his analysis of the crossing of the social groups was more a by-product of his investigation of personality than a direct interpretation of social process.[57]

The meaning of this passage is not entirely clear. Certainly Bentley in-

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[55]Systematic Sociology in Germany (New York, 1929), p. 33.

[56]As was discussed in a previous chapter, this has been contended more recently by F. H. Tenbruck in his article, "Formal Sociology," Kurt Wolff, Georg Simmel, 1858-1918 (Columbus, Ohio, 1959). Bentley's repudiation of this particular criticism may have been addressed to Abel, since he refers to "a series issued by one of the greater universities," and Abel's volume is one of a series published by Columbia University. A comparison of Bentley's remarks with those of Tenbruck is interesting. See Arthur Bentley, "Sociology and Mathematics," Inquiry into Inquiries (Boston, 1954), footnote 29, p. 86. This paper appeared originally in The Sociological Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (July, 1931), or about two years after Systematic Sociology in Germany.

[57]Process, p. 475.

tends to argue that a distinctly sociological perspective requires the achievement of a sense of distance from the flow of activity. One cannot accomplish this by beginning from a psychology, introspective or otherwise. But he says and means more. The sociological perspective requires not only detachment, it also seems to require passivity, a conscious suspension of certain human activities on the part of the investigator. He must see process proceeding through him, and "out" along society. This detachment separates the scientist not only from the individual qua unit but from at least certain kinds of action. With this statement we have come a long way from the idea of Verstehen.

It would be presumptious perhaps to press this point much further; from the few sentences Bentley devotes to the subject here we cannot divine the full meaning he assigned to certain key words. But it is certainly fair to suggest the parallels to Bentley's life. His own retreat to Paoli, Indiana, following academic and journalistic careers, his essential withdrawal from the mainstream of American intellectual life, present an obvious example of detachment in both senses. There is an element in Bentley's writing, echoed in what we know of his life, that might almost be described as "renunciation." One is reminded of Nietzsche's remark that science involves the capacity to care deeply and work diligently for something which is not of direct, personal benefit.

Gustav Ratzenhofer was the last group theorist considered in the closing pages of The Process of Government. Bentley considered Ratzenhofer's work a retrogression from that of Gumplowicz, and it is not entirely clear why he merits the attention received. Bentley accorded him that damnation of faint praise implicit in the phrase, "His categories . . . must be taken into account by all students of the field."[58] It is probable

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[58]Ibid., p. 476.

that Albion Small's General Sociology, which featured Ratzenhofer prom-

inently, lent a currency that Bentley felt himself unable to dismiss

lightly. While Ratzenhofer imagined himself "advancing beyond Gumplowicz,"

he was actually losing himself and the group interpretation idea in a meta-

physical haze. Not content "to take the facts as they paraded themselves

before the exceptionally well-located window which his position in life

afforded him through which to observe them, /¯Ratzenhofer¯/ instead felt

impelled to swathe them in an exceedingly wearisome and maladroit meta-

physics."[59] The metaphysics, the retrogression, was Ratzenhofer's intro-

duction of "inherent interests"—racial, individual, social, etc.—behind

actual group forms. He was then tempted to assign groups personalities

and to describe society as in this or that "phase" according to the domin-

ance of a particular personality.

Most of this was, for Bentley, quite unnecessary. Ratzenhofer did not

overcome Gumplowicz's difficulty, the tendency toward freezing group con-

cepts at too concrete a level, because his inherent interests were not only

mystical but static. The criticism common to Gumplowicz, Simmel, and

Ratzenhofer is their inability to treat ideas except as discrete bundles

of "stuff" functioning outside the social realm. Their systems fail, in

this respect, to give an account of the world. The nexus of the problem,

in terms of the group theory approach, lies in the relationship of the words

"interest," "group," and "activity." Recent literature in political science

abounds with analyses and evaluations of "what Bentley really meant" by

these words, and the proposal to indulge in still another such discussion

would appear to require some justification. I propose instead to examine

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[59]Ibid.

the relationship among these terms as it constitutes Bentley's alternative to the criticisms he levelled against previous formulations of the group interpretation school and traditional notions of causation.

We have already mentioned the distinction between political or interest groups and what might be called "classification" groups, e.g., the "class" of all left-handed men born on February 29th. True, the basis of both types of groups, the criteria of inclusion, must involve commonality, the possession of some similar features, but Bentley was interested in "political and other groups that function in the specifically social process."[60] The key word is "function"; the class (group) of left-handed men born on leap year day is not salient; it "exists" as a collectivity only in a mind and has no _social_ counterpart in the real world. The commonality in this instance does not create cohesion or a sense of belonging together on the part of the members. They do not think or act in any manner connected to this shared feature, which is what Bentley means by the "functioning" of a group.

Another way to approach this point is through that much discussed notion of the "potential" interest group. In terms of the previous example we might say that a piece of legislation which proposes to visit inconvenience upon a group defined as "all left-handed men born on February 29th" could activate a latent similarity. The individuals concerned would suddenly perceive that a hitherto insignificant personal predicate has become

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[60]_Ibid._, p. 212. The realist-nominalist difference as it applies to classification is tangential to our discussion here. "For in every classification, we pick out some one trait which all the members of the class in fact possess, and therefore we may call it natural. All classifications, however, may also be said to be artificial, in the sense that we select the traits upon the basis of which the classification is performed.", Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (New York, 1934), p. 223.

a shared characteristic which "makes a difference."[61] This perception

that something "makes a difference" is the vehicle by which the social

world is individuated, "broken up" into patterns. Since the number of

such characteristics and combinations thereof is virtually infinite, there

is no logical or a priori way to limit the number of "latent" categories

which may become activated.

If we look at our rich and varied world from the perspective of a

search for similarities or, more properly, for various bases of common-

ality, we come closer to Bentley's thinking than if we begin with "inter-

ests." The interests are, as it were, already a step removed from this

most basic thing, commonality. Bentley's insistence on the necessity for

an empirical conception of interest confirms this interpretation.

> The interest I put forward is a specific group interest in some
> definite course of conduct or activity. It is first, last, and
> all the time strictly empirical. There is no way to get hold of
> one group interest except in terms of others.[62]

This last sentence is particularly significant, since Bentley continued

to discuss the means of "isolating" an interest group from its Umwelt.

He is not, in this passage, asserting a belief in the necessity of group

conflict, nor the antagonism of interests, but rather he is striving to

present an epistemological problem; namely, how may interest groups be

isolated from,and at the same time related to, their Umwelt.

> No group has meaning except in its relations to other groups. No
> group can even be conceived of as a group--when we get right down
> close to facts--except as set off by itself, and so to speak, made
> a group by the other groups.[63]

[61]Bentley specifically warns against conceiving of "interest" in the
narrow sense of economic self-interest, Process, p. 212.

[62]Ibid., p. 214.

[63]Ibid., p. 217.

Viewed from this perspective, interest is a commonality factor that

has social consequences, i.e., it "makes a difference." "Activity" enters

through Bentley's insistence that the difference be observable, or somehow

open to empirical investigation. We could speak of activity as a manifes-

tation of interest, but only if we added the qualification that interest

is not some kind of entity standing "behind," or in any way bringing about

the activity. Each is a phase, an aspect of the same thing, and it is

absurd to imagine one as more "basic" than the other.

> In the political world, if we take the interest alone as a psycho-
> logical quality, what we get is an indefinite, untrustworthy will-
> o'-the-wisp, which may trick us into any false step whatsoever.
> Once set it up and we are its slaves, whatever swamp it may lead
> us to. If we try to take the group without the interest, we have
> simply nothing at all. We cannot take the first step to define it.
> The group is activity and the activity is only known to us through
> its particular type, its value in terms of other activities, its
> tendency where it is not in the stage which gives manifest results.
> The interest is just this valuation of the activity, not as distinct
> from it, but as the valued activity itself.[64]

In this passage Bentley adds the notion of the group. Groups, unlike

interests or activities, have no independent ontological basis; while the

latter terms indicate the two aspects of valuing activity, group is simply

a verbal economy, a summary of certain activity complexes. Instead of

referring to the "valuing activity of the oil industry" we say "oil inter-

est group." Ironically, it is precisely this conventional usage which

leads Bentley into deep water, for to speak in the language of entities,

even if they be understood as possessing no identity apart from their

constituent elements (i.e., activities) is to introduce a sense of bound-

edness into the social realm. It is to suggest a world of discreteness

and discontinuity wherein one group, or complex of activities, if you

prefer, is identifiable as belonging together. Bentley's own remark that

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[64]Ibid., p. 213.

an interest can only be known as it is distinguished from others is an oblique recognition of the need to create "space" among distinct activity groups.

But how are we ever to get hold of unifying principles, of what I have called the "commonality factors with social consequences" that constitute and illustrate the pattern? We are denied recourse to a priori determinations of "objective interest" for this would be speculative, without any empirical reference, nor can we be satisfied with an interest's definition of itself. If we shift our inquiry to a more empirical level and permit formal organization or "structure" to define the "group" or activity pattern, we emasculate our efforts as Gumplowicz did his; the categories are fixed at the purely formal level. This would leave us in exactly the position from which group interpretation promised an escape.

> [Political science] is a formal study of the most external char-
> acteristics of governing institutions. It loves to classify govern-
> ments by the incidental attributes, and when all is said and done
> it cannot classify them much better now than by lifting up bodily
> Aristotle's monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies which he
> found significant for measurements of all sorts and conditions of
> modern government.[65]

Some modern versions of these classifications "lose all sight of the content of the process in some trick point about the form."[66]

The entire point of group interpretation is to get behind the incidental characteristics of appearance, but in order to do so the "formal" or "structural" unities must be reduced to simple activity. When we have arrived at a conception of the social realm as homogeneous, continuous action, we must then find differentiating principles, ways to reintroduce discreteness: in short, new units of investigation. But Bentley had by

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[65]Ibid., p. 162.

[66]Ibid.

this time rejected so much, closed so many doors, that he found himself

unable, within the confines of The Process of Government at least, to

create them. This must appear an odd conclusion since group theory voci-

ferously contends that it has discovered the meaningful social unit; its

critics give tacit recognition to this claim by their espousal of "indi-

viduals" or "classes" as alternatives.

To see precisely why such is the case we need to put aside the trouble-

some word group entirely and speak simply of valuing activities. The

investigator is to "plot the course" of these across the society. The

image of a continuum implicit in this phrase must be taken quite literally,

as the following quotation demonstrates:

> The raw material we study is never found in one man by himself,
> it cannot even be stated by adding man to man. It must be taken
> as it comes in many men together. It is a "relation" between men,
> but not in the sense that the individual men are given to us first,
> and the relation erected between them. The "relation," i.e., the
> action, is the given phenomenon, the raw material; the action of
> men with or upon each other. We know men only as participants in
> such activity. These join activities, of which governmental activ-
> ities are one form, are the cloth, so to speak, out of which men
> in individual patterns are cut.[67]

Note that Bentley does not talk about "constructing," indeed he specifi-

cally tells us that the relationships are not "erected"; they are there to

be "traced."

> The activities are interlaced. That, however, is a bad manner of
> expression. For the interlacing itself is the activity. We have
> one great moving process to study, and of this great moving process
> it is impossible to state any part except as valued in terms of the
> other parts.[68]

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[67]Ibid., p. 176.

[68]Ibid., p. 178. Compare Simmel's view that "society" is "sociation,"
"The Problem of Sociology" and "How is Society Possible?", Kurt Wolff,
Georg Simmel, 1858-1918.

Two examples would probably be helpful here; the first and more pre-
liminary statement of what this "tracing" operation might look like comes
from The Process of Government.

> Take the indictments against the Standard Oil Company. The only
> way we can state them adequately is in terms of eighty million
> people, more or less; and indeed that even may not be a suffici-
> ently comprehensive statement for purposes of study. The meaning
> of the indictments, their values, extend to the activities of people
> who live far beyond the confines of one country; extend, indeed very
> nearly to all parts of the world.[69]

This yields some idea of the scope of inquiry Bentley envisions but it

falls short of clarity in those key words "adequately," "sufficiently com-

prehensive," and even "activities." By 1926 Bentley was ready to suggest

a more detailed example. The next passage is rather lengthy, but it seems

necessary that we try to add some meat to the rather abstract bones of the

argument as it has been presented thus far. Bentley is talking about the

Volstead Act, and he begins with the question, "What do we have? A set of

words, an enacting clause, many printed copies."

> When we have said that, have we said anything? Hardly, unless
> we carry with those words a great unexpressed background of refer-
> ence. Let us set down some of those background references, not by
> way of being complete or by way of discussing the Volstead Law,
> but merely for illustration of the material.
>
> A vote of Congress. The signature of the President. Many days
> of debate in Congress. Many weeks of committee hearings. Very,
> very many man-years of lobbying for and against.
>
> A constitutional amendment. All of its attendant efforts. Its
> submission to the states.
>
> State and community law and ordinance experiences, local option
> and prohibition.
>
> A generation or two of writing, speaking, organization, public
> meetings, addresses, editorials. Temperance societies, prohibition
> societies, political parties and platform planks. Brewers', dis-
> tillers', and retailers' organizations. Chemists' investigations.

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[69]Process, p. 178.

Circles of discussion widening out into principles of government and rights of man.

A changed industrial system, division of labor, machinery, motors.

A changing food complex.

A cross-section of the courts, judges, attorneys, marshals.

A welter of private attorneys, legal points, technicalities, relations to other laws and to the constitution, and the supreme court at last.

A new staff of investigators in the treasury department.

A new mass of law-breakers, differently lawbreaking.

Some new reaches and magnitudes or corruption.

A change in expenditures and in lives, in durations and exper-iences of men's lives. Disease changes, jail changes.[70]

The heterogeneity of this assortment of factors surely removes any

illusion that Bentley was thinking in terms of "concrete" or otherwise

"interacting" groups. Indeed, the word "group" does not appear in the

entire passage, though there are several points at which we might expect

it. Instead Bentley chooses to speak of "circles," "cross-sections,"

"reaches and magnitudes." Interestingly enough, each of these is an ex-

pression with mathematical relevance and "cross-sectional activity" is

particularly important in the present context. A few pages earlier Bentley

had defined it as:

Any activity in its characteristic appearing across a group of men. It is definable only in terms of a number of men, but not in terms of any or all those men, qua individuals.[71]

Shortly thereafter he indicates the reason for preferring it to the more

customary "group."

[70]Relativity, pp. 95-7.

[71]Ibid., p. 91.

In the definitions the word group has substantially the meaning of
cross-sectional. It would have been here used by preference for
cross-sectional, had it not such concrete reference to a total of
individual men, that it tends to divert attention from the common
activity by which alone the group is characterized. It has been
much used in recent sociology though without sufficient definiteness
of meaning, and it will very possibly prove to be the term which
sociology will adopt for the type of fact under consideration.[72]

Presumably Bentley had found unrewarding the effort to retain the

word "group," purged of its overly concrete connotations. But we may as

well talk about a "slice of life" as a "cross-section" thereof, for all

the distance either term advances us toward gaining hold of an analytic

unit. Bentley, through his critique of causality, was prevented from

turning to the "interest" aspect and using it as a determinent of a type

of activity. Such an attempt would risk losing all clarity by restoring

the idea things to their place "behind" or "below" the level of action.

A Weberian ideal typical analysis, insofar as it could be considered to

accord primacy to its idea components, is clearly excluded. David Truman's

concept of the "potential interest group," a second attempt to build a unit

of analysis, is dubious for the same reason.

Truman tries to escape the limitations of concreteness by using

"shared attitudes" as the defining characteristics of interest groups;

he is, by this means, able to speak of "interests that are not at a par-

ticular point in time the basis of interactions among individuals."[73] After

conceding the necessity of reference to observable data, Truman adds that:

Even the most insistent defenders of the scientific position, how-
ever, admit that, although activity is the basic datum of social
science, a "becoming" stage of activity must be recognized as a
phase of activity if any segment of a moving social situation is
to be understood.[74]

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[72]Ibid., pp. 91-2.

[73]David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York, 1951), p. 34.

[74]Ibid., p. 35.

He continues to draw attention to Bentley's term "tendencies of activity" and embraces Gordon Allport's definition of "attitudes." "An attitude is a mental and neutral state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related."[75] There are several difficulties with this definition, particularly when it is linked to Bentley's "tendencies of activity."

It is true that Bentley suggested the word "potential" but in the same passage he drew an analogy to the case of molecular (unobservable) motion, and molar, "palpable or external activity." It might be possible to speak of "bodily motion" as distinguished from tendency as "interior brain motion," but Bentley was very skeptical of our ability to avoid the error of everyday speech or "treating these brain motions concretely as feeling things, making them crude causes of outside happenings."

> We are driven back to a statement in which we give the brain motions value only in terms of bodily motions, which they mediate, and which are themselves (taken in the social mass) the creative or constructive phase of the whole world, social and physical, as we know it.[76]

This is the point at which Bentley's critique of theories of social causation and his search for analytic units meet. Truman is entitled to enlist Bentley in his support only if he clearly and consistently denies his "shared attitudes" or "potential interest groups" any independent, causal existence. It is difficult to imagine how Allport's phrase "exerting a directive or dynamic influence" could escape Bentley's objection.

It is the level of inquiry that Bentley refused to change; he would not except "feelings" as in any way more basic, or "interior," or "sub-

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[75]Quoted in Truman, p. 35.

[76]Process, p. 185. (Emphasis added.)

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jective." This would be to bifurcate the unity of experience and of the
world. Inquiry must proceed along temporal and spatial dimensions, but
always at the level of valuing activity. Thus the experience of anger
would be analyzable as a complex of observable activities.

> If we should follow this anger activity backward in time, we should
> find it a complex of certain other activities, which, when stated
> with sufficient completeness, would state the anger activity itself
> with no need of any soul-plus to add to it.[77]

From what has already been said it should be apparent that Bentley
hoped to escape his own critique of causality and satisfy the stringent
empirical requirements he placed upon social theory by a much more exten-
sive and complete description than he thought had ever been proposed.
That is, in fact, what he found lacking in previous group interpretations,
but he did not, in 1908, clearly see that the thorough description he
demanded could not be accomplished by, perhaps required the rejection of,
the group as analytic unit. What he needed, and what he began to grope
toward in Relativity in Man and Society, were new conceptions of time and
space. There are indications of this in his rejection in The Process of
Government of the subjective-objective dichotomy, but especially in his
remarks about "environment." It must not be conceived as "something ex-
ternal 'plus' the acting men," but rather it should be stated in the same
terms as the activity itself. For example, mineral deposits become impor-
tant elements in social behavior when they are discovered and prized, but
then they are already a part of the valuing activity of men.

To describe and classify activity in this way requires that our every-
day, common sense experience with space and time yield to formulations just

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[77]Ibid., p. 188. It should perhaps be re-emphasized that the words
and their meanings spoken during the condition of anger are themselves
analyzable as activities.

as was the case with our everyday speech patterns. It is entirely appro-

priate, then, that the early pages of <u>Relativity in Man and Society</u> begin

a discussion of the new physics, especially its space-time concepts, by

analyzing the meaning of the term "Einstein." Bentley demonstrates how

one might go about describing a man, a system of thought, a group of work-

ers and experimenters, past and present, and so on.[78] His review of phys-

ical theory emphasized the disparity between the certitudes of experience

and scientific knowledge, and concluded by relating this hiatus to the

need for "units" and "limits." After listing the number of constants now

known, and the extension of the table of elements to ninety-two, he ob-

serves:

> Needless to say there is at present no such remark to be made re-
> lating this status to the study of society. If anybody believes
> that the individual man, such and such a clot of hands, feet, muscle
> cells and nerve cells, feelings and ideas, is such a unit, he is
> entirely free to prove it.[79]

Physics has been able to conceptualize its subject matter as "events,"

as "living, moving process," a combination of perspectives identified by

such words as velocity, energy, and mass.

> Properly speaking the whole process is the primary fact they observe
> of which the duration, distance, energy and mass are measurements.
> The word is Action. Action is the event in the studied world, in
> combined terms of space and time and work, all varying with refer-
> ence to one another.[80]

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[78]Relativity, pp. 6-15.

[79]Ibid., p. 54.

[80]Ibid., p. 47. Contrast Frederick J. Teggart's use of the terms
"events," "objects," "situations," and "conditions."

> The most cursory observation of the world makes us aware of objects,
> entities, things, as well as of events. Science deals with objects,
> entities, things, and their relations; history concerns itself with
> events. Now events, as we say, "happen," but things undergo change.
> Things do not "undergo" events, though they may be affected by them.
> It is of importance to notice that our everyday, common-sense judgment
> associates change with events. On the other hand, extraordinary as it

Social science must begin to develop similar conceptualizations, and since

scientific thought, as all of knowledge, is ultimately social, the language

employed must undergo a concommitant adjustment. Linguistic dichotomies

such as mind-matter, conscious-unconscious, man-society and actor-environ-

ment are especially pernicious. Thus as the reformulation of social science

proceeds there must be lasting recognition that thought and language operate

"on" the world but are simultaneously themselves "of" it.[81]

Bentley offers the example of an editorial concerning regulation of

food additives to illustrate how description in the new terms would liberate

inquiry:

> Put our editorial writer and his activities in this /̄Euclidean̄/
> space. His head is in one cubic foot, his body in certain other
> cubic feet adjacent, his typewriter in another one near by, his
> editorial supervision in certain cubic feet not far away, his print-
> ing presses in still others, and his readers in still others. His
> behavior is in space at any rate, even though we have our private
> ideas as to where his mind may be under the terms of the old puzzle
> split. But at any rate if he has his mind and another man his, then
> they present themselves in different parts of that space, and their
> relation to one another is across that space.[82]

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may seem, scientific investigation, during the last two centuries,
has maintained the view that the study of change in objects, en-
tities, and things must be carried on independently of the study of
events., _Theory and Processes of History_ (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
1960), pp. 77-8.

[81]The insistence that the realms of thought and knowledge must be
viewed in their social dimension, i.e., as behavior, is well know through
Wissensoziologie, and the more recent work in philosophical anthropology.
Less often noted are the somewhat similar contentions of two quite analy-
tically oriented philosophers, C. S. Pierce and Ludwig Wittgenstein. "Our
idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given us in the language
that we use. The concepts we have settled for us the form of the experience
we have of the world. . . . The world _is_ for us what is presented through
these concepts.", Peter Winch, _The Idea of a Social Science_ (London, 1960),
p. 15.

"What is thought to be known is simply specialized and universalized
construction on the part of man.", Nathan Hakman, "Bentley's Transactional
View of Politics: An Approach to Social and Political Analysis," _Social
Science_, Jan., 1958, p. 36.

[82]_Relativity_, pp. 131-3.

The description has already posed insurmountable problems. How is causality to be introduced through these empty spaces and between the realms of matter and mind? What is the locus of "editorial policy"? How is the "actor" to be reunited with his "environment"? Our inquiry, Bentley insists, is over before it is fairly begun. The focus of description has been _the_ editorial writer, John Smith, writing under certain direction for certain other individuals, "with each factor so emphasized taken as capable of independent definition prior to the attempt at interpretative relation."[83]

Under the activity form we would emphasize food processing methods, practici.es representational govennmental, certain language specifications as represented by editorials, "and the presses of the newspaper and magazine proprietors (who now present themselves as loci of phenomena examined, not as unit facts), and pass on to a statement of the activities of reading by various publics."[84] As to the editorial and its writer, we might note certain characteristics of shading, particular skills or devices that would themselves require statement in terms of the writer's life experiences, the activities of his teachers and colleges.

In this example, the writer, _qua_ individual, is but an intersection of a chain of activities which are focused "through" him and funneled out again to his audience via his prose. This stream of activity represents not only a spatial distribution but also a temporal dimension, for as the writer is joined to his audience that bond connects both to those prior influences and experiences which molded his literary taste and skills. No _a priori_ limit can be placed on the extension of the description. One is

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[83]_Ibid._, p. 135.

[84]_Ibid._, pp. 135-6.

reminded of Wittgenstein's remark that "To give the essence of proposition means to give the essence of all description, therefore the essence of the world."[85]

In the example, cited, "writer-audience" is a particular configuration of the "man-society" complex, and it is, of course, only an aspect of John Smith that is involved in the description. This must not be understood as an abstraction, however, for Bentley insists that it is the notion of a complete individual Smith, taken in Euclidean space that is the abstraction. In reply to the criticism of his method as somehow belittling or degrading to the worth or stature of men, Bentley had argued some years earlier that the individual "can be banished only by showing a plus of existence, not by alleging a minus," adding that there could be no derogation from a reality which did not exist.[86] In phrases strikingly reminiscent of Simmel, Bentley suggested that the "real life" of men is "too rich" for the notion of the individual; through his action man "transcends" any definition of himself as discrete entity. Unlike Dilthey, who believed that the unit of investigation in the cultural or social sciences was given in experience, Bentley found that appearance belies reality.

Relativity in Man and Society, as the title suggests, is centrally concerned with physical and mathematical analogies and the inadequacies of the Euclidean spatio-temporal frame. It is quite proper that we should emphasize this aspect, but not that we ignore a second strain, only momentarily muted and strangely suggestive of the life philosophers. When he chose to lend a somewhat different stress to his criticism Bentley argued

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[85]Quoted from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Winch, p. 13.

[86]"Knowledge and Society," Arthur Bentley, Inquiry into Inquiries (Boston, 1954), p. 4.

that the Euclidean universe could not accommodate the stuff of life.

> We can picture the whole society so cut into individuals. But
> we cannot do it without arresting for the moment the whole action,
> that is, the whole life, of our society. We cannot do it without
> "staining" our tissue. We cannot do it without finding that our
> product is morphological in the least helpful way; it is "dead,"
> "stained," and capable of ofservation under the form of individual-
> ity, but with no good evidence that this form of individuality is
> the morphological form best to be chosen for knowledge of the
> living society.[87]

These words were written in 1910, two years after the author of The

Process of Government had expressed his preference for the vigor, if not

the crudity, of Gumplowicz over the elegant but formal contribution of

Simmel. By 1926 Bentley could still criticize the lack of a sense of

force in Simmel's sociology, but also express the conviction that "Today,

however, when Euclidean geometry is absorbed into physics, for Simmel's

sociology what is manifestly needed is that its statement too should pass

into one of energy, of activity, or of interests or pressures."[88] The two

strains were not, as we shall see, so easily reconcilable as Bentley's

careless analogy seems to indicate.

Relativity in Man and Society is probably the most loosely written

of Bentley's books. He remarked half-way through that the plan of his

"essay is however not to specify as far as possible, but to hold back from

specification as much as possible, in order better to get the feel of the

process."[89] Relativity and quantum theory are dominant but by no means

the only themes. It is probably more correct to say that they provided a

powerful stimulus, but Bentley clearly believed that there were trends

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[87]Ibid., p. 9. The manuscript is dated October, 1910.

[88]Relativity, p. 165.

[89]Ibid., p. 179.

toward convergence in a number of physical and social sciences. His remarks about these, especially his evaluation of sociology, will lead us on to his more rigorous theoretical formulations, but for the moment we need to make some general observations about the significance of the rather generalized analogies described above.

Bentley's description of this book as an "essay" is quite accurate, certainly as it compares to The Process of Government. Beyond this, in terms of its subject matter, it might be described as a transitional effort. He did devote a chapter to political matters, but the focus of attention has clearly shifted away from substantive discourse as a whole toward the kind of inquiry undertaken in Part One of The Process of Government. The desperate need for "observational coherence" is a recurrent theme, and that requirement is intimately linked to the search for satisfactory units of investigation, a demand not adequately met in the earlier book. It is tempting to believe that Bentley had not, in 1908, entirely realized the enormity of the task he had set for social science.

The group universe suggested in The Process of Government was abandoned as Bentley turned to the notion of process as a way of conceptualizing the wider and radically altered perspectives of man, space, and time which were requisite to development of adequate descriptive techniques. The voluminous appendices of Relativity in Man and Society contain comments and evaluations of trends in various of the social sciences as they might be helpful to or congruent with Bentley's efforts. It is clear that he was making an effort to relate his general concerns to the more narrow gauge work in sociology and psychology, and further that he did believe that there was a considerable degree of convergence in both physical and social science theory. In the broad sense in which most of these judgments are presented, he was probably justified in his optimism, but the dissatis-

faction with available theoretical tools certainly felt by many sociologists did not extend to a willingness to follow Bentley's excursions into the universe of process.

American sociological and political theory remained for some time fascinated by the notion of the "group," but it was not about to be drawn into a confrontation of those issues which might have led to a new conception of the universe. The initial review of The Process of Government in the house organ of American political scientists failed to discern "value as a contribution to the literature of political science."[90] With the exception of individuals such as Charles Beard, the profession accepted this reviewer's judgment until Charles Merriam and his graduate students at the University of Chicago "discovered" Bentley.[91] Merriam was interested in the application of scientific methods to microscopic study, and the tough-minded empiricism of The Process of Government had an obvious appeal.

In his A History of Political Theories in Recent Times (1924), Merriam praised Bentley's theoretical contribution, and another contributor, the indefatigable Harry Elmer Barnes, recorded his estimate of Bentley's importance. Barnes' Sociology and Political Theory expressed the dominant interpretation of Bentley when it placed him firmly in the pluralist, group conflict, tradition of Albion Small and Gustav Ratzenhofer.[92] As a contribution to American pluralism The Process of Government won mention in a

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[90]APSR (May, 1908), p. 457.

[91]Heinz Eulau, Samuel Eldersveld, and Morris Janowicz, eds., Political Behavior (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), p. 7.

[92](New York, 1924), footnote 15, p. 33 and p. 101. Bentley is discussed in similar terms in two additional essays by Barnes: "Sociology and Political Science," ed. William Fielding Ogburn and Alexander Goldensweiser, The Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), and "Sociological Contributions to Political Theory," ed. Joseph S. Roucek, Twentieth Century Political Theory (New York, 1946). See also Barnes' extended treatment of similar themes in Historical Sociology (New York, 1948).

number of text and reference books such as those of Merle Curti, Herbert W. Schneider, William Y. Elliott, and Margaret Spahr, all published during the 1940s.[93]

This acknowledgment reflected Bentley's inspiration of a number of classic monographs and case studies completed in the late twenties and thirties. "Since the publication in 1908 of A. F. Bentley's pioneering book, The Process of Government, academicians have given increasing attention to political groups."[94] To mention the authors of these works, such as Peter Odegard, Pendleton Herring, E. E. Schatschneider, Belle Zeller, Oliver Garceau, Dayton McKean, among many others, is to remind anyone familiar with American government and political parties of a large part of the scholarly literature.[95]

These case studies were relatively narrow gauge and deliberately so; they were written by professional political scientists seeking to establish a basic, factual inventory. Unquestionably there were many reasons apart from the particular influence of The Process of Government that directed American political science through what Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan have called the "empirical revolution." David Easton's remarks should also be kept in mind:

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[93]Curti, The Growth of American Thought (New York, 1943); Schneider, A History of American Philosophy (New York, 1946); Elliott, The Western Political Heritage (New York, 1949); Spahr, Readings in Recent Political Philosophies. See also Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), footnote 2, p. 120.

[94]David Truman, p. 46.

[95]Peter Odegard, Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League (New York, 1928); Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore, 1929); E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (New York, 1935); Belle Zeller, Pressure Politics in New York (New York, 1937); Dayton McKean, Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey (New York, 1938); Oliver Garceau, The Political Life of the American Medical Association (Cambridge, Mass., 1941).

For American political research the factual conception of science had its birth in the period following the Civil War. Prior to that time the building of factual inventories was practically unknown; after that time there sprang up a view of science that became the basis for modern political research. In this view the essense of science lay in the collection of objective data, the hard facts, about political life. Fundamentally it arose in revulsion against the speculative kind of system-building prevalent in the nineteenth century, especially in Europe and specifically in Germany where most prominent American social scientists either were trained or drew their inspiration.[96]

The drive toward "hyperfactualism" in political science is as old as the century, and by the 1920s it had received the imprimatur of its profess-ional association.

Early in the twenties, under the inspiration of a Committee on Political Research of the American Political Science Association, although not under its auspices, a series of meetings was held in 1922, 1923, and 1924 called the National Conference on the Science of Politics. The basic conceptions running through the reports of these meetings reveal that those most keenly interested in develop-ing a science of politics assumed that the task of political science at that stage was to gather new information. The brief reports of the Conference indicate that the participants devoted themselves to identifying what they considered to be "important" problems upon which research could be undertaken and to devising techniques, statistical and otherwise, for obtaining accurate knowledge about these problems.[97]

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[96]David Easton, The Political System (New York, 1953), pp. 68-9. Interest in establishing a reliable literature did not end with the early efforts listed above. Compare Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (New York, 1950); Fred W. Riggs, Pressures on Congress (New York, 1950); Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing Point Legis-lation (Ithaca, N. Y., 1952); Bertram M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle: A Study in Social Combat (New York, 1953); Gilbert Y. Steiner, Legislation by Collective Bargaining: The Agreed Bill in Illinois (Univ. of Ill. In-stitute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1951); Harold Stein, Public Administration and Policy Development: A Casebook (New York, 1952); George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy (Baltimore, 1951); Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Bal-timore, 1952); David Truman, The Congressional Party (New York, 1959). See the bibliographical accounts of Jean M. Driscoll and Charles S. Hyneman, "Methodology for Political Scientists," ed. Eulau, et al.; and Hyneman, The Study of Politics (Urbana, Ill., 1959).

[97]Easton, p. 75.

Factual knowledge was the necessity, whether it related to legislative, executive, or judicial actions on national, state and local levels, or administrative procedures, or the activities of private pressure groups; a glance at the titles of the studies cited above will reveal an interest in all of these. Certainly the intellectual tide was running favorably for an endorsement of a vigorous, no nonsense research program.. Bentley had added an Appendix to The Process of Government in which he gave as examples of research in politics his own studies of a Chicago municipal referendum, the 1905 session of the Illinois legislature, and the proceedings of the Chicago City council. He could thus be read as a pioneering methodologist as well as a theorist about politics.

I have discussed Bentley's impact, through his most famous book, upon both the professional political scientist qua researcher and, in a more general way, American thinking about politics. Crick's view that The Process of Government was primarily (and properly) received as a recommendation of particular research programs has a good deal of merit, as does his next remark that "a particular methodology becomes a way of stating what is alone thought to be significant political experience."[98] Presumably he means to say that substantive notions about politics underlie and interpenetrate ideas of method, and by 1951 a volume appeared which combined an appreciative professional view of the research monographs with a more generalized theoretical conception of politics and government. This was David Truman's The Governmental Process; it was, if you like, the rediscovery of Bentley.

Early in his Preface Truman states the importance of the interest group studies:

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[98]Crick, p. 120.

More important for purposes of this book are the academic monographs on particular interest groups, of which there have been a considerable number over the past three decades. These monographs have scrutinized techniques utilized by these groups in connection with the enactment and administration of particular public policies.[99]

Shortly thereafter he acknowledged his indebtedness to Bentley:

Among these many items $\int$ of indebtedness $\int$ there is one book, however, that deserves special mention because it has given the subject much of what systematization it has so far received. That is Arthur F. Bentley's The Process of Government, first published in 1908. As the title of the present volume suggests, Bentley's "attempt to fashion a tool" has been the principal bench mark for my thinking. In fact, my plans for this study grew out of my experience in teaching from Bentley's work.[100]

The "plans for this study" to which Truman refers are in essence the project of updating Bentley. This is in no wise intended to minimize a book which has in a little over a decade established itself as a modern classic for the instruction of researchers and the education of students. Truman's intent is quite plainly to write a synthetic work which would gather relevant data under Bentley's categories and to offer a summary statement of the state of our knowledge in these various areas. A perhaps unintended consequence was that in reinforcing Bertram Gross' reminder to contemporary researchers of their predecessor's contribution, Truman implied a more continuous and conscious tradition than actually existed.[101]

Another, though quite deliberate, achievement of The Governmental Process was to place these summary research findings within the context of

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[99]Truman, The Governmental Process, pp. vii-viii.

[100]Ibid., p. ix.

[101]See Gross' review of the second reissue of Bentley's classic, APSR (March, 1950). The Governmental Process is reminiscent of Robert Lane's Political Life (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), but because Lane does not write within or in reference to a particular theory or theoretical work his book assumes a more bibliographical character. A closer parallel is Louis Coser's The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), which attempts a rather rigorous reformulation of some of Georg Simmel's propositions in the light of recent sociological evidence.

a substantive theory of politics which the empirical data supported.
Truman, and a year later Earl Latham, gave perhaps the most clearly ar-
ticulated versions of that theory which had been implicit in much of the
monographic work on political parties and public opinion; it was, of course,
that version of pluralism known as "group theory."[102] The theoretical
framework called "pluralism" is so much a part of American political ex-
perience as well as its science of politics that, like the proverbial
iceberg, by far the greatest part of it lies beneath the articulated sur-
face.[103] The degree to which American political thought and analysis has
been and is a creature of our history and institutions is a vast and in-
triguing question to which a number of recent scholars have addressed them-
selves;[104] at this point our interest is primarily to indicate the manner
in which The Process of Government became absorbed in the main stream of
political science.

American sociologists have been more interested in process theory
per se than have our political scientists. In the next chapter I will

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[102]Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory,"
APSR (June, 1952). The literature on group theory is too voluminous to
be meaningfully sampled here, but of books already cited Bertram Gross'
analysis might profitably be examined.

[103]For a suggestive account of Madison's victory over Paine and its
impact on the course of American political science, see Norman Jacobson,
"Political Science and Political Education," APSR (Sept., 1963).

[104]Henry Kariel, "The Norms of Social Research," The Decline of
American Pluralism (Stanford, Calif., 1961), and Louis Hartz, The Liberal
Tradition in America (New York, 1955), are two such accounts. So perva-
sive is the notion of pluralism that Hartz was led to disregard the con-
siderable comparative material that Bentley urged in support of his in-
terpretation and to insist that a group approach was somehow uniquely
American: "The Bentley group analysis, which was to have so great an
influence on our political science, was a variation of the same process:
the projection of irrational 'Americanism' into the study of America.
It was not, to be sure, a political weapon, as the Beardian analysis
was, but its elevation of peculiar American phenomena into absolute
categories of political analysis was of the same kind as we found there.",
p. 30

review the major developments in sociology's use of the process concept
and contrast them to the evolution of Bentley's theory. When Bentley's
full process theory has been set out I will return to evaluate that theory
in comparison to prevailing forms of process statement in contemporary
sociology and political science.

Our life is a process signalized by events. Succession is transition, a one-way road from the past to the future. The road has no breaks in it. The discontinuous signposts, the events of experience, merely reveal the continuity of passage.

R. M. MacIver

Etymologically, "process" merely means "the fact of going on or being carried on."

Read Bain

CHAPTER IV

PROCESS IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

Albion Small is widely credited with the most forceful as well as one of the earliest formulations of the "process" approach to social phenomena. His General Sociology (1905) is an extended commentary on the work of Gustav Ratzenhofer, and thus we would anticipate the prominence of group struggle notions. They are certainly present but Small wanted to express a broader, perhaps less substantive idea. He saw the central line of methodological progress in past Spencerian social science as the change from a structural to a process viewpoint. The possibility of conceiving of human association as a process is, he said, as old as Hegel, but "hardly in a realistic sense."[1] Sociology is a study of the social process, a whole of knowledge, and this idea of the "process" view of events requires that we conceive of relationships not simply in terms of proximity in time, space, or series, but also as "relationships of working-with, of process."[2]

This notion of "working-with" is murky; it seems to involve temporal proximity even though it is not reducible to that alone.

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[1]As has been argued elsewhere in this paper, Hegel represents an important addition to the process conception but its origins are as old as Western speculative thought. Small himself credited E. C. Hayes and E. A. Ross with the earliest, presumably "realistic" formulations of the idea. General Sociology (Chicago, 1905), footnote, p. 3.

[2]Ibid., p. 18.

> We do not see the real fact in a simple, familiar episode of today--
> like a teamster's strike in the stockyards, or a merger of railroad
> systems--unless we see it as a transient phase of a permanent whole,
> which not only fills the present, but which shades off gradually
> into an invisible past, on the one hand, and into an impenetrable
> future on the other. In a very real sense, the life which we live
> is one with all the life that has occupied the earth, or will oc-
> cupy it hereafter.[3]

It is the temporal dimension of the "permanent whole" that is emphasized

in this Burkean passage, and Small continued to stress the continuity of

the process: its incompleteness and openness. We cannot describe "an

absolute terminal for the social process," nor refer to an association as

a finished affair; we can however, "discover a definite content of the

social process, a work which it is always doing, and which in the nature

of the case, so far as we can see, it must always continue to do, so long

as the process persists."[4] This "definite content" is linked substantively

to Small's tables of drives or desires, and methodologically to the teleo-

logical implications of "becoming." "Nothing is ever described properly

unless it is described with reference to the end which $\lceil$ sic $\rceil$ it is sup-

posed to be fitted, serve or to the process in which it occurs."[5]

The requirement that becoming be seen as a whole ("around it, and

along toward the outcome of it") entails that sociology accept a burden

previously borne by the philosophy of history, namely, the search for

coherence in human experience. The philosophy of history suggested var-

ious one-sided views of that experience, such as the "great man" inter-

pretation of history, later to be superseded by a belief in collectivities

as the bearers of culture. These exaggerations produced sociology, a

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[3] Ibid., p. 32.

[4] Ibid., p. 34.

[5] Ibid., pp. 33-4.

balanced perspective.[6]

Small defined this advance primarily as the <u>recognition of previous distortions</u>, but not as a "new"vision, nor even as a synthesis of partial truths. He did not, for example, suggest that sociology had found a way to combine or otherwise more successfully relate the units of individual and collectivity; instead he suggested an <u>increased</u> number of categories might be applied to an object or situation. "Reality" consists in thinking these classifications as they run through the situation.[7] The sociologist's advantage over older disciplines seems to lie largely in his increased awareness of possible classifications; an awareness that leads him to accept a different notion of reality. Surely Small would not argue that the great philosophers of history were unaware of alternatives to their choice of interpretative categories, indeed much of the body of literature in the field consists of the raising of alternatives and presentation of a reasoned argument for the primacy of some or one. Small's argument would seem to be that the precursors of sociology erred in that they attempted to select at all.

Sociology should focus on precise problems and employ more scientific methods toward their solution.[8] Presumably once <u>given</u> an adequately defined problem area the appropriate classifications will, if not suggest

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[6]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 52. "The several one-sided views have thus been merged into a many-sided inquiry."

[7]<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 73-4. It is interesting to compare Small's remark with Bentley's circle analogy in which the sphere (or society) is intersected by countless possible planes (classificatory principles), <u>The Process of Government</u> (Evanston, Ill., 1949), p. 207. Note especially Bentley's remark: "No one set of groups, that is, no set distinguished on the basis of any one plane, will be an adequate grouping of the whole mass."

[8]Small, p. 52.

themselves, at least prove more easily identifiable. In the absence of a given starting point, we could speculate about which classification or combination would prove the most enduring or yield the maximum information about what goes on in society, but Small's inference is plainly that speculation would be the appropriate term. In this sense the advance represented by emergence of the sociological perspective is a kind of suspension of belief, a reluctance to <u>finally</u> characterize the universe of human association.[9] Small's concept of society as process extended the parameters of inquiry in both space and time; it placed limitations on the depth and permanence of <u>social</u> knowledge.

The great alternatives presented to us by the philosophy of history are possible classifications of reality, and the task of sociology is to narrow our choice through posing and analyzing relatively smaller problems and situations. Small suggested these questions as examples: What forces join men's actions? What are the conditions or laws of action? How may we distinguish between constants and variables? How should an "equilibrium" be described?[10] Queries of this kind can scarcely be described as narrow gauge, but they do provide a focus for thought and they can probably yield sub-propositions of more manageable proportions. Yet precisely because sociology as the master social science must speak to the largest issues, this narrowing method is perilous. Small put the danger this way:

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[9]Of course this kind of analysis might simply move the argument back one step. Instead of asking "What classifications of sociation are most important?" we could ask, "What (precise) problems are most important?" Pursuit of this line of inquiry would move us to another level in which the social and psychological determinants of knowledge would have to be considered. As a sociologist, Small was certainly aware of these matters, but he does not present a full discussion in the text.

[10]Small, p. 105.

Regarding human experience as a whole, how may we mentally resolve it into factors, and at the same time keep effectively in view the vital interaction of the factors in the one process.[11]

He did not find a satisfactory answer, but his efforts to suggest the means through which the total view might be attained did take us quite a distance toward our contemporary situation. Before examining those efforts in more detail it will be well to recall that Small, unlike Bentley, did not purge his idea of process of its fixed points, e.g., drives or instincts. Because he retained some idea of what is "there" in sociation, he had a means of identifying and locating recurrences. This is how he was able to speak of a "definite content" and to assert that some kind of "work" must, in the nature of things, be done by this or that particular process.

Small tried to illustrate this content by incorporating the contributions of Herbert Spencer and Albert Schaffle. Spencer's conception of society as an entity composed of discrete units which are formed into aggregates through performance of necessary services was a <u>structural</u> view. "The essential idea in the concept 'structure' <u>is parts of a whole at rest in relation to each other.</u>"[12] He used the work "function" to describe those services, and thus in some sense structure could be said to follow function.[13]

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[11]<u>Ibid.</u>

[12]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 131.

[13]There is a sense, of course, in which this would be true analytically since "structure" as a particular aggregation is not something else in addition to activity. It is well to be aware of this tautology but such an interpretation of the relation between structure and function or service is not necessary. We might, for example, so define the structure of the family as to keep it in view while the services it performs evolve; we might expect altered services to transform the structure eventually, but the short run modifications might be imperceptible. See, for example, Barrington Moore, "Thoughts on the Future of the Family," <u>Political Power and Social Theory</u> (Cambridge, Mass., 1958). The literature on the "logic" of functionalism, especially the question of tautology, is very extensive. These are a few of particular interest: Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of

Spencer's interest was in these structures, and primarily in the larger more formal aggregates. Small accepted a structural point of view not simply as a stage of sociological thought but as a perhaps enduringly necessary perspective.[14] Yet he leaves us in no doubt that the structural viewpoint has been exaggerated and "dynamic" inquiry ignored.

Schaffle's work represents a trend away from the structural perspective—"Spencer is chiefly interested in demonstrating that functions are; Schaffle is chiefly interested in demonstrating what functions are."[15] For Schaffle, the "initial fact of structure becomes the device for work," and large organizations represent increasingly complex "agencies for work."[16] A postal system would be described in terms of the activities of the manufacturers of paper and pens, of furniture, of transport wagons, the activities of stable owners who rent and raise horses, and the activity of the manufacturers and operators of railroads, and so on.[17]

Welcome though this approach as a corrective to Spencer's teaching was, Schaffle did not investigate causal or consequent states, before and after the "function." Schaffle describes but does not explain. An additional

Functional Analysis," Llewelyn Gross, Symposium on Sociological Theory (White Plains, N. Y., 1959); Ernest Nagel, "Teleological Explanation and Teological Systems," Sidney Ratner, Vision and Action: Essays in Honor of Horace Kallen on His Seventieth Birthday (New Brunswick, N. J., 1953); Robert K. Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions," Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill., 1957); and Marion Levy, The Structure of Society (Princeton, 1952). A stimulating essay on closely related matters is Ernest Gellner, "Holism versus Individualism in History and Sociology," Patrick Gardiner, Theories of History (Glencoe, Ill., 1959).

[14]Small, p. 114.

[15]Ibid., p. 148.

[16]Ibid., p. 150.

[17]Relativity in Man and Society (New York, 1926), pp. 95-7. This example is strikingly similar to Bentley's proposed description of the Volstead Act.

difficulty with Schaffle's method was the circularity involved with iden-
tifying a structure and assigning it a function. Small found this serious
enough to require a denial that functions are identical with the operation
of structures. In support of his argument Small offered several examples
of the failure of structural operations to fulfill functions. We might, he
suggested, say that the operation of the medieval church did not fulfill a
religious function but that the Protestant reformers did.[18] "Functions,"
Small concludes, "are parts of processes, not parts of machineries."

Small hoped to combine the perspectives of Spencer and Schaffle while
yet avoiding their respective distortions. He subordinated both structure
and function to the concept of process and expected it to sustain the study
of aggregates through time. A great weakness of this attempt was his fail-
ure to be clear about the relation of structure and activity on the method-
ological and ontological levels. Does Small mean that "static" analysis of
institutions is the result of an investigator's choice of what stress he will
give to a uniform process, or is he saying that institutions or structures
are "there" alongside of "functions"?

He presented this paradigm of two types of sociological investigation:

Static[19]	Dynamic
Contemporary relationships	Historical background
Classification	Process analysis
Institutional study	Informal group study
Institutional analysis	Causation
Description	Explanation

If, as Small has said, sociology has been moving toward a process view, are
we to understand that process analysis belongs to the dynamic classification,
or does it somehow transcend both? Small was reluctant to finally dispense

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[18]Small, p. 175.

[19]Ibid., p. 113.

with structural analysis, but he clearly felt that the study of development, the way in which structures came to be, was more significant.

This is a preliminary definition Small offered of _the_ social process:

The social process is a continuous rhythm of the _individualization_
of structures arising anew out of others already in existence--i.e.,
the reappearance in the social realm of the biological phenomena of
the propagation of organisms; and on the other hand, of the _social-
ization_ of social structures already existing--i.e., the reappearance
in the social realm of the physiological phenomenon of the somatic
upbuilding of organisms.[20]

Leaving aside the awkwardness of its language, the most striking character-
istic about this passage is the pluralism in its notion of "realms." There
is nothing particularily new in the conception of a phenomenal world com-
posed of vertical realms, the "biological" underlying the "social," but
it is interesting to find Small incorporating a "continuous rhythm" into
this universe. This process, describable as either socialization or dif-
ferentiation, goes on within the social realm, but it is yet in some way
a reflection (a "reappearance") of what has or is going on at a physiolog-
ical or biological level. The process itself seems to operate within the
social, rather than running vertically through several levels. As such,
the social process is set in motion by some yet unnamed mediator operating
between the levels.

The concern to distinguish the social from other, lower-lying spheres
is very prominent in this second definition of the social process:

While we must hark back constantly to the traits of individual per-
sons, the philosophy of social action can never long at a time leave
out of sight the affinities that work in groups of persons. In other
words, the social process is a continuous formation of groups around
interests, and a continual exertion of reciprocal influence by means
of group action.[21]

20[Ibid., p. 191.

21[Ibid., p. 209.

We are back to the "relationships of working-with," the term Small used in his early remarks about the idea of social process, but now we are in a position to understand that phrase in greater depth. The "concrete elements" of the social process, Small tells us, are these: environment, interests, individuals, social structure, social functions, and social purposes.[22] It is the "incessant workings of reciprocal cause and effect between $\overline{}$sic$\overline{}$ these elements" that comprises the social process.[23]

What we call "society" is the activity of individuals, but it is a special aspect of that activity that constitutes the social process. Whatever the multiple determinants of that activity, which might lie in the biological, physiological, geographical, etc., areas, they reach the social process at or perhaps through the element of interest. The psychological dimension of interest is "subjective," but at the point of emergence as collective action it is "objective."[24] At that time we may speak of such phenoma as "rivalry," "competition," and "conflict." They come about through individual interest which arranges activities into fixities or structures. In this sense any motion of the social process is an index of the interest behind it, and our study of visible motions "is merely a means of approaching the view-point from which it will be easy to inspect the spiritual reality that impells the motion."[25]

To interpret society as a process we must see the initial thrust of the interest as it emerges from the sub-social realm and "out along it" to its fulfillment.

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[22]Ibid., p. 212.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., p. 282.

[25]Ibid., p. 284.

That is, we are bound to schedule associations in accordance with
our judgment of their relation to the scale of the ends at issue
in the particular situation in which these associations function.[26]

To grasp the "real process" carried on in structures and activities we

must discover "the deep undercurrents of energy in all association."[27]

This insistence on inquiry in "depth" seems at odds with the conclusion

reached earlier in this chapter: that Small's notion of "thinking" classi-

fications through reality implies acceptance of a certain tentative or con-

ditional character in knowledge of the social. The tension is resolved if

we distinguish between the relative depth of the analyses possible of "in-

terests" at the psychological and those at the social level. Interests

form the classifications which may be thought through society, and they are

determinate--possessing one character or set of characteristics, and not

another. They can be grasped firmly for exactly what they are. However,

when projected onto the social level and incorporated into the social pro-

cess the multiplicity and complexity of their arrangement seems to preclude

attainment of the same depth and precision of knowledge.

We might, for example, be able to delineate the biological and psycho-

logical roots of a "wealth" drive, trace its emergence as an interest in

the social process, and even conclude by describing the arrangement of

activities we call a banking system together with the purposes it serves.

It would be a very different matter to describe the society in which the

banking system exists from the point of view of the wealth interest, i.e.,

by placing those concerns at the center of our analysis and treating any

others as dependent or secondary institutions and structures. In the latter

case we could, if we chose, adopt the wealth perspective, but only with the

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[26]Ibid., p. 217.

[27]Ibid., p. 234.

knowledge that we were making a selection, and perhaps (though this is

not certain) only after thinking through a number of alternative interests

as interpretative principles. At this point Small's methodological dictates

parallel his ontological conception of multiple causal factors.

The basic unit of the social process is the group, although only the

constituent individuals have ontological reality. But to have arrived at

this point is not to have given the social process any content. Small

speaks of the arrangement of interests when they are congealed into groups,

but is there anything that can be said of what the stuff of this succession

of occurrences is? Of course interests considered psychologically, in the

pre-social stage, have content; the six interests, health, wealth, socia-

bility, knowledge, beauty, and rightness, are substantive, but it is not

at all clear what they will look like in the specifically social realm.

This point was troublesome to Small and he specifically warned against con-

ceiving of the social process entirely as the operation of machinery. Still,

in a general survey, "we must describe the social process very largely in

terms of the mechanism of the process rather than of the content of the

process."[28]

Later Small seemed to suggest that the social content is very much the

same as psychological interest but viewed differently. It is discoverable,

he said, in qualities and relations of persons "considered as the ultimate

terms rather than as factors in an ultimate cultural process."[29] Unless

Small simply meant that psychology need not concern itself with "social"

phenomena, this passage is quite unclear, but whatever was meant, the notion

of conflict was very important at the social level. Because he built his

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[28]Ibid., p. 284.

[29]Ibid., p. 350.

entire notion of the social realm upon an individual psychology, Small was led to envision the social process as predominately a conflict area. Private interests together with the scarcity principle seemed to him to require conflict as at least a preliminary stage of social organization.

Organization, with the state considered as the most inclusive organization, progresses to a condition of relative civilization from one of relative barbarism through the resolution of conflict. Conflict takes place not only among the various private interests, but between the _idea_ of private interest (the sum of all private interests) and the achievement of the common good.

> The tendency of the social process is thus in sharp anti-thesis with the essence of the struggle incidental to the process. Yet, as a matter of fact, the process goes on by means of this unsocial and even anti-social spirit.[30]

The state supresses conflict, but it also promotes cooperation (and thus civilization) by expanding the area of the common good--for example, by encouraging "functional equality," or the right of a man to be treated as a person rather than as a commodity.[31]

The problem of sociology is to state the existing conflicts within a society, but Small was reluctant to anticipate or prescribe the nature of the social process.

> Our present thesis anticipates nothing with reference to the nature of the social process, or its mechanism, or its results. We are concerned at the start merely with the empty, formal conception that, so far as it goes, whether taken in its minutest fragments or in the largest reaches which we can contemplate, human experience is a congeries of occurrences which have their meaning by reference to each other.[32]

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[30]Ibid., p. 332.

[31]Ibid., p. 347.

[32]Ibid., p. 514.

Here is the familiar holistic note; the insistence that occurrences must be understood less for themselves (as their content or nature) than in their juxtaposition in the remainder of the congeries. At a much earlier point Small had urged the need to seek out connections between and among processes, but, "At the same time, we are freed from all assumptions that bind us to theories of likeness or other relation, if it does not exist."[33]

We would not expect to be bound to theories of demonstrably non-existant relationships but surely Small has more than this liberation in mind. He is asking for the freedom to think through possible classifications as they might apply to this or that situation of the social process. Freedom in this sense means without prior commitment to one or another classification. "We do not represent human experience to ourselves as it is, unless we think every portion of it as a factor in a process composed of all human experiences."[34] With this statement we have come nearly full circle in Small's conception of the social process. There remains to be considered his example of analysis in the process method.

A process analysis of the French Revolution would begin with the recognition that all the activities of the period accomplished some part of the realization of essential human interests, and the first task to be faced is to achieve an overall view of the entire movement. This is how Small would make such an initial appraisal:

> The French, from lowest to highest, had become conscious of wants which the traditional social system arbitrarily repressed. The Revolution is in part a spontaneous, spasmodic effort, and in part a reasoned plan, of the French to release themselves from those inherited restrictions, and to achieve a social situation in which the

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[33]Ibid., p. 185.

[34]Ibid., p. 513.

wants of which they are now conscious, or semi-conscious, will be free to find satisfaction.[35]

The second step would be to identify the specific wants of particular portions of the French population. Presumably it is at this second stage (though possibly also at the first) that Small would undertake the exercise of thinking about possible classifications of the population.

Having completed these steps the specifically dynamic conception of process analysis begins as we would "follow out the details of analyzing the several classes of wants" down to concrete demands of specific interests, tracing relations of "each occurrence worth noting" to the "whole complicated interplay of these desires throughout the complex movement."[36] The "dynamic" quality of this inquiry consists in its encompassing prior and subsequent states into the idea of a single developing interest, and in its refusal to erect conceptual partitions between these evolutionary chains of interests (e.g., "estates"). The tracing of these interests does not need to "bump into" or "flow over" a law or an institution. Finally, the whole of the situation, the post-revolutionary society, is reconstructed and the degree and direction of change recorded.

Throughout this example the central idea of extending the analysis dominates all other characteristics. In part this is the case because Small omits to mention an entire range of subsidiary questions about his procedure; in particular we are left without a clue as to the means of identification of these interests on the social level. Very specifically the questions are: How are we to determine the "several classes of wants" whose details are to be followed out? What links some occurrences together in such a fashion as

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[35]Ibid., p. 515.

[36]Ibid., p. 516.

to distinguish them from others? In Small's terms, what is the nature of the principle of classification? Does it, for example, lie on the surface of human activity, open to our sight and comprehension?

To put the query in these terms is to raise the central difficulty in General Sociology, a difficulty Arthur Bentley's criticism of Small locates and dramatizes with considerable accuracy but insufficient generality. Small's sociology is teleological, as he tells us over and over in many different contexts. The great stumbling block is that Small cannot get his purposive ideas formulated in a _social_ statement. He wanted to stress movement and becoming, but this led him to empty his notion of process of its content. If he were a speculative philosopher like Hegel he might have offered us a metaphysic in which the dialectic, or some comparable predicate of the process, would be invested with purpose of substance. Alternatively he might have adopted some distinction akin to Simmel's form-content dichotomy, however much difficulty he might have in getting them together in one universe. Finally, he could have swallowed any nominalistic objections and openly built purpose into existing institutions instead of tortuously inferring them from the biological or psychological (i.e., individual) realm.

In fact Small does almost exactly this last, but he is not quite frank about what he is doing. As we noted above, Small's universe of human experience is hierarchical, composed of vertically conceived realms. The interchange of psychical influences within the biological, social, and physical context is human association, and "the interpretation of the social process which has been projected is what we know as 'social psychology.'"[37]

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[37]_Ibid._, p. 622.

> The psychologist and the sociologist are trying to tunnel the life-process from opposite sides; the one from the individual, the other from the associational side; but there is no way for either of them through the life reality, unless it is a way in which they meet at last.[38]

The study of society begins where psychology and physiology stop, or where they <u>would</u> stop <u>if</u> they adhered to a rigid, schematic program, "or where they would stop if our mental processes occurred in the lineal and serial order in which <u>we have to represent them in speech</u>."[39]

If one phrase had to be chosen to illustrate the differences between Arthur Bentley and Albion Small this one would be difficult to surpass; it would be little exaggeration to say that the main thrust of <u>The Process of Government</u>, and the corpus of Bentley's later work, is the denial of any such necessity, together with a determination to formulate alternative language patterns. A corollary of this is the quite apparent difference between their respective views of the connections among thought, science, and language. Bentley's entire point against Small's plural realms and his use of drives or interests was that as vehicles of scientific analysis and ultimately as the very basis of thought, their linguistic form leads to imprisonment, not liberation.

Most of Bentley's specific critique of <u>General Sociology</u> was a polemic against Small's belief that we could talk one way but think differently. The most immediate substantive theoretical consequence is that Small's social process goes on in the social realm which holds an "interchange of psychical influences" with the others, while Bentley's process runs transactionally through <u>the</u> realm of human experience. In this sense, Small's use of the term "social psychology" appeared to Bentley as a most concise

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[38]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 506.

[39]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 447. (Emphasis added.)

confession of bankruptcy. It was the joining of two non-existing "halves"
of experience into a fictitious whole. For Small, on the other hand, this
union was vital, since the only way "definite" content can find its way
into the social process was from psychology.

> That is, after human experience is formulated in terms of structure,
> and of function, and of process, we have only formulations of effects.
> The causes of these effects, so far as we can trace them, are the
> volitions that register the resultant of purpose and feeling and choice.
> The restatement of the social process in terms of purpose and choice
> is social psychology.[40]

Finally, it was through the individual's purposes that Small could get
to the teleological principles underlying those classifications he wished
to introduce into the social process and thus conduct any kind of analysis
at all. The difficulties into which Small was led by this procedure are
legion and most of them have been at least mentioned above. In the end the
old ambiguity of methodological and ontological levels remains, even in the
last quoted passage. Is the "restatement" referred to simply another pers-
pective as Small sometimes seems to intend his classifications within the
social realm itself to be? If so, are we then excluded from the consider-
ation of causation in the specifically social process? If not, does a
social psychological statement represent a richer, more complete conception
of the universe of experience? Neither alternative seemed to satisfy Small,
nor do they satisfy us today.

But to conclude that his formulation of the process idea is unsatis-
factory in many respects is not to give unqualified assent to Bentley's
criticism. Small is important for a number of reasons, not the least of
which is his determination to get on with the work of sociology while at
the same time developing a methodological foundation for the enterprise.
His desire to do both made him reluctant to embrace totalistic solutions,

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[40]Ibid., p. 637.

such as discarding this or that conception in the sociologist's arsenal.
Small believed in a sociological tradition, albeit it an evolving one, and
he was much less prepared than Bentley to dismiss his predecessors as stupid
or mistaken. This means that the compromises, the patchwork and the stop-
gaps that Small used are more likely to reflect the course that a discipline
will, in fact, pursue in the short run than are the more profound but more
ruthless resolves of an Arthur Bentley.

My intention has not been to compile a catalogue of vagaries or out-
right inadequacies which might be charged against Small. The structure of
this inquiry has necessarily stressed the differences among writers in the
process tradition, but apart from the admittedly fundamental divergences
discussed above there is a wide area of agreement between Bentley and Small.
This is especially true on the metaphorical level wherein passages from one
author could be exchanged for those of the other without violating either
text. Even Bentley's detailed critique notes with considerable approval
certain of Small's ("social") formulations of interests. To a degree this
condition is a consequence of the metaphorical usage on both sides of the
word "process," but metaphor, simile, and analogy are just as surely a means
of communication as symbolic logic, and they are much more widely employed
and employable.

Bentley, unlike the author of General Sociology, pursued his inquiries
into the idea of process, but Small's statement is still representative of
important parts of that idea. His admiration for Ratzenhofer is genuine,
and his drives and instincts, wherever they are placed in a conceptual
scheme, provide a link to contemporary theories of the group process. For
very many American political scientists that brief phrase is the totality
of the "theory." Small's clear perception of the need for unity, expressed
in the desire to break down false divisions among the social sciences, and

the demand for continuity in our study of human activity lent the idea of process a holistic inclination it still retains.[41]

Closely associated with the sense of "connectedness" in continuity and holism was the notion of the social process as a "becoming," with all the teleological overtones of that word. The temporal dimension of becoming has inclined at least one scholar to classify Small's entire approach to process analysis as "evolutionary" as opposed to later "analytical" usage.[42] This interpretation has merit and we will have occasion to explore it more fully in the following pages, but there is another connotation of "becoming" that is at least as worthy of our attention, namely, that of "richness." To Aristotle and Hegel, and certainly to Small, something was becoming. The analogies that come to mind at the mention of the word are organic relations, and we think immediately of complex interconnections and multiple causes.

The point is that Small thought very definitely in terms of human experience when he wrote about "becoming" and not about the austere geometrical analogies which appeared before Georg Simmel. The strange part of this is that Small should then proceed to a conception of the social process in which it is so hard to accommodate any "content." In fact what happened was that Small's process had become much more akin to Bergson's sense of passage, and in one respect it was as content-less as Simmel's form. Despite his passionate insistence on the dynamic analysis of the social process, Small poured all content into the sub-social realm and then squeezed it "up" to the surface of collective action through the funnel of interest. When he came to discuss ways of tracing interests through the social process

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[41]We are more likely to express this today by talking about "systems," but the equivalence is manifest.

[42]Earle E. Eubank, "Relationship of Social Process, Emory S. Bogardus, Social Problems and Social Processes (Chicago, 1932).

there was no path for him to perceive; the skein had been broken and he had to "think" all kinds of hypothetical patterns through the process as if it were the sphere of Bentley and Simmel.

Simmel had charged sociology with the task of abstracting general form from the rich content of on-going process of sociation which was neither simply individual nor simply collective. By locating causal factors in the sub-social realms Small put himself in the position of examining a becoming process from which he had drained the content and dynamism. The social process "passes"; what else could Small say? This is a curious termination of the historical, evolutionary version of the idea of process.[43]

Central to these remarks about Small and Simmel is the difficulty of getting social phenomena stated in terms of the social process. In large part the problem has been one of bringing methodological constructs into harmony with ontology; for example, in maintaining a consistent treatment of the idea of a "social relation" on both levels. Small's formulation was definitely nominalist in that whatever unit of investigation he commended to sociology he insisted that "society," the social process, was composed at bottom of acting individuals. In this respect Small represents a conception of what is ontologically real about society that has dominated American sociology and political theory. However, as was mentioned in preceding pages, a belief in individual action as the ultimate basis of society does not require that sociology accept a particular methodological unit (although it may exclude some). What, after all, is a "social relation" and what connection does it have to activity per se? Simmel had replied to this question with the metaphysical form-content dichotomy, but this alternative has been distasteful to the mainstream of American social science.

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[43]Compare Simmel's treatment of "conflict" as a form with Small's.

One of the most interesting and detailed attempts to establish a

theoretical foundation in this treacherous ground, without following

Simmel into the speculative realm, was that of Leopold von Weise and his

associate Howard Becker. The most complete exposition of this approach

in English is von Weise and Becker, Systematic Sociology, subtitled, "On

the Basis of the Beziehungslehre and Gebildelehre."[44] Von Weise is espec-

ially important to us because Bentley praised him as making the most strik-

ing advance in systematizing our technical knowledge of society.[45] For the

moment I will simply set forth von Weise's central contentions as an alter-

native formulation to Small's evolutionary or becoming notion of the social

process.

By comparison to Small, von Weise gave at least the initial impression

of great rigor. "Society," he said, is a purely verbal expression for the

sum of "happenings," but it would not be correct to deduce from this that

"structures" may be adequately stated when their component parts are enum-

erated. The parts stand in particular relations to one another in a struc-

ture. On the knotty matter of "purpose" von Weise was more cautious than

Small in that he conceded a need to understand the contribution of the parts

to the whole, he remained skeptical of the teleological method as scienti-

fically acceptable, and he disliked the conception of certain actions as

"functions" of something else. In response to the direct question, "What

is the 'social,'" Weise gave this answer:

> The specifically "social" or interhuman consists in an involved and
> entangled network of relations between men; each social relation is
> the product of one or more social processes; the human cosmos will

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[44](New York, 1932).

[45]Relativity, p. 344. Bentley retained some reservations and we will
need to look very carefully at these since they provide a clue to the later
stages of his own idea of process.

find its ultimate explanation in the social processes.[46]

The social, as distinct but not isolated from the realms of body and soul, is a "chain of occurrences flowing along with time," and therefore, "a dynamic conception of the interchange will be more adequate."[47] The social relation, a product of the social process, he saw as "a station or halting place in the vast stream of occurrences."[48] "We will always find in dismembering the social occurrence that it consists only of processes but never of substances existing independently of the individual men."[49] If we were to halt the "constantly flowing stream of human activity" for just a moment, we would find an "apparently impenetrable network of lines between men." A "static" analysis would consist in "dismemberment and re-construction of this system of relations."[50]

Thus far we seem to be on relatively firm ground, but as von Weise recognized, we are already in the swamp. "Relations" might be considered as analagous to the rapid motion of magnitudes which create a stream of energy-bearing atoms from one molecule to another.[51] The molecules ("in-dividuals") and "crystals" ("plurality patterns") were probably (although this question is beyond science) always co-existent, but at any rate the concepts are inseparable.

> Hence the analogy might with some justification have been reversed. We might have postulated an "energy-stream cosmos," within which there come to exist large and complex structures that reciprocally

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[46]Leopold von Weise, Sociology (New York, 1941), p. 23. (Emphasis added.)

[47]Ibid., p. 29.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Ibid., p. 38.

[50]Ibid., p. 29.

[51]Von Weise and Becker, p. 25.

influence each other until as a result of this activity molecules, atoms, etc., are detached.[52]

Sociology focuses upon the "socius," the "spatial locus of sociation"; what in Charles Horton Cooley's phrase, "A man may be regarded as the point of intersection of an indefinite number of circles representing social groups, having as many arcs passing through him as there are groups."[53] If either analogy is acceptable, why choose the former? The answer is that terms like society and even socius refer to relatively _advanced_ stages of complexity, and on a temporal dimension the first analogy enables us to follow an historical development from the simpler to the more complicated.[54] Weise and Becker argued that they had achieved a secure epistemological foundation in the individual actor, but, following Simmel, they conceded that though reciprocity is all that is "out there," the complexity of human institutions is such that we are "compelled" to speak _as if_ there were substantial social unities at a supra-individual level.[55]

The point at which sociology begins to disentangle this web of inter-relationships is entirely a matter of convenience and utility (compare Small's suggestion that the choice of classifications of the social process could be determined by the selection of problems).[56] As to the "depth"

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[52]_Ibid._, p. 29.

[53]Quoted from Cooley, _Human Nature and the Social Order_ in von Weise and Becker, p. 23. The persistence of the arc and circle analogy in the work of social process theorists is remarkable.

[54]Von Weise and Becker, p. 29.

[55]Compare the remark of Hans Vaihinger, "It must be remembered that the object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal of reality—that would be an utterly impossible task—but rather to provide us with _an_ instrument for finding our way about more easily in this world.", _The Philosophy of "As If"_ (London, 1952), p. 15.

[56]Von Weise and Becker, p. 36.

aspect of human experience--the various physiological, biological, and psychological elements plus "purposes"--these should be examined by the appropriate special social sciences.[57] This excludes consideration of "inner" states.

> Sociology must consider as "real" what manifests itself in action. Often it must take mere appearances for truth as long as it wants to give surveys or to develop a frame of reference; only later in its individual analyses can it reach the "reality" of inner rela-tionships.[58]

This quotation puts Weise pretty firmly in the empiricist camp. It is contentions like this that prompted Theodore Abel to choose him as the prototype of the empirical heritage of Simmel as contrasted to the pheno-menalist alternative pursued by Alfred Vierkandt in which the Verstehen approach to inner states is much more important.[59]

The point is that no predicates of the psychological or individual states, instincts, interests, etc., can be determined a priori or "deduced" from existing social arrangements and then installed as principles or clas-sifications by which to analyze society. How, then, does the student of society proceed? "What is a social process? It must be some kind of occur-rence which can be shown as a basic happening in the whole interhuman sphere."[60] Weise began this vital phase of inquiry by adopting an almost absurdly simple suggestion. Social processes, he said, do one of two things; either they bring men "closer," induce them to "approach" one another, or they separate them, "create a distance."[61] This formulation gives von Weise's

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[57]Of course this exclusion comes very close to Simmel's purely formal sociology.

[58]Von Weise, p. 36.

[59]Systematic Sociology in Germany (New York, 1929).

[60]Von Weise, pp. 30-1.

[61]Ibid., pp. 31-2.

system an enduringly spatial emphasis in contrast to, for example, Small's temporal, sequential stress. But what did such a conception of "closeness" or "apartness" mean? Could it be made to include "social" distance? Von Weise argued that spatial distance might, to an extent, "illustrate" social interconnections. We should be concerned with the direction and the degree of distance involved in social processes, with the former understood as "toward" or "away from," and the latter understood as a comparative measure.

We should begin with simple occurrences, select a "thread," one original and primal process which leads to a relation, and follow its course through possible or probable interconnections with other processes to the formation of a social structure.[62] Social processes, as we have noted, create social relations which are relatively stable, i.e., repetitive; these are social structures "which in a static study must be defined as a number of social relations so bound together that they are understood as units or substances in daily life."[63] The constituent individual processes might be divided according to a simple scheme such as: "A" or associative processes comprising advance, adjustment, accordance, and amalgamation; and "B" processes including competition, opposition, and conflict. On the same conceptual level provision could be made for "M" or mixed processes.[64]

The realm of the social is "external," and is thus more easily expressed as the physical sense of distance. But in the interest of avoiding the criticism that this view is overly "naturalistic," we can define "sociologically relevant action as the 'projection' of mental phenomena into

[62] Ibid., pp. 42-3.

[63] Ibid., pp. 40-1.

[64] Ibid., pp. 58-9.

the world of physical space by means of sensually perceivable modes of expression."[65] In this sense social _phenomena_ would not be equivalent to the social as a _category_.[66] Von Weise contended that once we have attained some measure of agreement on the categories applicable to "perceivable modes of expression," the theory of relations he hoped to create would become "primarily a theory of the procedure (method) of observing the phenomena of the social sphere in a correct manner."[67]

If at this point von Weise would have proceeded to specify sociology narrowly as a theory of relations, he might have found his way to a position very like that of Georg Simmel, but instead he takes a step which closed that door. The general method of analysis, he said, can be expressed in the formula, "P$[$rocess$]$ $=$ A$[$ttitude$]$ X S$[$ituation$]$.[68] This is a formula for uncovering "process" and not simply "relation."

> If we were interested in mere relations we should not care whether
> they were caused by human influences or by mechanical forces and
> chemical processes, or whether they were dynamic or static.[69]

If it were simply a matter of saying that sociology should concern itself with the external manifestations of attitude or motive states von Weise might have let this formula stand as an heuristic device, but he continued to assert that men's inner states are not independent of the social realm. Thus "A" must be itself a product of "I" or "innate pecularities" and "E", experience.

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[65]Von Weise and Becker, p. 70.

[66]The language is Dewey's but the point might well be Simmel's.

[67]Von Weise, p. 51.

[68]_Ibid._

[69]Von Weise and Becker, p. 54.

The "S" component must also be sub-divided into "C", the non-human environment, and "AS", the attitude of other men involved in a particular social process. Situation must then be represented as "S = C X AS". The original formula as modified would then read: "P = A (I X E) X S (C X AS)".[70] Now instead of having a conceptual schema like Small's, in which the individual and the psychological lie "behind" (on a temporal scale), or "beneath" (in a spatial sense), the social, we have elements of both realms interacting on the same phenomenal level. In order to disentangle them analytically von Weise introduced the methodological device of "orders" of processes. Those processes which take place between or among individuals ("interhuman processes") he calls "processes of the first order"; processes of the second order refer to occurrences between men when the existence of a social structure must be taken into account, and beyond these is the third category of processes between structures themselves.[71]

The latter two orders presuppose a theory of social structure that can operate on a conceptual level comparable to the theory of social relations so that the ideas of social process and distance can remain basic to both. Weise suggested that such constructs as "crowds, groups, and abstract collectivities" could be distinguished by determining the degrees of distance between the individual and the collectivity. In part "distance" seemed to rest on the degree of freedom or prescription enjoyed by the individual "within" the structure.[72]

These remarks indicate von Weise's willingness to enrich and broaden his plan for a systematic sociology, but as he proceeds he strays further and further from the strict nominalism with which he began. Elements of

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[70]Von Weise, p. 58.

[71]Ibid., p. 63.

[72]Ibid., p. 71.

[73]Ibid., p. 75.

psychology become increasingly prominent as he refers to the "perceptions

of group" by its members, and to the "principal desires" of the membership.[73]

At the other end of the scale we find him introducing a notion of "force"

akin to Durkheim's constraint, as a predicate of structures.[74] The attempt

to reassert a rigorous nominalism becomes a little pathetic when we are

told that the "power" of a plurality pattern is the mental influence it

wields over its members; the state is real because men define it as such.[75]

The two forms of sociation (association and dissociation) were to be

analyzed by the following sets of concepts:

Dynamic[76]	Static
Motion	Distance
or	or
Action Pattern	Action Pattern
or	or
Process	Relationship

The second of these paired concepts, "Action Pattern" and Action Pattern"

are strikingly similar to Arthur Bentley's discussion of "interaction" and

"interaction" with, as we shall subsequently see, the vital exception that

Bentley was not willing to rest content with a dualism.[77] For all of the

labors of Weise and Becker, their conceptual framework does not satisfy.

They did, however, manage to clarify difficulties which were covered over

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[73]Ibid., p. 75.

[74]Ibid., pp. 76-7.

[75]Von Weise and Becker, pp. 88-93.

[76]Ibid., p. 53.

[77]Another parallel might be Franklin Giddings' discussion of "form pattern" and "action pattern" in The Scientific Study of Human Society, see von Weise and Becker, footnote, pp. 54-5.

and obscured in Small's work. In an important footnote they explicitly
recognized the central tension in the process tradition when they proclaimed
that "with Ross":

> We choose the social process as the unit of the present system--
> not the group, not the single human being, not the family nor
> anything similarily static, and finally not even the institution.[78]

We have finally achieved an unequivocal assertion that the process
unit is not the group. We do not yet have much idea of how to identify and
work with the process unit, and unhappily von Weise does not seem to either.
His empirical and comparative method depended entirely upon determining
the direction and the degree of the process, and movement in spatial terms
is relative to some system of coordination. Even the fundamental notion of
association and dissociation is qualitative, and von Weise's hope for "rank-
ing" of those processes, as Theodore Abel pointed out, did not provide a
parallel unit basis for quantification.

Bentley, with his usual astuteness, located the source of the diffi-
culty. He recognized that Weise's Beziehungen, or relations, were essen-
tially Simmel's forms but with an important modification; they were "not
merely logical relations, but 'something doing,' something going on,
Handeln, activity."[79] Bentley described von Weise's system, particularly
the treatment of interhuman relations and institutions, and noted that
"Beziehungen showed signs of going all the way up and Gebilde of coming
all the way back." At this point, continued Bentley, Weise discovered that
any social situation appeared as process from some point of view in reference
to other situations. To accommodate this insight he introduced the term
Prozesse between Beziehungen and Gebilde, but "Almost at once the Prozesse

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[78]Von Weise and Becker, footnote, pp. 55-6.

[79]Relativity, p. 345.

identified themselves with the Beziehungen; there was no way to hold them apart."[80]

Recognizing this, Weise made the terms equal by definition but continued to distinguish them for purposes of study. As he proceeded to an analysis of situations "something surprising happened." "The Gebilde began to appear in between the technical Beziehungen and the technical Prozesse, without waiting for their due time to appear later on in his system."[81] Von Weise "grudgingly" recognized them there, "calling them by preference Zustande, which we may translate as situations that are going to be."[82] This entire difficulty, Bentley maintained, was due to the notion of distinct stages of psychology, i.e., the individual, psycho-social, social psychological levels. This foundation retained too much of the Seele trappings of German philosophy which led Weise into tortured formulations in order to retain them.

With all this, however, von Weise stood pretty well in Bentley's estimation until he stumbled over that old obstacle, the subjective-objective dichotomy. He had regarded MacDougall's instincts, or some comparable formulation, as necessary to a full comprehension of human experience even though they were not a part of his own work. Because he distinguished the instinctual, mental realm from the external or social, Weise was forced to "see" his stages from these different viewpoints.[83] This introduced the same kind of division into the realm of human experience, the old boundedness of phenomena that gave us the world in two incomplete spheres awkwardly conjoined. Weise stressed the externality of social behavior because

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[80]Ibid., p. 346.

[81]Ibid., p. 347.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Ibid., p. 351.

his analytic procedure rested upon detecting movement toward or away from. Presumably he envisioned these terms to be much more operational than any he could devise to examine the internal or psychological state.

Unlike Alfred Vierkandt, who represented an alternative development of Simmel's social thought, Weise chose action and the observable as the basis of sociology. Vierkandt's phenomenological sociology insisted that the objective or external manifestations of interaction were trivial in importance compared to the inner states of individuals involved in sociation. The former were but "sediments" of the latter.[84] Both Abel and Bentley regarded Vierkandt's phenomenology as a departure from the most fruitful lines of Simmel's thought, and the latter went so far as to call it a destruction of Simmel. The point of Bentley's criticism is not that Weise conceded the "inner state" phenomena a place in social analysis, but rather that he conceived of it as distinct from "external" phenomena. The difficulty lay in the reintroduction of discrete realms.

We are fortunate that Becker's reply to Bentley centered about a concept very closely related to the subjective-objective dichotomy, namely, the "self." Becker began by affirming (against, for example, Vierkandt) the difficulty of apprehending an essential self when it appears always in a state of flux. If it be so considered then it is "in actuality nothing more than a temporary focal point of mutable relations," and thus:

> Should not everything fixed, permanent, and indissoluble, or in other words, substantial, be completely decomposed into inter-human processes and the relationships and plurality patterns arising from them?[85]

This Becker affirmed (correctly, I think) as Bentley's position, and he continued to make the conception of the self the essential difference be-

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[84]See Abel's remarks, pp. 58-60.

[85]Von Weise and Becker, p. 102.

tween them. Despite the relativity of the notion of self, and despite a measure of agreement with Durkheim's dictum that one social fact must be explained by reference to another, "We nevertheless regard the self as the point of initial and fixed focus in any genuine science of interhuman behavior."[86]

From this starting point it followed that Bentley dealt with only half of the sociological problem.

> [Bentley's] road avoids the morasses of over-hasty judgments and crude single-factor fallacies but finally confuses and dismays us by the multiplicity of its facts and branches, by the indistinguishably intricate maze of social occurrences that flashes by.[87]

We must, Becker argued, have system, a sense of relative importance or else we flounder in byways drowned by our factual knowledge. "At bottom the question is whether sociology can dispense with an Archimedean point," which for Weise and Becker is the individual as "the loci of sociation."[88]

The issue is now joined at, if you like, the Archimedean point. To Becker the individual self was requisite as a unit by which the multiplicity of plurality patterns and their intertwining could be disentangled, and it also served as a locus of the inner states, the dimension of psychology and motivation. It is apparent that Becker, despite his inclination to defend retention of the self concept as an heuristic principle (e.g., as a "loci" of sociation), believed that the individual had a more secure basis in reality than simply that of a conceptual unit. We must imagine that Bentley would have conceded the possibility that under some specific circumstances the self might appear as a useful unit of analysis, but he unquestionably

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[86]Ibid., p. 103.

[87]Ibid., pp. 103-4.

[88]Ibid., p. 104.

rejected a vision of human experience in which the individual self and the social self formed two "halves" of a whole.

More clearly than Small, Weise and Becker present the case against Bentley's radical version of a process universe; how, they asked, avoid being overwhelmed by pure, undifferentiated fact? Their reply to Bentley represents a forceful critique of the position advanced in Relativity in Mand and Society, and it is probably this argument that accounts for the refusal of American sociology to give itself over to Bentley's science. But Weise and Becker failed to accomplish two important tasks. First, they did not meet Bentley's critique of the inability of systematic soc-iology to accommodate the individual, dynamic, or process half of its universe to the collective, static, patterned portion. Second, their counter critique of Bentley did not reach the later development of his thought in which he attempted to meet the central difficulty, namely, how can there be a science of process?

A point not to be overlooked is the great degree of similarity in these two positions which seemed to be recognized on both sides. The systematic sociology of von Weise is very similar to that of Simmel, even to the nature of the difficulties in handling the form-content dichotomy. Bentley's social science is a radical attempt to cut across that dichotomy by expanding the concept of process to eliminate distinct realms or spheres within human experience. In an overall view, these two approaches to soc-iology are closer to each other than to Albion Small's notion of social process. American sociology has dealt rather gingerly with the methodolog-ical and theoretical differences among these various approaches. There did develop what might be designated loosely as "schools" of process analysis which emphasized the historical or becoming phase on the one hand, and the analytic or systematic on the other.

Political science in America has been less conscious of the strains and discontinuities within the idea of process, and because of its largely uncritical acceptance of Bentley's version, one of the richest and most complex, it has been able to find room for a wide variety of differing studies and approaches within the idea of process. It is interesting that political scientists, placing the group unit at the center of their analyses, began to explore the notion of process in terms much more reminiscent of the becoming variant, and only more recently began taking a more analytic turn, e.g., their concern for political "systems." In the remaining pages of this chapter I will describe in summary fashion some of the principal definitions and uses of the process notion in American sociology. With that summary as a basis, we can turn to an elaboration of Bent'ay's mature transactional analysis and present its deviation from both sociological versions of process in the following chapter.

The 1931 annual meeting of the American Sociological Society was devoted "in considerable part" to analyses of the idea of social process, and selected papers were published the following year as <u>Social Problems and Social Processes</u>.[89] The papers are quite diversified and present a variety of approaches: there are case studies, historical treatments, and conceptual analyses. Evaluations of the term "social process" also varied widely, from provisional if cautious approval to outright dismissal. Emory Bogardus struck the note of optimism in the Introduction when he remarked that though the term social process had long been prominent in the sociological vocabulary it had often been "swallowed whole," and "has never achieved a commonly accepted meaning, nor has it been sharply enough de-

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[89]Edited by Emory S. Bogardus (Chicago, 1932).

fined to give it status as a reliable scientific tool."[90] He continued to call it a "generalization of concepts," useful in referring to all social processes, but cautioned against its use as "a concrete working tool in the study of social problems."

"Interaction," he thought, was the "best illustration" of process.

The term, a social process, as representative of many social processes, has scientific import. . . . Objectively, a social process is a series of social changes. Structurally, it is the mode which the social changes of a given series follow. Subjectively, a dynamic social process is found in the changes in attitudes and values of those persons who figure in any series of social changes. Intrinsically, a social process is a dynamic moving equilibrium of human energy.[91]

This is not remarkably helpful, but it does indicate the degree to which the idea of social process was associated with the notions of dynamism, change, and motion.

C. M. Case echoed this theme and added the idea of the study of wholes. Read Bain remarked, "The social process concept was a protest against both static, descriptive sociology and the normative implications of progress and social evolution."[92] He assigned the non-normative implications to the methodological realm, and as a philosophical concept he thought it indicated the "relative on-going-ness" of social phenomena. As a natural science concept it was "useless and meaningless." "Social interaction," "socialization," "organic social growth," "social evolution," "social organization," "social dynamics," "social change," or the normative "social progress" were all possible substitutes.

Bain viewed social process primarily, it would seem, as an evocative phrase. If, he argued, we adopt plural phrases such as processes of com-

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[90] Ibid., p. ix.

[91] Ibid., p. xi.

[92] Ibid., p. 105.

petition, conflict, accommodation, and so on, we will be talking about observable, possibly measurable and classifiable, conceivably even scientific concepts, but the phrase "process of" is mere tautology, "so we must render a verdict of pseudo-science alike for the singular and plural form of social process."[93] Process was, he concluded, harmless in its tautological usage but pernicious when it was used to suggest that _it_, and not the specific activity, e.g., conflict, is the concept. In this form the use of process was "pseudo-scientific jargon," and "an attempt to make a natural science concept out of a methodological or philosophic concept."[94]

Bair's criticism of careless usage certainly merits attention but on the whole his colleagues did not share his enthusiasm for "hard" natural science. Of primary interest to us is his list of equivalent terms which stress the terms of Small's version of process analysis, "growth," "organism," "evolution," and so forth. Florian Znaniecki, with his customary care, contributed a more convincing discussion of process and science. "In modern science, every process is referred to some static or dynamic system of interconnected events"; this system "furnishes the set of conditions under which a cause produces its effect and the causal law applies to the process in the very measure in which the system is _closed_."[95] Social life does not contain this kind of system, but offers instead innumerable systems and systems without structures, therefore "open." Znaniecki preferred to use "social process" in "the abstract generic sense (like chemical process)" to denote "a certain general class of facts."[96]

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[93]_Ibid._, p. 107.

[94]_Ibid._, p. 110.

[95]_Ibid._, pp. 126-7.

[96]_Ibid._, p. 123.

Earle E. Eubank contributed an interesting historical account of various uses of the term in sociology. He found that the kind of dichotomy we found emerging in German sociology and illustrated in the Twentieth century by Small and von Weise continued in America. I will spend some time with Eubank's examples, drawn from this essay and his larger work, The Concepts of Sociology, in an effort to explore the nature of this dualism and to pose it as a difficulty that Bentley hoped to overcome by the transactional analysis.

C. M. Case applied the term social process to "characteristic social change," a repetitive or recurrent activity, as opposed to the historians' concern with the unique.[97] L. T. Hobhouse used it to denote sequence, especially growth, development, and evolution, and implicitly, progress. E. C. Hayes, perhaps the first sociologist to use the term, intended the whole, on-going life of society, especially causal relationships. For Cooley it meant "adaptive growth"; Cooley, we might add, gave it a distinctive organic meaning and his version of process stressed the interaction of organism and environment. To this he added the ideas of holism and multiple causation.

> If you insist that there is a centre from which the influence comes, all flowing in one direction, you fly in the face of fact. What observation shows is a universal interaction, in which no factor appears antecedent to the rest.[98]

Cooley represents probably the best example of the evolutionary, historical tradition of process analysis. The diverse strands flow together so naturally in what must appear to a more self conscious generation as ingenuous prose, that he is, if anything, too rich a source. Ellwood

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[97]Ibid., p. 11. The following series is quoted from pp. 11-12.

[98]C. H. Cooley, Social Process (New York, 1918), p. 45.

also thought in terms of "reciprocal progressive adaptation," but imagined the process to be going forward among individuals within a group. Thomas and Znaniecki viewed process as stages or sequences of behavior in individuals or groups.

These examples belong, more or less, to the evolutionary conception which, Eubank believed, had gone through three stages. The first emphasized universal process, a general, cosmic unfolding of which social life was a part; its connections to the philosophy of history and to philosophy proper are clear. The second stage stressed the specifically societary process itself, and the third period was more analytic, intent upon studying the "multitudinous constituent processes" composing the larger process.[99] This evolutionary approach was largely descriptive, particularly concerned with societary origins and their relation to nature. The first, or universal process phase claimed such sociologists as Comte, Spencer, and Ward who were writing under the influence of the biologists Darwin, Lamarck, and Huxley. Sociologists of the second or specifically social process period were Ratzanhofer, Small, Kropotkin, Keller, Thomas, and Hobhouse. The final stage included the later Small, and much of the field.

Eubank correctly perceived that Simmel belonged to a rather different classification of process analysis, a branch he called "analytical." Ross, Park, and Burgess were American representatives. The concern of this approach was with timeless form, with the typical and not the particular, and not with historical context or chronological sequence.[100] Ross, for example, paid tribute to Simmel in Foundations of Sociology, and in his chapter entitled "Unit of Investigation in Sociology" he suggested the study

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[99]Bogardus, jp. 114.

[100]Ibid., p. 113.

of relations as complementary to groups.[101] Robert Park distinguished be-
tween the "realist" and "nominalist" perspectives in sociology, the former
accepting collective behavior as its starting point and the latter begin-
ning from individuals, and indicated his preference for the former.[102] In
the text he wrote with Burgess, social process was used as "the name for
all changes which can be regarded as changes in the life of the group."[103]

Eubank considered their text, Introduction to the Science of Society
(1921), and Ross' Principles of Sociology (1920), as representing a turn
toward the analytic approach. A few years later the use of the term "re-
lations" by Park and Burgess was to be the subject of a debate between E.
C. Hayes and Floyd House which raised a very fundamental problem. Before
examining that exchange, we should pause to note Eubank's point that the
choice of approaches has definite consequences for the units of investiga-
tion adopted by the sociologists. I have mentioned this point above in
discussion of Bentley's critique of "vertical" theories which segregate
social "results" from their personal or psychological causes, but Eubank
took a somewhat different tack. He explained the difference between Small's
causal use of interest and the more formal approach which preferred des-
criptive study of activity for itself, on its own level, and pointed to a
microcosm of this dichotomy in Park and Burgess.

They had listed four "social processes" (historical, cultural, polit-
ical, economic) and contrasted them to four fundamental types of inter-
action which, they asserted, were "of much greater value for analytic pur-
poses." These were: competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation.

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[101]E. A. Ross, Social Control and the Foundations of Sociology (Bos-
ton, 1959), p. 148.

[102]Society (Glencoe, Ill., 1955), p. 226.

[103]Quoted by Eubank, Bogardus, p. 112.

Hayes disputed this classification, found "assimilation for example much too broad a term, and proposed a list of thirteen items. Much more important, however, was his argument that assimilation was itself a result and not a process itself. The difference he suggested was between a social relationship and a type of activity.

> This raises the question as to the best use of the phrase "social process." That phrase is widely used as a technical term in sociology and by some is regarded as its most important technical term. Yet a present considerable confusion attends its use. The question raised is whether the term "process" should not be restricted to activity and change in activity. A social process would then be an activity or change in activity that is causally affected by the fact that it stands in relation to other activity by another actor.[104]

The distinction was, he continued, readily confused, for his thirteen relationships (e.g., "imitation," "conflict," "co-operation") could accommodate many varied activities. For Hayes, it was the relationship that gave "unity to the class of facts and meaning to the term by which the class of facts is designated."[105]

> If we restrict the term "process" to activity and change in activity, as distinguished from relations between activities then the social process is the total tide of causally interdependent acitivities that are impossible to individuals in isolation. It is the life process of society.[106]

It is called a process because it is composed of activities, and "because it is characteristically a changing reality, a becoming," whose inner essence is psychic. Social explanation, Hayes concluded, is description of an event which extends to the conditioning relations, environmental, geographic, genetic, etc.

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[104]Edward C. Hayes, "Some Social Relations Restated," AJS, Vol. 31 (Nov., 1925). Hayes' sympathy for Small is apparent in his essay "Albion Woodbury Small," Howard Odum, American Masters of Social Science (New York, 1927).

[105]Hayes, pp. 342-3.

[106]Ibid., p. 343.

Hayes' article was answered a few months later by Floyd House. The
thrust of House's reply stressed the need for concepts in making any deter-
mination whatever about activity. He correctly perceived that the heart
of Hayes' argument revolved about labeling "assimilation" a result. House
posed this question:

> Is this [distinction between interaction and relationship] however,
> anything more than the distinction between the substantive or static
> abstraction of the reality of immediate experience, and the abstrac-
> tions of the same reality which we make in terms of function, pro-
> cess, or activity? There can be "relation between activities" only
> if the persons or other elements which are thought of as the actors
> are interacting.[107]

One answer, and an answer House seemed to accept, was Bergson's dictum that
we must choose what distortion we will accept through selection of categories
of observation.

> If our abstraction is to preserve the active aspect of the experienced
> datum, it must apparently tend to assume one of two forms: that of
> an ongoing change conceived in time, or that of a process of inter-
> action between factors conceived as fixed at points in space.[108]

Sociology, more than psychology, appeared unable to escape spatial con-
figurations and dimensions because of this nature of interaction; sociology
conceived of interaction as forces moving through space rather than time.
In this spatial dimension the events which are unique in time become univer-
sal and transferrable in space. Such a construction, House thought, would
place Comte in the temporal camp, and Spencer in the spatial. While our
naive experience yields a reality of continual change, sociological method
should use the term social process "to refer to the interaction of elements,
factors, or forces, which are conceived from logical necessity as located
at points in space."[109]

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[107]Floyd House, "Social Relations and Social Interaction," AJS, Vol.
31 (Mar., 1926), p. 630.

[108]Ibid., p. 631.

[109]Ibid., p. 632.

House rejected Hayes' claim that science must study the conditioning relations, for this would be to follow Comte and study "history." If instead of the antecedent and consequent (temporal) dimension we focused on "interaction," we would adopt, with Spencer, a spatial and sociological perspective. In House's terms, we would not be studying the "that" of becoming, but the "how" some form of relationship and activity succeeds another.[110]

This was direct confrontation between the evolutionary and the analytic versions of social process thought, but it was not the only expression of the tension. R. M. MacIver, writing on a very favorite subject "Causation and Social Process," distinguished the study of pattern and dynamics. "Patterns are formations, not formative processes," he argued, and the former stand to the latter as fabric stands to weaving. "The weaving is a time-process, a becoming; patterns are congealed moments in this time process."[111] MacIver further distinguished two types of causal investigation; the first was the explanation of events considered as "salient concrete occurrences for some reason distinguished in the flux of change." In the explanation of processes, "modes of social change," "we are concerned with the flux itself, not in its multitudinous totality, not conceived as an endless series of unique historical situations, but as a nexus of type-factors and type-situations related in a necessary or at least an understandable sequence."[112] Concern with the latter is social science, it is the study of "interaction, development, reconstruction, and dissolution of social forms"; it studies particular situations to uncover their nexus, the

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[110]Ibid.

[111]Bogardus, p. 145.

[112]Ibid., p. 147.

relations among them, and not the concrete situation as a whole.[113]

MacIver was, as should be apparent from these brief excerpts, very sympathetic to the German sociologists; and while it is certainly true that with these facile distinctions he has passed over the heart of the difficulty, the direction of his thought as opposed to that of House is clear.[114] Inquiry of this kind seems to have passed from contemporary American sociology, but we might note in passing that the very words in which House, Hayes, and MacIver presented their thoughts were echoed by an English sociologist, W. J. H. Sprott. In distinguishing social processes from social relations he contended that, "the latter denotes the field in which the processes are exhibited, and it is obvious that for the purpose of explaining social change an analysis of social processes is of the greatest importance."[115]

But our concern here is with American developments, and I will conclude this chapter with a discussion of Eubank's solution to the conflict. He presented what is perhaps the most self conscious discussion of the idea of process in American sociology, and his efforts to maintain a consistent dualism constitute a transitional link to contemporary theories such as structural-functionalism.

Reality, said Eubank, was grannular, ultimately composed of particle units found clustered together in structures. The three realms of our experience with this reality are enduring substance presented in three dimensional space and temporal duration, change in the substance, and causation,

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[113]Ibid.

[114]MacIver devoted a book to the same subject, Social Causation (New York, 1942). It contains a much more complete exploration of these themes.

[115]Sociology (London, 1959), p. 12. See also K. William Kapp, Toward a Science of Man in Society (The Hague, 1961), especially Chs. X and XI; and Donald MacRae, Ideology and Society (London, 1961), Ch. 4.

the link between the two.[116] While all substance is in perpetual flux

and movement, and change never stops, some "results" emerge as they arrive

at some kind of completed or finished state. These he called "products."[117]

In the next chapter we will encounter a more fully philosophical statement

of this position in the teleology of A. N. Whitehead. The substance with

which sociology is concerned is people, alone or in human plurals called

groups. Change appears as action and involves a shift in relationships.

Causation Eubank described as "force," and he located it in the bio-psychic

realm of wants and desires.

Comte had begun the practice of building a sociology upon physiological

or psychological needs of the individual, and it had persisted until the

Twentieth century when the hierarchy was challenged by Cooley and Franklin

Giddings who emphasized the associative character of the individual and the

"socius." Closely allied to this development were the ideas of multiple

"personalities" stemming from social status and social role. Psychology

was initially hostile to this movement, preferring to pursue its inquiries

into physiology (within the boundaries of the organism), but the year 1908

marked a convergence toward a "social psychology." In that year E. A. Ross

published his Social Psychology and William McDougall, An Introduction to

Social Psychology. In 1908, we might add, The Process of Government also

appeared, which, despite its contempt for the uneasy compromise implicit in

the words "social psychology," was certainly an attempt to escape from the

"hierarchical" conception of Comte.[118]

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[116]Eubank, p. 75.

[117]Ibid., p. 76. See chart, p. 77.

[118]Evron M. Kirkpatrick, in his essay, "The Impact of the Behavioral
Approach on Traditional Political Science," Austin Ranney, Essays on the
Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana, Ill., 1962), noted the close appearance
of the Ross and Bentley volumes, together with Graham Wallas' Human Nature in

Whether the hierarchical or the socius approaches were employed, the group was the visible form that association takes. The "first conscious beginnings" of sociology were considerations of the form and appearance of human groups, "rather than of the interactions which were taking place within these groupings."[119] "Structure" enters human association through relations and form, and no human organization is without an arrangement of parts. At this point Eubank states the case for the dualism that appears to have been accepted by contemporary social science.

> There can be no processes, no activities, except in terms of some thing; there can be no forms that are not made and kept so by some sort of process. While the philosophers and the natural scientists dispute as to whether or not matter is "real," we must live in a seemingly substantial world, and must act as if it is composed of structural forms.[120]

Despite the Einsteinian revolution, he argued, we live and perceive in the sense data world of Newton; a new reality may lie behind it, but the world of space and substance is ours.

It is certainly questionable to assert that we _do_ perceive social "structures," or that we _must_ think in Newtonian constructs; even if this be true, it does not then follow that a social science must be framed in those terms, but this is not the place to argue those points. The most interesting contribution Eubank made to the idea of process lies in the subtle but vital shift that he illustrated in the following quotation:

Politics. The coincidence of Wallas and Bentley has been interpreted by Kirkpatrick, and by Heinz Eulau and his associates, as an early articulation of the behavioral approach to politics, Political Behavior (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), pp. 8-9. In view of the Ross and McDougall volumes it would appear that the currents of convergence should be interpreted more broadly.

[119] Eubank, p. 121.

[120] Ibid., p. 124.

The difference--and the likeness--between structure and process is expressed in Dewey's conception of structure as process slowed down and regularized. Conversely, process is structure in action. They are merely the static and dynamic phases of the same reality, comparable to a moving picture, which is made up of a rapidly blended succession of instantaneous photographs. The one reveals the parts in the seeming inactivity of a given instant; the other reveals them in the activity of successive instants. Thus structure in its true nature is seen to be not only a relatively permanent arrangement of parts, but an arrangement in which there are continuous modification and activity of these same parts. All societary forms include both.[121]

Eubank might have had in mind Dewey's lecture "Experience" in which he remarked in part, "To designate the slower and the regular rhythmic events structure, and the more rapid and irregular ones process, is sound and practical sense."[122]

Eubank's previous quotation had argued the impossibility of conceiving either process or structure in isolation from the other; he spoke then as if both things and change must be present "in" reality. But the passage above suggests that they are "phases" of the same reality; it has begun to sound as if the investigator chooses to take a static or a dynamic view of his experience. One (view) "reveals"; it is a matter of perspective. Kimball Young managed to express both interpretations:

In fact the study of social processes is but one manner of viewing society while the study of social order and culture constitutes another way of looking at the same thing. ... . When we analyze the social processes we are concerned with the social functions, the interactional patterns of individuals and groups. When we analyze social organization and culture we are dealing more especially with the framework or structure of society.[123]

But, he concluded, both structure and function must be studied together.

The trouble is that if we are prepared to say that the universe exhibits structure and function, thing and change at the same time, further,

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[121]Ibid.

[122]Experience and Nature (New York, 1958), p. 71.

[123]Source Book for Sociology (1935), p. 347.

that one presupposes the other, then we must encounter the whole series of problems involving definition of object, conceptualization of change, causation, etc., to which Bentley devoted so much of his critical effort. Conversely, if we accept the alternative, a kind of complementarity principle emerges; we would then choose the perspective, the phase of reality we wished to see, but one choice would exclude the other. This second interpretation approaches the Bergsonian dictum that reality is necessarily distorted by conceptual thought, except, of course, it does not commit itself to the choice of what, in fact, reality is.

Neither formulation seems satisfactory although the former would appear to have won the allegiance of most contemporary social scientists, at least as far as the two can be distinguished in the corpus of their work. Unfortunately the distinction is all too frequently obscured, as in the case of Kimball Young. This difficulty emerged when what Eubank called the analytic version of social process theory became dominant over the more evolutionary view, because a hiatus had appeared between the subject matter of activity and the science of form and relation. We must abstract, House had said in answer to Hayes, and we abstract through the concepts we choose. Eubank was less prepared to accept such a gap between knowledge and reality. He tried to preserve the universe of activity and a science of structure. The problem was that which Becker and Weise had encountered, the distinction between Gidding's form pattern and action pattern. When the evolutionary version became less important to American social science, the dualism was expressed within the analytic interpretation by terms such as Giddings'.

Intimately related to this problem was the question of the unit of sociological investigation which was, in turn, connected to the nature of explanation. If the emphasis be placed upon becoming, change, activity, and succession, then groups of various sizes were a favorite unit, and explana-

tion was permitted to extend "down" or "back" to the individual, his

drives, motives, etc. If a more formal, structural, stress were the

choice, then interrelations would be the units, and explanation would be

confined to the purely sociological level. In Durkheim's phrase, social

fact must be explained by social fact.[124]

This chapter has sought to present two principal versions of the pro-

cess idea in American sociology and to indicate Bentley's divergence from

both. Though I have not detailed the connections, it should be apparent

that Small represents the process approach of the Austrian conflict soc-

iologists, especially Gustav Ratzenhofer, and Weise's systematic analysis

owed a great deal to Georg Simmel. Small's notion of process analysis

sought to extend the scope of sociological inquiry backward and to project

it forward on a temporal dimension, and to connect the appearance of var-

ious forms of sociation at the level of behavior to prior internal, bio-

psychic states through the teleological use of "interest." Weise's system-

atic sociology followed formal sociology's attempt to distinguish content

from the patterned activity of forms and to provide operational means for

the identification and classification of the latter.

Bentley's fundamental objection to both lay in their mutual desire to

introduce boundary lines into their subject matter and consequently into

their science. His own thought inclined toward the procedures of the for-

mal version, but they are separated by the apparently unbridgeable differ-

ence regarding individuation. Bentley's refusal to grant a bounded "self"

is a microcosm of his dissatisfaction with the static results of both for-

mal and systematic sociology, and this difference means that Bentley cannot

be absolutely severed from Small's temporal emphasis. True, he would not

[124]See George E. G. Catlin's comment that the term "social structure"
might be a substitute for "social fact," "Introduction," Emile Durkheim,
The Rules of Sociological Method (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), p. xvii.

accept a system held together with individual interests and teleologies, but he wanted badly to preserve the temporal connectedness and the sense of on-going activity of the historical version.

Arthur Bentley's idea of process cut across, or, to use a more pretentious word, transcended this dualism. He sought to preserve his subject matter as activity and flux, but yet to avoid the introduction of false boundedness in group as unit, and to eliminate "hierarchical" conceptions of causation. In the next section we will see how transactional analysis was to accomplish this task, and what parallels it presented to some converging currents of thought in physical science and philosophy. I will then return to more specifically sociological and political matters in an attempt to make an evaluation of the contribution and prospects of the idea of process.

In philosophy, the theories of Whitehead and Alexander in England, of Husserl and Hartmann in Germany and of Bergson in France have "placed" the _nisus_ or the process of things at the very heart of the explanation of experience; and this is to give emphasis to the confessed incompleteness of theory.

C. Delisle Burns

The complications that result from conceiving our subject matter as that of a society of opposed processes in a state of equilibrium, breaking up the unity of the whole into balanced process, presents a logical problem of the first importance. It has arisen again and again in every science that has reached a certain stage of development where mechanical description is inadequate and the task of describing a collectivity in a process of change was seriously attempted.

Richard L. Schanck

CHAPTER V

PROCESS AS TRANSACTION

While it is certainly true that a process conception of the universe
is as old as Heraclitus there is considerable value in considering the
Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries as uniquely concerned with that idea.
The preceding chapters have suggested several reasons why this should be
the case. The Nineteenth century was the great period of the philosophy
of history, especially in Germany, and of the emergence of an historically
based social science. Comte, Hegel, and Marx, their unquestioned differ-
ences aside, shared this fascination with the search for continuity and
meaning in historical experience. But the idea of process cannot be so
simply or readily identified with this tradition, for beside the names of
the founders of modern social science must be placed those of its most im-
placable enemies.

Perhaps the best examples of the latter can be drawn from the so-called
life philosophers, especially Henri Bergson. His profound conviction that
life was vital, a continuous flow of energy and event, would not admit the
clumsy hand of analysis. Knowledge of the process that was human life and
experience could be achieved only through an exercise of intuition that
would grasp as essence, a meaning that was simply there, not to be synthe-
sized or constructed after prior dismemberment of the given. In an earlier
chapter we noted how Dilthey, one of the greatest philosophers of history
of his time, felt impelled to struggle with Bergson's contention and to

find a way to save analysis without rejecting the central conception of history and life as process.

Nietzsche, like Bergson a life philosopher, was no friend of the fledgling social science, whether based on becoming or not. Concern with process, especially insofar as it implied change, is certainly central to Nietzsche's work, but it is his critical genius, what I will somewhat inadequately call his "anti-formalism," that constitutes his most interesting relation to the idea of process.

One can hardly speak of any important Nineteenth century idea without mentioning the name of Darwin, and the notion of process is certainly no exception. Darwin's writings, perhaps more correctly that agglomerate called "Darwinism," seem to have provided a cloak, a rationale, an inspiration, or a "theory" for the most diverse and bizarre intellectual currents and social movements imaginable. It is exceedingly difficult and certainly beyond the scope of this paper to offer any rigorous connection between Darwinism and process, but certain affinities leap to the eye. Central, perhaps, is the notion of evolution with its concommitant or corollary associations of development, continuity, and change. The organic metaphor, long a favorite of the Romantic school of historical and social theory, found welcome support from the most unexpected realm of empirical science. Finally, we should mention that the notion of struggle lying at the center of Darwin's theory of survival was very congenial to the important conflict school of process analysis.

These three powerful currents fed the idea of process in ways sufficiently congruent to permit us to speak, albeit it metaphorically, of an emerging vision of the universe as process. Vital as they were, however, there was an even more powerful agent waiting just off-stage to give the idea of process its decisive Twentieth century direction. That force was

the new physics.

It is difficult to overstate the impact of such physical theories as special and general relativity and quantum analysis upon Western thought. Not only was the beachhead in reality that science had so laboriously established and proudly exhibited now imperiled, but the very structure of thought and the validity of perception itself were being questioned. Something comparable might have been experienced had Hume been read widely and seriously without Kant providing at least a means of arguing one's way around the great skeptic. But now one of the more, if not the most, prestigious and secure pillars of knowledge, the science of physics, had betrayed its trust. Now it was necessary to reconstruct epistemology, to reconsider logic, and to accommodate to a universe of relativity and possibility.

Even before 1905 there had been considerable dissatisfaction with the state of scientific philosophy. Philipp Frank has remarked upon the intense interest in Henri Poincare's conventionalism[1] and Ernst Mach's attempt to purge scientific explanation of non-empirical (i.e., metaphysical) elements. But unquestionably the new physics lent not only an additional impetus but an enduring direction to the search for new foundations.

A prime point of convergence between theoretical physics and the more humanistic or biological influences was the rejection of what is usually called mechanistic explanation. There were, of course, several versions of mechanism, but it usually involved postulation of a chain of events set in

[1]Modern Science and Its Philosophy (New York, 1961), especially the Introduction, "Historical Background." There are many fine treatments of the philosophy of science and the new physics but the collection edited by Paul Schilpp, Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (New York, 1959); and A. D. D'Abro, The Rise of the New Physics (New York, 1951), merit special mention.

"motion" at some point by a "force." Change, development, or causality were believed to take place through the agency of one bearer of force coming in contact with a second, more passive entity which in its turn became the active agent, and so on. This is readily recognizable as the billiard ball notion of causality that Bentley, among many others, denounced. The mechanical or causal chain might extend from the present moment back to a whim in the mind of the Creator, as is suggested by the lines, "And the first morning of Creation wrote / What the last dawn of reckoning shall read."[2]

Mechanical explanation meant more than this. The Newtonian laws of motion had relied upon states of rest, bounded entities, absolute space, and fixed points. Action went on when entities at rest were impelled through space by force, and was detectable and measurable in relation to the known constants. Most of us are at least superficially acquainted with the replacement of mechanism by field theory that occurred with the advent of Einstein's special theory of relativity. We have already noted Bentley's enthusiasm for what might be called combined measures, e.g., space-time, mass-energy, and the intimate new relationship between physics and geometry, and it should be clear that he would welcome experimental support of his philosophical critique of mechanism.

In a paper entitled "Sociology and Mathematics," published in 1931, Bentley began in earnest to develop language and concepts which would be capable of framing statements about man in society in a manner congruent with the spirit of field physics.[3] Before considering that paper in detail,

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[2]See William James, "The Dilemma of Determinism," Essays in Pragmatism (New York, 1954), for the famous distinction between "hard" and "soft" determinism.

[3]The Sociological Review, No. 2 (July, 1931), and No. 3 (Oct., 1931), reprinted in Arthur Bentley, Inquiry into Inquiries (Boston, 1954).

something more should be said about the relation between mechanistic and field concepts in physics. The statement in the preceding paragraph which suggests an antithesis or at least opposition between them is somewhat of an oversimplification. There have been, for example, continuous and discontinuous mechanistic theories and field theories employing mechanistic categories such as force, velocity, or stress.[4] It is also true that even Einstein's general relativity theory retained elements of mechanism.

> Both the electromagnetic and the gravitational theories are dualistic theories. In both of these theories, we have sources of the field (charges, particles) and the field itself. Thus we see in both theories a mixture of two concepts: matter and field.[5]

The point is that these combinations or dualisms are now perceived as hybrids and are sources of dissatisfaction. For example, Einstein's unified or pure field theory was an attempt to eliminate the mechanistic elements and to derive material phenomena from field conceptions alone. The following passage is perhaps as succinct a summary of the difference as is available:

> A field theory is a theory whose aim is to study the peculiar condition, or field, which is thought to pervade the ether of space in certain cases. Formerly, the ether was viewed as an elastic medium, having many of the properties of matter, and so a field theory did not appear to differ essentially from a mechanistic theory of the continuous type, such as the theory of elasticity. But according to modern views, the two kinds of theory are totally different, for the ether is now assumed to have no mechanical properties and hence its field is sharply distinguished from the field of mechanical stresses which pervades an elastic body.[6]

"Field" are thus to be distinguished from mechanistic theories which are continuous in that they do not contain references to mechanistic categories,

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[4] I am indebted to D'Abro, Vol. I, Ch. X, for this discussion of field theory.

[5] Leopold Infield, "Albert Einstein," Makers of Modern Science (New York, 1953), p. 117.

[6] D'Abro, p. 72.

and from non-continuous mechanistic theories on the additional ground of
the field's continuity versus the discreteness of matter viewed atomis-
tically.

The importance of this difference in theoretical physics, great as it
is, is not sufficient to indicate our interest in it here. The emergence
of the dispute in contemporary physics was a dramatic illustration of a
much older problem which Charles C. Gillispie has described in these words:

> The historian finds a dialectic informing successive resolutions of
> the great dilemma in which science oscillates between the unity of
> nature and the multiplicity of phenomena, the one and the many. Is
> the universe a single continuum, to be described in a geometrical
> physics? Or is it a congeries of discrete entities?--atoms, bodies
> which, in Clerk Maxwell's straightforward definition, "cannot be cut
> in two." Is the world, as Bertrand Russell somewhere asks, a bucket
> of molasses or a pail of sand? The issue divided Einstein from most
> of his fellow physicists at the end of his life. And since this prob-
> lem, though ever more fruitful, is no nearer solution after 2,500
> years than when it was discovered in Greece, it seems safe to say
> that its merit lies in the discussion, not in the answers.[7]

In Hellenistic times it was Stoic philosophy and physics which spoke
for a dynamic nature, for activity, the Heraclitean flux, and for becoming.

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[7]_The Edge of Objectivity_ (Princeton, 1960), p. 95. Gillispie's book
was written with Arthur Koestler's _The Sleepwalkers_ (New York, 1959), very
much in mind. While Koestler wrote to celebrate the irrationality and my-
sticism of Kepler's genius against the "objectivity" of a Galileo, Gillispie
would dispute that judgment. (Gillispie, pp. 43-4.) In view of this it is
all the more interesting to note the degree of agreement between the authors
as to the lines of conflict within the history of science. Compare the text
quotations with this passage from Koestler, pp. 28-9:

> The Ionian philosophers had been materialists in the sense that the
> chief accent of their inquiry was on the stuff from which the universe
> was made. The Pythagoreans' chief accent was on form, proportion, and
> pattern; on the eidos and schema, on the relation, not on the relata.
> Pythagoras is to Thales what Gestalt philosophy is to the materialism
> of the nineteenth century. The pendulum has been set swinging; its
> ticking will be heard through the entire course of history as the blob
> alternates between the extreme positions of "all is body," "all is
> mind"; as the emphasis shifts from "substance" to "form" from "struc-
> ture" to "function," from "atoms" to "patterns," from "corpuscles" to
> "waves," and back again.

Compare also the classifications of F. S. C. Northrop, _Science and
First Principles_ (New York, 1930).

For them there could be no boundaries in nature and combinations could arise only from the blending of principles.[8] Against them stood the great school of Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius which maintained the existence of atoms moving through the void in obedience to general laws, where change and process "consist not in flux or penetration by soul or realization of the goal of life, but in the physical rearrangement of varied particles of specific shape and size which do have objective existence."[9]

This is not the place to review the interesting interpretation Gillispie presents in support of this thesis, but it would be valuable to mention his remarks about the scientific aspects of the revolt of Romanticism against the Enlightenment. Eighteenth century chemistry, he tells us, saw itself as the science of the internal, of essences, as contrasted to the "super-ficiality" of a physics concerned with crude location and dimension. This is the Faustian idea that "nature has an inside." "It is the physicist who brutally pulverizes, ignites, and destroys. The chemist does not analyze, He divines."[10] Goethe's botany and biology, perhaps better than any other example, illustrate the desire to find "destiny and necessity indwelling in flux and process, in the organismic, and not the mechanistic universe."[11] For him, even the classifications of Linnaeus would violate a continuum not of geometry but of sentience.[12]

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[8]Gillispie, pp. 182-3.

[9]Ibid., p. 99.

[10]Ibid., p. 186.

[11]Ibid., p. 192.

[12]Ibid., p. 198. Compare the somewhat subtler analysis by Eric Heller, "Goethe and the Idea of Scientific Truth," The Disinherited Mind (New York, 1959), in which Goethe appears as opposed to the Romantics as well as to Newton.

In Gillispie's view Romanticism appears as the despairing attempt to defend a qualitative science against a measuring, numbering science which totally objectifies nature.

> For physics romanticism would substitute biology at the heart of science. For mechanism as the model of order, romanticism would substitute organism, some unitary emanation of intelligence or will. Romanticism might take any form in politics, art, or letters. But in natural philosophy there is an infallible touchstone of romantic tendencies. Its metaphysics treats becoming rather than being. Its ontology lies in metamorphosis rather than atomism. And always it wants more out of nature than science finds there.[13]

Our purpose is not to define or characterize "Romanticism," nor even to suggest that it is possible to trace a consistent "process" view through the course of Western speculation. It is, however, to demonstrate that such concepts as process, continuity, structure, discreteness, have persistently run through various divisions of thought about the world, often on a metaphorical (or metaphysical in its literal sense) level, but apparently always compelling attention from the working scientist as well as the historian and philosopher. It might be useful to interpret a life philosopher such as Bergson as defending a process view of the continuum of human experience against the incursion of a mechanistic or atomistic science, and in the opening pages of this chapter that is exactly what was done. Our mention of Goethe and that movement called Romanticism certainly will recall earlier discussions of German philosophy, sociology, and philosophy of history.

But if it is proper and illuminating to speak of differences between sciences, it is also necessary to see similar divisions appearing within certain disciplines. An example is the difference between mechanistic and field conceptions in physics. We have already mentioned the tension within Bentley's early presentation of the process conception of society between its

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[13]Gillispie, p. 199.

organic or biological and its geometrical imagery. When he embarks upon a development of concepts such as "behavioral space-time" under the influence of the new physics, he encounters a second dualism between field (process) and mechanism within that discipline itself.

We have already presented the dualism within the social process tradition between the group conflict school and the relation or formal alternative. In these terms, Bentley comes down on the latter side, but remains dissatisfied with the static or empty character of Simmel's and Weise's forms. The necessity was, to create a method of "full process statement," after the example of a science that had absorbed geometry into physics. Within the sphere of physics itself Bentley inclines, as we might expect, toward the field pole, and his proposed transactional analysis is comparable to Einstein's search for a pure field theory in its unwillingness to tolerate mechanistic components. In Gillispie's terms Bentley's preference is consistently for geometry, units and the infinity of straight lines rather than for the counting of measurable, separable entities.[14]

Bentley may be said to have used physics as an analogy or even a source of inspiration in his development of transactional analysis, but it would not be correct to call him a natural philosopher who labored to accommodate the new science to a universal cosmology. His completed transactional analysis goes beyond physics in that it anticipates making statements over the biological-physiological and the social, as well as the physical, realms. From the standpoint of the natural philosopher mentioned above, Alfred North Whitehead has provided perhaps the most complete metaphysical system, and in the following pages we will have occasion to compare his version of the process universe with the "tool" that finally emerges from Bentley's strenuous labors.

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[14] Ibid., p. 95.

We are now ready to begin an analysis of the 1931 article, "Sociology and Mathematics." Mathematical terms do not possess a uniform function. They may be "things," e.g., natural numbers or line segments; they may be "relations," as in the case of "odd," "even," and "prime"; they may be "operations," such as "plus" and "times." The function performed by any one term at any particular time is dependent upon its place in a system. Relations might appear in one system as things and in another as operations. Analysis of the system is a precondition to determination of the use to which a term is being put.

This situation in mathematics, our most rigorous science of "discipline," should be instructive to sociology. The first and most basic lesson to be learned is the avoidance of premature formalization, a reluctance to assign a final or fixed place to a term. How, we might ask, is a group to be imagined? As thing, relation among things, or as operation? Recourse to the "factual" is not much help, since the "what is" just as "thing" must be determined within a system. The concept of space is the vehicle Bentley chose to demonstrate the point.

We may, he argued, discern at least these distinct senses of the word: "vulgar" or the personal experience of space; "mathematical" space; "physical" space, or mathematical space applied to and used by speech; "social" space; and "sociological" space.[15] Vulgar space is the familiar common-sense world: three-dimensional, Euclidean, based on or at least congruent with Newtonian space. There are various vulgar spaces, those of animals and insects, for example, just as there are many possible mathematical spaces. By social space Bentley intended "Those discretenesses and continuities, those separations and distributions and purely social mensurations,

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[15]*Inquiry*, p. 62.

which are found among men outspread in societies."[16] Sociological spaces are: "Theoretical constructions which, with respect to social spaces, hold a position comparable to that of mathematical spaces with respect to physical spaces."[17]

Vulgar space is the most natural to us, and, Bentley conceded, it might prove most useful to sociology in the long run. Its great difficulty is its inability to provide an adequate frame for description of activity. The individual man existing at the moment in Euclidean space represents a form of discreteness which may or may not be important. The question is whether vulgar space could accommodate descriptions of situations where the discreteness is of a different order. Bentley proposed this example: "If we take two nations with rival commercial interests as the discreteness, we have still the continuities beneath offered by the specifically human social industrial organization of the present era."[18] He concluded that it was as futile to strive for an a priori determination of which form of space will ultimately prove most useful as to ask which conception was "real." Both judgments need to be made in individual cases, dependent upon our purposes.

Although he urged caution in making a definite and final commitment to one space form there is no doubt that Bentley's interest was in creating forms of statement in social space and social time. The latter dimension is not explored in this particular article, but Bentley suggested that an analysis in that direction would proceed much as had that of space.[19] Con-

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 80.

[19] Ibid., pp. 82-3.

ceptualization in social space would result in this sort of statement:

> We have this society before us in the form of men and their activities and all that those activities involve. This includes the knowledge factors that are in the men and in their activities and their society. It also includes the factual references or implications, and the realisms and externalizations of their knowledge.[20]

Rather than "inspecting a factual world with a knowledge factor floating in it," this approach "inspects a living procedure of knowledge-experience-contact, with the stress for knowledge not on its exactness but on its indicativeness."[21] This would present the investigator with one great system for research, unbroken by such dualisms as an inner-outer dichotomy.

Here is a final example of how a social theory set in vulgar space might be restated, or at least reinterpreted in a more sophisticated form:

> Sociologies using basic human desires or instincts, or in a more elementary form depending on temperaments, take these factors for dimensions; they do not call them dimensions because they take them realistically, concretely, as forces or agents; but for us, seeing such materials as abstractions, and crude preliminary abstractions at that, they have the dimensional meaning.[22]

We would take a "dimension" such as cruelty, study it in its "social manifestations," i.e., as people inflicting pain on other people in various contexts including the mental, in order to "establish spatial and temporal transitions in amount of intersity" which could be considered a kind of "social coordinate."[23]

Bentley suggested that other dimensions such as "religious intensity" and "industrial organization" would themselves yield new coordinates, and coordinates could be brought together to form a "configuration." This formulation ignores many difficulties such as how we would identify and mea-

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[20] Ibid., p. 78.

[21] Ibid., pp. 78-9.

[22] Ibid., p. 94.

[23] Ibid., p. 95.

sure "pain," and how, on what level, and with what common denominators could the coordinates be joined. I will but mention such questions at this point but not interrupt the narrative to press them here. The important point to emphasize is the analogue this line of reasoning presents to the field theory of physics. The older sociologies represented in the preceding example took dimensions for agents or forces; in short, they sought to establish causal chains. Process, or, as we shall come increasingly to call it, transactional statement will disregard the pursuit of causality but extend the surface of inquiry and description along spatial and temporal parameters.

In an article which appeared a decade later addressed more to psychology than to sociology, Bentley restated the liberation he sought in broader terms. The problem was that:

> The established attitude of the psychologist came to be that his facts were "in" the Newtonian universe but not technically "of" it. This attitude allotted the behavioral facts locations in the world, but not such locations as Cartesian co-ordinates could establish. The locations were quasi-locations, asserting the presence, not definitely, "in" or "at" an organism.[24]

The solution was to state the behavioral event, e.g., boy-planning-college, so as to include the full range of organism and environment within the duration of, say, the period of entry into high school to entry into college.

"Duration" was to be made as extended a predicate of "behavior" as had been "event." Behavioral duration, Bentley argued, had a "much fuller and richer factuality than the 'instant' that any clock records, or than any series of such instances." No adding of instants can represent that factuality, and no false dilemma must be allowed to obscure the fact.

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[24]Arthur Bentley, "The Factual Space and Time of Behavior," _Journal of Philosophy_, No. 18 (Aug., 28, 1941); reprinted in _Inquiry_, p. 215.

Achilles does in fact catch the tortoise. Behavior does, in fact, what for clocks is impossible; it spans the duration. Organic-boy-living is thus durationally much more complex than infinitely tick-ing clocks, or for that matter than the infinitely extended paral-lels in three dimensions.[25]

Bentley concluded by finding some measure of agreement with Gestalt psycho-logies and with Kurt Lewin and J. F. Brown's use of topological space; but, just as Einstain, he was dissatisfied with the residue of "quasi-mechan-istic" particles or "forces" in their theories.[26]

We have now come a good way toward understanding the basic ideas of transactional analysis of process, and we have a foundation for examining Behavior Knowledge Fact and Knowing and the Known. Before beginning that examination, however, we should pause to recognize and make explicit an uneasiness about the logic of Bentley's proposed analysis, especially as it relates to that great underpinning of rational thought, the law of identity. Even if we have unreservedly applauded Bentley's criticism of mechanism and causality, his ruthless exorcism of things, and his determin-ation to extend the scope of observation in behavioral space-time, there remains in the back of our minds a question about how our thought can mas-ter this new world.

In defense of what might be viewed as a depreciation in some sense of the "individual," Bentley had written:

Let no quibble of skepticism be raised over this questioning of the individual. Should he find reason for holding that he does not

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[25]Ibid., pp. 217-8.

[26]Ibid., pp. 219-20. Other scholars have felt the currents of con-vergence suggested in this chapter and explicitly recognized by Bentley. See the stimulating article by Herbert Bonner, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Jan.-Feb., 1949). "In keeping with developments in relativity physics, organismic biology, and configurational psychology, I shall call this science of society 'field theoretical sociology,'" p. 171.

Compare also the rather off-hand but suggestive essay by Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961).

> exist in the sense indicated, there will in that fact be no deroga-
> tion from the reality of what does exist. On the contrary, there
> will be increased recognition of reality. For the individual can be
> banished only by showing a plus of existence, not by alleging a minus.
> If the individual falls it will be because the real life of men, when
> it is widely enough investigated, proves too rich for him, not be-
> cause it proves too poverty-stricken.[27]

The argument should be familiar to us by now, and it probably constitutes

an acceptable defense against those who feared possible moral or ethical con-

sequences of this "displacement" of the individual. But the problem in logic

is not so easily dealt with, since Bentley's entire work constitutes a refu-

tation of Dilthey's confident belief that the social, unlike the physical,

sciences had their basic unit given in experience. To read Bentley as hav-

ing replaced the individual by the group is, as we have seen, a gross sim-

plification. More difficult still, his critique of the particle universe

seemed to doom all attempts to find what Becker so aptly called an Archimedean

point.

The question that begins to emerge from these speculations is, "How

can we apply the principle of identity in behavioral space-time?" Presented

in such stark form the problem appears deceptively simple. If it can be

formulated so directly, how did it happen that Bentley didn't recognize and

discuss it immediately, or at least in his early works? Not until Behavior

Knowledge Fact, 1935, did he appear to identify Aristotle as an obstacle.

In distinguishing "two great types of linguistic behavior," Bentley finds:

> The first appears where a man affixes a certain word to a certain fact
> which he regards as assured--to a "fact" which at least ranks to him
> as certain enough for his needs in so far as he has become aware of
> them. The second appears where man finds it necessary to erect a
> great construction of consistent language, and to strive desperately
> for its ever greater consistency, in order to have richer and wider

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[27]Arthur Bentley, "Knowledge and Society," Inquiry, p. 4. It is well
to keep in mind Bentley's doctoral dissertation, much of which appeared as
"The Units of Investigation in the Social Sciences," Annals of the American
Academy, Vol. 5 (May, 1895). His fascination with the subject remained
even while his opinions about it underwent drastic revision.

control of "fact."[28]

In more precise terms:

> The one pole is represented by the Aristotelian canon of identity;
> the other, by full consistency in mathematics. The strong existen-
> tial is, binding a "word" to a "fact," appears at the former pole.
> The fully clarified "1 + 1 = 2" appears at the latter pole. In
> the former case the "existence" is assigned to the fact, and cer-
> tified to by the word. In the latter case, so far as "existence"
> enters at all, it is an existence that has its full locus within
> the consistency of the expression and its system of expansion.[29]

Bentley seems only now to have realized that if the behavioral event

"boy-planning-college" has burst the confines of the Newtonian universe,

so has it transcended the capabilities of Aristotelian or traditional

logic. It is most probable that Bentley was led gradually into this chal-

lenge by the development of his own thought. In 1908 the implications of

process or transactional analysis were certainly not entirely clear to him,

but when he became convinced that traditional logic was incompatible with

it, he identified and attacked the obstacle with characteristic energy

and disregard for authority, even that of "the philosopher."

Bentley's enemy becomes again unwarranted discreteness. The adjective

is necessary because he does attempt to find room in the process universe

for discontinuity, but the thrust of his critical thought is nearly always

against those who have drawn boundaries arbitrarily, made definitions too

rigidly, and "frozen" their categories prematurely. We will need to return

to his objections to Aristotelian logic below, but for the moment it will

suffice simply to indicate that Bentley expected to treat logic as well as

epistemology as knowledge and behavior factors within transactional analysis,

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[28](Bloomington, Ind., 1935), p. 23.

[29] Ibid.; Bentley added that "In applying the name 'Aristotelian' the
reference must be understood to run, not to Aristotle's own philosophical
system, but instead to that linguistic logical construction which has been
dominant from medieval times down even into the present age, and which is
everywhere labelled by his name.

Compare Bentley's remarks on the "Aristotelian Effect," and his "The
Case of Definition," John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, Knowing and the Known
(Boston, 1960).

and emphatically not as foundation stones of inquiry.[30]

Nine years intervened between Bentley's survey of sociology in Relativity in Man and Society and the appearance of Behavior Knowledge Fact. The latter volume can properly be viewed as an attempt to present the kind of observational framework that the concluding sections of the former had deemed necessary. Perhaps the first remark to be made about Behavior Knowledge Fact is that its subject matter is much more psychological than sociological. This statement requires immediate qualification, in that Bentley himself would have been very reluctant to accept such a distinction, and indeed argued vigorously against any such separations. Yet the point needs to be made that he narrowed the range of his inquiry to study situations between two or only a few persons rather than situations such as political parties or mass movements. Perhaps the best way to put the matter is to say that Behavior Knowledge Fact studies and describes smaller units of society, more akin to the scale of analysis we have come to expect of contemporary social psychology or psychology.

In typical fashion Bentley begins with a survey of the state of psychology, displaying his usual (or perhaps unusual) acquaintanceship with the literature of a field presumably not his own. The psychologies were examined for their adequacy as expressions and conceptualizations of human behavior, and for Bentley this meant primarily how well they provided "observational coherence" in transcending segmentations. He examined these "psychologies" "construction forms," or, as he sometimes called them, their "traits," which meant primarily the space and time forms and the segments or units of investigation. But underlying Bentley's classification of

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[30]Thus in Bentley's "Vagueness in Logic," Knowing, there is the beginning of an insistence upon the need for a theory of behavior which could incorporate logic as activity.

these construction forms is the division between those systems which ac-
cepted an Aristotelian logic in that they believed in some factual situa-
tion before experiment or investigation. The second division of psychol-
ogies "proceed as if, in the outcome, the specific identification of pos-
itive psychological facts with definite psychological names will be the
type of 'knowledge' they attain," but nevertheless they are somewhat re-
moved from the "heavy stress upon factuality, running often to dogmatic
extremes," of the first group.[31]

It is vital to remember that Bentley proceeded upon the assumption
that everything about these psychological systems ("traits") were to be
studied as behaviors. In this sense, when he discussed the "two types of
linguistic tools," one of which refers to a physical world, the second
which speaks of the mental realm, he was standing "off" from the psycho-
logies as subject matter; that is, he did not imagine himself as accepting
or committed to or "within" any alternative system. Thus Bentley's conclu-
sion that the psychologist failed to bring the two languages into a "common
functional organization" says nothing about ontological reality but treats
the "linguistic behavior" purely phenomenologically. This perspective needs
to be kept in view when Bentley speaks of the relations between the mind
and physical languages as they denote "sectors" such as "immateriality,"
"Apprehensionality," "Isolationality," and the "environmental."[32]

We are now in a position to modify the remark made above that the
canons of Aristotle's logic were not acceptable to Bentley as "foundation
stones of inquiry." They were fundamental to most psychological systems
viewed as phenomena, but emphatically not as axioms to be accepted as a

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[31]Behavior, p. 25. See the table, p. 19.

[32]Ibid., pp. 28-31.

priori necessary to all other thought or science. Their most damning flaw

was the assumption that "fact" could be "known" and represented for all

time in all contexts by fixed linguistic devices. Instead, "In appraising

'fact,' we must take into account its involvement in procedures called

'knowing' and 'being known.'"[33] This means that "from within any one sin-

gle department of inquiry, 'fact' can neither be determined certainly nor

appraised; above all, no single generation can hope to establish it safely

for all time under whatever manner of expression happens to be most char-

acteristic of its own age."[34]

We should now make a brief survey of Bentley's classifications of the

traits of various schools of psychology, emphasizing the weaknesses in

construction form that transactional statement will correct. The first

group includes the "behaviorists," especially Watson.[35] Their use of the

word "behavior" is precisely what Bentley meant by "movement space," in

which "the specific observable movements are taken as if capable of definite

severance, each from the others around, and from before and after."[36] The

temporal form of these behaviors is successional. These behaviors or move-

ment spaces may be described as "events," but their durations are inciden-

tal, even external conditions, instead of being "necessary components of

the primary observation."

Watson was interested in the observable "psychological" which he

called "reaction," as temporal successor to "a separately observable non-

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[33]Ibid., p. 135.

[34]Ibid. This is the kind of remark that has identified Bentley with
the sociology of knowledge.

[35]Compare "A Sociological Critique of Behaviorism," and "Situational
vrs. Psychological Theories of Behavior," Inquiry.

[36]Behavior, p. 53.

psychological fact, the 'stimulus'"; and "the observable reaction, under

the name of 'behavior,' presented as a gross-body-movement segment of move-

ment space."[37] This Watsonian universe was much too fragmented for Bentley

who compared it to the manipulation of jig-saw pieces in one corner of a

puzzle as an attempt to comprehend the whole. This criticism we might well

have anticipated, but Bentley makes a second point that ought to be con-

sidered by those who have dismissed him as a "crude" behaviorist. Watson,

he argued, had betrayed his own criterion of observability by his intro-

duction of words like "implicit" which permitted the re-introduction of

the old mentalisms of mind language. But Bentley's criticism is not that

Watson should have held at all costs to the observability criterion; it is,

rather, that he should have recognized that he was transcending it and not

insisted that his "gross-body-movements" construction form had been retained

intact.

More than this, Bentley did not believe that Watson's observability

criterion was adequate, and the following passage was addressed to both

Watson and Washburn.

> Again, for both of them it may be said with respect to their language-
> thought constructions that "language," taken in the form of "movements"
> of an "organism"--stripped, that is of all implications of thought and
> meanings--is no more "language" than "thought" is "observable thought,"
> if stripped of all its linguistic or other physical form.[38]

A second school, represented here by Woodworth and Dunlap, employed

"activity" as "their basic envisionment of the phenomena of inquiry" in

place of the orthodox behaviorists' segmented movements. Bentley calls

these psychologies of "action spaces." Choice of activity has the advantage

of preserving "durations," and a number of activities are taken as "the facts,"

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[37]Ibid., p. 54.

[38]Ibid., p. 58. See also footnote 35, above.

then "clotted" to make durational wholes.[39] This had the considerable advantage of avoiding the substances, subjects, and things that inhabited the old mind-language, but it was subject to a dangerous fallacy, namely: "It makes the individual take the form of 'activity' and nothing more, and then turns around and makes that 'activity' an individual and allots him causal status."[40]

A further difficulty with Woodworth's construction forms was his conception of the hierarchy of the social sciences, and especially the place of the individual who was conceived as:

> lying between the subject matter of physiology on the one hand, and "the doings of the people," i.e., the "sociological," on the other hand. In this asserted intermediate position, psychology is to "keep its eyes fixed" on this individual as activity. In effect what Woodworth requires of us is that we permit, or compel, ourselves to "see" this active individual as detached or detachable both from the physical organism and from society at one and the same time.[41]

While as a methodological device for some specific purposes this might be admissible, Woodworth's use of the distinction as serving to mark off the boundaries of this from that science is illegitimate. We might, Bentley continued, study psychology as a branch of physiology or sociology, but we cannot insert an individual activity between those perspectives. Woodworth's procedure made the "seeing" of blue identical to the physiological process, and thus ends with a formulation that perceiving is activity, and the activity does the perceiving.[42]

Action space psychology did, however, represent a form of progress in that it encouraged the substitution of verbs and adverbs for nouns and ad-

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[39]Behavior, p. 66.

[40]Ibid., p. 68.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Ibid., p. 70.

jectives. John Dewey and Madison Bentley carried this development to a point which Arthur Bentley felt merited classification as "Mind-Language Reconstructions." We will be concerned here with Dewey's construction forms to which Arthur Bentley gave the name "transactional." By this designation he meant that Dewey saw organism and environment together, separable only by analysis and selective abstraction; the interaction between the two constituted a transaction. To Dewey, "Structures lie in 'the recurrent modes of interaction taking place between what we term organism, on one side, and, environment on the other.'"[43] Selective abstraction permits Dewey to identify that "quality" of behavior called "experiencing" which can be considered as "in" the individual in the sense that he serves as a "locus of observation."[44] This activity or process of experiencing of the human organism is specifically psychological.

Dewey's notion of structure as "recurrent modes" is very reminiscent of some sociological theories discussed in previous chapters, and it should not surprise us to find that Bentley reacted to Dewey in much the same way as he had to the sociologists. Specifically, he contended that Dewey had not gone far enough. Transactional experiencing became the acts and attitudes of a person, and behavior, "a developing temporal continuum marked off into specific act situations."[45] The abstraction of organism from environment, and of acts from the total experience, constituted "breaks" in Dewey's system. The break occurred between his vision of what psychology's subject matter was and his narrower specification of the science itself. Illustrations of this discontinuity could be expressed in a number

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[43]Ibid., pp. 76-7.

[44]Ibid., p. 79.

[45]Ibid., p. 80.

of familiar dochotomies: stimulus-response, part-whole, process-content, structure-function, and abstract-concrete. All or almost all of these pairs are at least as applicable to sociological concerns.

The phenomena of act, continued Bentley, should be process or function, or even structure of the full transaction, but with Dewey it became transformed into a "part" or "content" of a personalized response. The following passage is rather lengthy but it has the virtue of bringing Bentley's criticism to the level of example; if, he argued, his own "act" of writing a paragraph be analyzed, certain segments of transaction could be taken out:

> But such a part so inspected will not be an instance of the abstracted "experiencing" which Dewey has shown should be psychology's primary concern, nor will it be a "structure" of the full "transaction." It is not "abstract" in any ordinary rendering of that word; it is "concrete" if the word "concrete" means anything at all, which is very doubtful; it is full of "content"; it is a bit of segmentation of "what is happening," viewed as if "within" the boundaries of the "organism" or "person." If we want to study this bit of "what is happening" with any thoroughness at all, we shall have to deal with it elaborately in a frame of wider happenings across thousands of years and thousands of miles—a frame wherein it secures a significance vastly greater than that of "life-career," though perhaps not so currently interesting. As "act," spatially delimited, it may have a certain quasi-anatomical status. It is most certainly neither synonym nor substitute for experiencing.[46]

If this quotation is read with care it reveals the difficulty friends and critics alike have had in fully comprehending Bentley's demands. He went very far along the road with Dewey, as he had with Simmel and von Weise in sociology; he went with them in their images of man in society, as process, flux, and activity. He broke with them over the proper procedure of "cutting into," or "abstracting from," the process. Dewey came very close to an adequate statement, and his shortcomings illustrate the true extremism of Bentley. Given that Dewey had a sense of the meaning of transactional situation, given further that he appreciated the task of selective

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[46]Ibid., p. 81.

abstraction of parts, he still fell short because he thought it possible

to abstract from the actual "concrete" situation. Bentley argued that if

an act, say of writing, was to be taken out of the situation of "man-writing-

book," it had to be recast in broader terms, but not necessarily those of

the original situation itself. We might, for example, need to discuss the

"writing" in terms of the physiology of the man's hand, and this might re-

quire inquiry into his genetic heritage, and so on.

The point here is that there are at least two forms of transactional

statement involved. The original transactional statement of the man-writing-

book, and then the new transactional statement of "writing" per se. Unless

this second form of transactional statement was observed, the abstraction

"writing" would be nothing but lifeless segmentation. Once this point is

grasped we can realize that Bentley never accepted the idea that analysis

or abstraction from process involved dismemberment, fixity, or any such

static distortion. It meant just a different transactional statement.

A still more advanced construction form was Kantor's, to which Bentley

gave the name of "apprehensional space-segment." We need not devote much

space to Kantor, except to note that he more thoroughly integrated his ob-

ject and organism in a temporal (though not spatial) construction. He

called his procedure "interactional," which Bentley refined to "inter-

actional" as opposed to "interactional." The reason Bentley gave for this

modification is important: "If it were read as 'interactional,' the stress

would seem to be upon the end-points of behaviors, which is exactly what

he does not intend."[47] Kantor's interactional, just as Dewey's experienc-

ing, were approximate but insufficient forms of transactional statement.

Again, as in so many instances before, Bentley was insisting that all was

process, not only whatever concourse flowed between points, but those points

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[47]Ibid., p. 91.

themselves.

In a summary evaluation of the state of psychological construction Bentley stressed the progress made toward the elimination of the four "issues" of dichotomies of the "old mind-language": organism-object, mind-body, organism-environment, and man-man.[48] The mind-body problem he believed to have lost its importance, but only Kantor had begun work on an adequate construction of organism-object. The man-man dichotomy remained, but Bentley found widespread discontent with contemporary constructions in this sector. Organism-environment, perhaps the most profound of the pairs, in part because it undercut the others, was as yet insufficiently conceptualized, though Dewey and Kantor had made a beginning. Bentley viewed this last dichotomy as of such importance that solutions in the other sectors could not come about until it was conquered. In fact we may read the remainder of Behavior Knowledge Fact as an effort to do precisely that.

In the chapter entitled "'Isonality': Language and Fact," Bentley firmly located the problem which his improved linguistic construction was to solve in the rather ugly word "isonality" or "isolationality." Arguing in a manner very similar to his analysis of "vulgar" space, Bentley contended that to generalize from the personal knowledge that "I perceive individuals" to the statement that "Other people perceive individuals" was to become involved in the Aristotelian "naming procedure" criticized above, and thus to build isonality into the structure of language via the mind-object dichotomy. Replacement of presentations like "soul," "mind," etc., by "person," or "activity" is an advance in that the latter may be given a biologically individuated locus, but they may well be insufficient for

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[48]Ibid., p. 102. See table, p. 100.

psychological purposes. Though it <u>may</u> be true that we receive our materials in primarily individual terms, this does not mean that we must use them as a linguistic or analytic frame. Physics, for example, retained a notion of matter even as it worked with it in a highly altered conceptual form.

A satisfactory linguistic construction of transaction must extend "across the full range of knowledge," which for Bentley included not only the realm of "science," but the realms of "Experience, Existence, and Value."[49] For this reason he rejected Titchener's Systematic Psychology: Prolegomena (1929) which, despite its merit in suggesting a functional point of view distinction within the branches of science refused to extend this construction beyond what he called "scientific facts."[50] All knowledge is "social," but the social itself must be framed within the wider body of knowledge, including that of the physical, vital, and psychological. These realms do not stand in hierarchical arrangement to one another such that we could speak of one as "epiphenomenal" vis-a-vis one more "basic," but rather, to borrow Talcott Parsons' phrase, they "interpentrate."

> Neither "social" nor "psychological" can hope to secure permanent formulation except under clarified offsetting with the other; alike they involve participations in, and presentations of, the "outer" world, the "physical," which itself reaches up into and through them, and which, "in knowledge," may in the end dominate them.[51]

"Fact" implicates "experience," and "knowledge" implicates "language." As a preliminary statement Bentley suggested the following:

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[49]Behavior, p. 113.

[50]Another shock to those who have regarded Bentley as a "positivist" concerned to keep "science" untainted by "value," must be his contention that Titchener's use of terms like "subject matter," "point of view," "observation" and even "logic" involved him in the realm of value. Ibid., p. 124.

[51]Ibid., p. 134.

If experience can be taken as personal fact; if facts in general
are taken as the scattered "stimuli" of experience; if knowledge
is the wide social embodiment of experience—so Language is the
wide social formulation and embodiment of fact and knowledge.[52]

These four terms of "phases" if placed in the "tellurian-sidereal

cosmos" (Newtonian universe), need to be expanded "inwards" and "outwards,"

"backwards" and "forwards." We must "run our construction far backwards

from the few thousand years of history which we have used as a base for its

consideration," and interpret out constructions "phasally" and "functionally."[53]

If, for example, we pause at the description "sensing," we must
read it, not as some capacity assignable mechanistically (via the
mind-language) to a limited bit of "matter" (or "mind") or to a
special area of space, but as a functional phenomenon in which
"race" and "environment" come functionally into account along with
"individual," and without radically disjunctive oppositions between
any of these terms.[54]

A series of terms such as "sensing," "speaking," "thinking" should not be

"cut apart," separated onto different levels of time of evolution. Rather

"we shall endeavor to learn what beginnings of 'thinking' there may be in

'sensing' and what extensions of 'sensing' there may be in 'thinking,'"[55]

As a conclusive analogy Bentley suggests that the difficulty physics en-

countered in finding a light ray participant both in the realm of the ob-

served and the observing (i.e., "fact" and "knowing") should warn us against

placing the perception and the undulation in separate, alien worlds.

This concludes our summary of the primary dimensions, the four phases

with which transactional analysis must at least begin. The discussion here

has been difficult and abstract, but as such it has abridged the intrica-

cies and subtleties of Bentley's exposition itself. Small wonder that when

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[52]Ibid., p. 150.

[53]Ibid., pp. 180-1.

[54]Ibid., p. 181.

[55]Ibid.

he concluded this more general section he felt impelled to encourage weary

readers with these words:

> I can deeply sympathize with anyone who objects to being tossed into
> such a floating cosmology. Much as I have stressed its substantial-
> ity, I can hardly expect everyone to feel it. The firm land of "mat-
> ter" or even of "sense" or "self" is pleasanter, if only it stands
> firm. To anyone whose tasks can be performed on such ground, I have
> not the slightest thought of bringing disturbance. But for many of
> us tasks are pressing, in the course of which our firmest spots of
> conventional departure themselves dissolve in function. When they
> have so dissolved, there is no hope of finding refuge in some chance
> island of "fact" which may appear. The continents go, and the is-
> lands. The pang may be like that felt by a confirmed landsman at
> his first venture on the ocean, but the ocean in time becomes famil-
> iar and secure. Or, if I may change the figure, the fledgling will
> vastly prefer his firm nest to falling with untried wings. But the
> parent sciences are pushing; the next, even, is disintegrating; and
> there is air for flight, even though it is not so vividly felt and
> seen as the sticks and straws of the nest.[56]

I have said that Bentley intended "encouragement," but it may as well have

been consolation—even consolation tinged with contempt—for the "confirmed

landsman" and the "fledgling" who would not brave the process universe for

science. Nor was Bentley entirely frank in his disavowal of any intention

to bring disturbance. Of course he wanted to disturb, but he had, since

1908, learned enough about his Hericlitean world to recognize that not

everyone could dwell there. For his was the tough-minded course; better

to know the limits of coherence we may hope to gain than rest content with

our incoherence.[57] To the more tender-minded or faint-hearted Bentley could

have echoed the words of the policemen in Kafka's parable, "Give it up."

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[56]Ibid., p. 183. In a recent article Norman Jacobson has pointed to
the striking similarity of Bentley's imagery to that of a passage from
Nietzsche, "Causality and Time in Political Process: A Speculation," APSR,
Vol. LVIII (Mar., 1964).

[57]I have suggested before certain psychological or personality paral-
lels between Bentley and David Hume, who, when his youthful analyses brought
him to the limits of speculation, abandoned philosophy for the "conventions"
of history. The dismissal of Hume as "purely negative" recalls the revul-
sion Bentley's destructive genius occasions among those social scientists
who have troubled to understand him. History's case against the essen-
tially critical thinker has been well made by J. S. Mill: "Hume, the

We must now conclude our examination of Bentley's transactional-process analysis; the remaining pages will explore some preliminary constructs of simple situations and the form of statement in which they may be described. Bentley began this task by trying to characterize (not "define") the social as a field of inquiry. Facts can only be known through human senses, he argued, and this meant that every social fact had to be "physical" in the sense that the discipline of physics includes space and time (extensions and durations). Thus the "full setting and embodiment of the 'social' must be physical."[58] At the same time it must be vital, in the sense that vital processes are exhibited in it, and the techniques of the biological sciences applicable to it. Provisionally, though certainly unsatisfactorialy, psychology may be associated with individual phenomena, and the social may refer to those characteristics of behavioral phenomena not satisfactorialy treated by the former; as, essentially, a residual category. If we so conceive these two "fields," they are independent of reduction to statement in terms of biology or physics.[59]

In this sense Bentley certainly maintained the "autonomy" of the social sciences, or more properly the social realm, but this contention must not be read carelessly to include him in the ranks of those contemporary political scientists who bend their considerable ingenuity towards

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prince of dilettanti, from whose writings one will hardly learn that there is such a thing as truth, far less that it is attainable; but only that the pro and con of everything may be argued with infinite ingenuity, and furnishes a fine intellectual exercise." "Bentham," J. S. Mill, Essays on Politics and Culture (New York, 1962), p. 89.

[58]Behavior, p. 190.

[59]Ibid., pp. 193-4.

distinguishing a priori the realms of "the political" or "the social."

His distinctions were preliminary, and would be maintained only so long

as science found itself unable to treat of certain phases or aspects of

human experience within a unified construction form. On the other hand

Bentley must be vindicated of the charge of "crude reductionism," of be-

lieving that social or political matters could be conceptualized and under-

stood in terms of a "physics."

He explicitly rejected the form of the question, "is there a social,"

and suggested that it be rephrased in some such manner as this:

> Can we in the specific case of the "social," select, under verifiable
> observation, definite presentations which, by the broadest tests of
> present-day technique and construction, are separable form those
> other presentations which are dealt with by the techniques and con-
> structions of the physical and biological sciences? And if we do
> select such presentations can they maintain themselves in scientific
> work in correlation with other presentations established through
> specialized psychological investigation and set forth in terms of
> the "individual" as separate from the "social"?[60]

There must be no mistake about this. Bentley's requirement that behavioral

(social and psychological) facts be "visible" does not mean that they are

only observable activity, as some readers have interpreted him to have said.

It was, in the stilted phrase of the logician, necessary but not sufficient.

Of course "observation" itself required analysis in terms wherein it was

considered as activity (including linguistic analysis, training, concepts,

etc.), as well as in terms of the "what" of observation (e.g., "bird in

flight"), but this has been covered more generally above. The point to be

stressed is the provisional nature of the "behavioral fact"; its persis-

tence as a category depended not upon a determination of its existential,

ontological "reality," but entirely upon the need within a unified science

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[60]Ibid., p. 95.

for residual categories.[61]

How, we may now ask, would this criterion of "visibility" or "observability" be applied in transactional analysis of the behavioral realm? The example Bentley offered was, as indicated at the outset, a relatively simple one: the conversational situation between two men. What in the most rigorous sense, can we say we "observe" of this situation? The sound is not visually perceived, although the framework of men talking, men listening, men gesturing, is. Events such as speaking and hearing have no materiality, but they do have extensions and durations within a field. What is required is the widest possible observation of that field. Exactly at this point Bentley found a subtle danger capable of undoing all the careful preparations thus far made. The temptation he warned of was to introduce the notion of man as "actor," in which man/actor would be isolated and the remainder of the situation become "abstract," as environment or history.[62] It is perhaps justifiable to anticipate later arguments to the extent of pointing out that Bentley would have junked the whole edifice of Talcott Parsons and the "General Theory of Action" group for what he would have considered the re-introduction of isonality.

In the conversational situation just described, concentration on the "speaking-heard" as event yields a factuality in technical differentiation from specifically physical and vital facts that are yet visible, capable of scientific observation and extension. Bentley called this event, the speaking-heard, the Dicaud.[63] The "thing" that the Dicaud is "about"—

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[61]This, by extension, would be the case with all other sciences except the most "advanced." If, for example, a way should be found to treat the phenomena of biology in terms of a future physics, the former would simply disappear as a phase or category before the extension of the concepts, constructions, of the latter. This makes nonsense of the claim that one science is more "basic" than another as is sometimes urged of the psychology-sociology relationship.

[62]Behavior, pp. 208-9.

[63]Ibid., p. 232.

the referrent of the "speaking-heard"--he called the <u>Dicaudane</u>. Bentley

noted the similarity of the Latin roots of "fact" and "act" and contended

that each "reported" on something done. "Only in the recent outcome have

the senses of 'a doing' or 'a thing done' been stripped away from 'fact,'

while the senses of 'reality,' 'actuality,' and 'accomplished fact' have

become in counterpart obsolete for 'act.'"[64] Fact, he continued, had come

to stand forth "on its own," while act, meaning "deed," required an intel-

ligent "actor."

> The "act" requires an "actor," but it also requires its own differ-
> entiation of "actor" from "act." In this setting "speech" as an
> "act" received dictionary classification in a separate compartment
> from "speech" as a factual reference in terms of the "individual"
> or his "capacity," and from "speech" as "socially-spread" fact.[65]

As a consequence the speaking-heard is regarded as act, the examiner

has inserted "between the organic activity and the wider factual presenta-

tion a duplicatative phenomenon, the 'actor.'"[66] This fractures the frame

of observability; conversely, under an extended observation, fully durational,

the actor fades either into the organism (activity) or into the wider social

fact of language.

The Dicaud could be examined from a variety of perspectives and for a

number of purposes. A narrower approach than the one Bentley favored was

the "behaviorist" which would not attempt to deal with the dimensions of

"meaning" and "communication." Such specialized investigations within the

field of the Dicaud he compared to histology, as it was distinguished from

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[64]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 239. I have referred earlier to the notion of language as
a shaper or determinant of thought that is found in Wittgenstein. The same
idea has been argued from an anthropological basis, notably the "Whorfian
Hypothesis," which holds in part, "linguistic patterns themselves determine
what the individual perceives in this world and how he thinks about it.", F.
Fearing, "An Examination of the Conceptions of Benjamin Whorf in the Light of
Theories of Perception and Cognition," H. Hoijer, <u>Language in Culture</u>, Amer-
ican Anthropologist 56, Memoir No. 79, 1954; quoted in Ludwig von Bertalanffy,
"An Essay on the Relativity of Categories," <u>Philosophy of Science</u> (Oct., 1955),
Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 243.

[65]<u>Behavior</u>, p. 239.

[66]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 241.

physiology; it could deal with "certain tissues of speech" but not with the living process.[67] The general classification of "men seen in communication" would be a specialized observation which ignores the "what" communication is "about." Bentley called this the Communact and considered the Dicaud a subclass thereof.[68] As a parallel to the Dicaud he suggested Scriptilect for writing-reading activities and Gest for communication by gestures.

A more inclusive situation in which the references, meanings, and objectives of communication in addition to the Communact come under investigation, was called the Communicane. It denoted the full situation, the description of which Bentley thought beyond the capacity of his contemporary social science. In part this was due to the greater complexity of the Communicane's space and time dimensions. While the Communact, "behavioral" in the broad sense, could make use of the Newtonian frame, at least for initial formulations, the Communicane required new constructions. This is perhaps the place to note Bentley's somewhat specialized use of "behavioral."

> Behavior is that specifically separate field of scientific inquiry, set over against the physical and vital, within which both "social" and "psychological" research must be carried on. It is that great type of activity which cannot be held within a physical description and technique, nor within a vital, but which requires a directly psychological and social form of research, with whatever better descriptions and techniques we may secure to replace the two very imperfect words "psychological" and "social."[69]

This designated area, irreducible to physics or biology, needed persistent exploratory research and freedom in hypothesis formulation. As such, it

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[67]Ibid., p. 246.

[68]Ibid., p. 251. He continued: "In this terminology the suffix ane will indicate behaviors inclusive behaviorally of the 'referant' in some one of its many forms, while the terminal consonants d or t, suggestive of imperfection or suspense, will be used for the partial or aspectual observations."

[69]Ibid., p. 262.

needed to be sharply differentiated from "behaviorist" insofar as the

latter term indicated a restricted area of inquiry and an already estab-

lished construction form and method.

Reviewing Bentley's progress to this point, we have: (1) the Commun-

icane, representing "full behavioral observation," and its subclasses of

Dicaudane, Scriptilectane, Gestane, etc; (2) the Communact, specialized

observation of men in communication, with its subclasses of Dicaud, Scrip-

tilect, Gest, etc.[70] But this outline omitted a third set of terms needed

to complete the analysis, namely terms to designate the referrent of com-

munication itself. The attempt to conceptualize this set brought Bentley

very close to the central difficulty of transactional analysis, and we must

proceed here with great caution.

We have described in some detail the suggested vocabulary with which

he intended to distinguish phases of the act of communication from the full

situation. The detail may have seemed burdensome or unnecessarily intricate

to indicate a distinction that could be much more succintly put. I will

try now to show that our care has not been excessive.

When Bentley tried to conceptualize the referrent of communication

he again encountered an old enemy, the object, the "thing," the bounded en-

tity which transactional analysis had promised to eliminate as a block to

the course of inquiry. He explicitly recognized this.

> We face here a critical issue, not merely in terminology, but in the
> whole manner of exposition, for the further results of our investiga-
> tion. We may, if we wish, decide that our "background" of observation
> is now sufficiently clear so that we can henceforth display our phenom-
> ena--our "figures," our "objects"--positively and without qualification.[71]

If, that is, we are satisfied that all the prior and painstaking analysis and

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[70] Ibid., see diagram, p. 265.

[71] Ibid., pp. 266-7.

reconstruction has sufficed to conceptualize a "background" from which an "object" may now be separated, and if we can rest content with the re-introduction of the bounded thing or entity without fear of creating new, artificial divisions, then there is no reason to feel that more than an additional set of terms is necessary. But if we believe, as Bentley did, that transactional analysis had just begun to restructure its conceptions of background and could not afford to accept fixities, entities, or any boundaries as fact, then the problem of conceptualizing the referent of the communication situation becomes quite difficult. After all, does not the very idea of a referent _of_ conversation require that the latter be separated, marked off from the remark itself--and further, that it be somehow identifiable in its own milieu? Bentley put the issue this way:

> We are now at a point where the two great opposed attitudes towards the materials of investigation, the disjunctive and the functional, will begin to show their sharpest conflicts. We must continue to exercise the greatest caution against looseness in the application of words.[72]

This is all very well, but the matter is before us in urgent form. Can process or transactional analysis create linguistic and conceptual frameworks for even the simple, conversational situation _without_ introducing Aristotelian designations and fixed entities? Bentley tried to accomplish this task by treating the "object" as "phasal" or, in more familiar terms, "functional" to the situation observed. To understand precisely how he expected this to advance him we need to look at his conceptualization of perception. Perception, he argued, had to be treated on a level parallel to that of communication, and he suggested the term Perceptane to indicate "Any specific instance of the observable behavior of an-organism-in-environment."

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[72]_Ibid._, p. 267. He refers, of course, to the Aristotelian and the "scientific" attitudes.

The term Personan would designate the behavioral participation of this separated organism as it was phasal to either the Perceptane or the Communicane. If the individual organism were phasal to the former Bentley thought it might be termed P-Personan, and if to the latter, C-Personan.[73]

Objectan was the name given to the reference, considered as behavioral, of either Perceptane (P-Objectane) or Communicane (C-Objectane). Perceptane and Communicane have now been brought onto the same level, as direct observation of subject matter. Personan and Objectan are now "phases of specialized inquiry with respect to Communicane and Perceptane, separately or together."[74] "Specialized inquiry" was the key phrase in Bentley's treatment of the object. This is made manifest in the final set of terms to be considered here: Objectane, Personane, Perceptan, Communican. These terms stress inquiry into object and person.

> Objectane and Personane present "object" and "person" as the dominant observations of basic phenomena which are to be the primary subject-matters of inquiry. Communican and Perceptan then name the communicational and perceptional processes as dependent presentations of analysis.[75]

Words such as "stress," "selection," "provisional," and "hypothesis" were the constant reminders Bentley addressed to an audience that might be tempted to establish an object as distinct object beyond conceptualization as environment.

Communicane and Perceptane were repeatedly presented as observations of the full situation within which various experimental segmentations might be constructed. Process or transactional analysis was to deal with the problem of "object" not by refusing to make any segmentation whatever, but by creating

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[73] Ibid., pp. 267-8.

[74] Ibid., p. 268.

[75] Ibid., p. 269.

a vocabulary which expressed categories and concepts of relative stresses and emphases. This meant, despite Bentley's repeated dismissal of the term, an "holistic" bias in that the provisionally segmented Objectane must never be considered without referrence to some system. This was what he meant by the phrase, "always to take objects and organisms together in moving systems."[76] But if all that Bentley had done was to insist upon conceptualizations in which "part" would be related to "whole," he would have said nothing even remotely new. The distinctive step he took was to link this notion of system with a denial of any fixed boundary or structure to the part-whole relationship. That is, a part isolated for certain purposes from its environment might well blend back into the system (environment not to be stressed) for other purposes. The same part, object or Objectane might, for other purposes, receive stress in another system, or, under still different circumstances, it might itself constitute a Communicane with its own parts.

The liberation from restrictive formulation afforded by process analysis is finally a very fragile thing in that it rests ultimately upon the willingness and ability of the investigator to regard his segmentations as tentative and hypothetical. Once he forgets this, he slips back into Aristotelian usage and the universe of basic separation. Once there, nothing remains except to lead him step by critical step back through the argument which brought him originally critical awareness of process analysis.

It must almost seem at this point that the mountain has labored to produce a very small mouse, that the painstaking creation of a new vocabulary was not needed to establish a cautionary principle in our minds. I will not argue the necessity for a technical language beyond pointing out that some of the best minds of the Twentieth century have regarded the

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[76] Ibid., p. 283.

analysis and reconstruction of language as indispensable to the clarifi-

cation of thought. A more important defense of Bentley may be made on

epistemological grounds. It rests upon Bentley's conception of the rela-

tion between knowledge and fact, or as he and John Dewey were later to put

it, knowing and the known. For the moment let us lay aside the technical

procedures described in the immediately preceding pages and turn to Bentley's

remarks about nature and knowledge.

The general postulate of "scientific uniformity" could, he argued, be

divided into two types, contrasted:

> according as they do or do not take into account the communicative
> behavioral phases of the world-presentations they set forth. One of
> these we may call the postulate of uniformity of nature; the other,
> that of uniformity of knowledge. The first presents "nature" as so
> thoroughly and uniquely "known" that it is before us in transcendence
> of the limiting conditions of its "being known"; the second retains
> this limiting condition in its statement.[77]

We need now to take a close look at the precise formulation of both types,

and I will quote both definitions in their entirety before commenting fur-

ther. First is the postulate of the uniformity of nature.

> The physical world, as extrapolated from the knowledge of it, is
> the basic presentation of science. Physically located "within"
> this world and as "part" of it are living organisms, themselves
> of ultimately physical constitution. Physically and vitally lo-
> cated "within" the range of living organisms—and, more particu-
> larly, "within" certain "higher" organisms of that range—are
> neurological-psychological processes, themselves of ultimately
> physical and vital constitution.[78]

Then, the postulate of the uniformity of knowledge.

> Knowledge of the physical must be taken as basic knowledge, and as
> applicable, so far as its descriptions and techniques extend, to
> all the vital and to all the behavioral; and with full freedom for
> the unlimited extension of its specialized techniques, so far as it
> can achieve satisfaction through its own success. Knowledge of both

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[77]Ibid., p. 275.

[78]Ibid., pp. 275-6.

physical and vital must be taken as applicable, so far as their
descriptions and techniques extend, to all the behavioral, and
with full freedom for unlimited extension across the behavioral
field. All of this knowledge, all of these descriptions and
techniques, exhibit involvement in communicative behaviors in
the sense that neither as Fact, nor as Knowledge, nor as Exper-
ience, nor as Language, can any "part" of it be basically, radi-
cally, fundamentally, absolutely, severed from the other "parts,"
so far as either our present powers or definite outlooks suffice
to indicate.[79]

Bentley thought that the differences between these formulations

turned on their respective treatments of the dichotomies part/whole and

within/without. In the first postulate physical nature is "reported upon"

by certain "parts" of itself. This idea has worked out reasonably well

with regard to the natural sciences because its users seemed to have pos-

sessed "adequate structural comprehension of such distinctions." The pos-

tulate of the uniformity of knowledge confesses itself without any adequate

notion of them.[80] Psychology and sociology are in a situation represented

by the latter, an "analytic and functional" statement. If we were to try

to apply the uniformity of nature postulate to the social disciplines we

would find that "it involves the position that the C-Objectan, or whatever

that term 'really' indicates, lies outside of behavior and behavioral

knowledge."[81]

The uniformity of knowledge principle contains the "limiting condition"

that the "what is known" is, at our present stage of knowledge if not in

principle, inseparable from the "knowing" of it. This condition of know-

ledge in the social and psychological realms underlies the necessity for

tentative, hypothetical procedures in the sciences which investigate them.

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[79]Ibid., p. 276.

[80]Ibid., pp. 276-7.

[81]Ibid., p. 277.

The conviction that knowledge must be regarded as "behavior" because of its intimate connection to knowing has sometimes been regarded as evidence that Bentley accepted the "sociology of knowledge." A recent article insists that because "meaning" was to Bentley a "social event":

> The transactional approach yields this cosmic view. This involves an extreme form of what has come to be called the sociology of knowledge, a view which reduces ideas to factual responses of interests to the environment. Bentley embraced the sociology of knowledge in The Process of Government.[82]

The conclusion is buttressed by a quotation from that work. It is true to say that Bentley regarded behavior in the broad sense of all activity as an aspect of interest, and interest had, of course, a relation to other interests within society, and if this is what is meant by "sociology of knowledge" then the author is correct.

But that term has a more precise application in the literature of social science, denoting the works of its most famous exponent, Karl Mannheim.[83] While dedicated scholarship can no doubt find propositions with which Bentley and Mannheim would both agree, their differences are more revealing. Without disputing the author's judgment about The Process of Government, which is written about politics and society, it should be apparent from the preceding pages that the "transactional approach" is both much more and mubh less than the sociology of knowledge. If Bentley conceded Mannheim's fundamental point, that "knowledge" was decisively conditioned by adoption of a perspective, the adoption itself, being conditioned by the social milieu of the investigator, he proceeded to create a tool which could convey the investigator outside of linguistic and cultural limitations. Mannheim's effort

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[82]Myron Q. Hale, "The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley," APSR, Vol. LIV (Dec., 1960), p. 958.

[83]Ideology and Utopia (New York, 1940). See also, Werner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge (Glencoe, Ill., 1958); and the work of Max Scheler.

was devoted towards uncovering the latent presuppositions underlying cer-
tain periods and kinds of thought and establishing what might be called a
meta-logical theory of thought. It was largely an historical effort.
Bentley casually conceded that thought was an aspect or phase of behavior--
more, that science did advance and make its former bed rock truth obsolete--
but his vision of transactional analysis left little room for any precon-
ceptions to mediate between perception and the observable. Indeed, the
thrust of Bentley's effort was to eliminate all verbal and conceptual ob-
stacles to direct observation of behavior, and while he made the prudent
reservation that another generation might achieve an unanticipated break-
through on some unspecified scientific front, he clearly intended to ground
his science in the unassailable bed rock of the observable.

The fact that Bentley had earlier endorsed "interest" as a means
toward conceptualizing what man in sociation does, and that his mature for-
mulations of transactional analysis emphasize the hypothetical nature of a
"truth," does not suffice to bring him into the camp of the sociology of
knowledge. More than this, a reading of his postulate of the uniformity of
knowledge indicates that by extending the boundaries of inquiry in the
social realm he hoped to transcend any partial or limited perspective. It
is not too strong a statement to say that the passage describing the unifor-
mity of knowledge can be taken as Bentley's vision of human experience as
process. If it be contended that "truth" or "thought" depends, in both
Bentley's and Mannheim's formulations, upon perspective, then it is also
true that to the former it was a concession blithely made, and to the latter
it was the basis of a science. Mannheim chose to press "backward" toward
the preconditions of the choice, while Bentley preferred to march forward
toward a broader and more reliable conceptualization.[84]

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[84]The text interpretation rejects Hale's argument from sociology of

But if Bentley sought to do less than the sociology of knowledge in respect to its "unmasking" function, he attempted much more through his determination to put knowledge into a behavioral framework and yet preserve its integrity and consistency. In the essay, "The Terminological Problem," written with John Dewey, Bentley spoke of the need to treat the two great factual aspects of "event" and "designation" as equally "in" a cosmos: "designation is the naming through which Event appears in our Knowing as Fact."[85] Designation and the designated are not ultimately separable, but constitute one event in behavioral space-time. Designation, and this is the point that is difficult to keep constantly before the mind, is itself event. Bentley saw no need to make a name, designation, or logic stand outside of event, behavior, or cosmos.

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knowledge grounds, including his interpretation of Bentley as consenting to a test of truth between critics and defenders of the status quo based upon "a practical contest of power." This is plainly an extension of Hale's pre-occupation with ideology far beyond any sympathetic chord in Bentley, and disregards the latter's deep disaffection with his times. Bentley's position is much closer to that of Ludwig Bertalanffy:

> The categories of knowledge, of every-day knowledge as well as of scientific knowledge, which in the last resort is only a refinement of the former, depend, first, on biological factors; second, on cultural facts; third, notwithstanding this all-too-human entanglement, absolute knowledge, emancipated from human limitations, is possible in a certain sense.", Bertalanffy, p. 247.

Still, Hale merits applause for his willingness to read beyond The Process of Government, and his consequent ability to avoid some of the cruder positions taken by other critics. For example, R. E. Dowling, in the same issue, feels no discomfiture in classifying Bentley, Catlin, and Hobbes as men who have fallen victim to, "the centuries-old attempt to appropriate the success of dynamics or mechanics to politics." Dowling continued to explain that, "the reduction of phenomena to the primary qualities of matter and motion," was the chimera bewitching these men. "Just as Newtonian physicists speak of material bodies and particles, and the forces they exert upon each other, so we must confine ourselves to the description of the motions of atomic political bodies and the forces they reflect upon eabh other.", p. 944. This caricature of Bentley's position might be explained by the fact that Dowling's article contains, in addition to The Process of Government, one reference to Relativity in Man and Society. Even so it is hard to understand his inability to detect Bentley's repudiation of the atomic, billiard ball theory in the former work.

[85]Knowing, p. 61.

We shall regard these naming-knowings directly as a form of know-ings. Take this statement literally as it is written. It means we do not regard namings as primarily instrumental or specifically ancillary to something else called knowings (or knowledge) except as any behavior may enter as ancillary to any other.[86]

Bentley freely admitted that this was a circular procedure, but thought it could not be avoided.

We observe world-bing-known-to-man-in-it; we report the observation; we proceed to inquire into it, circularity or no circularity. This is all there is to it. And the circularity is not merely round the circle in one direction: the course is both ways round at once in full mutual function.[87]

In his technical psychological language Bentley expressed the idea this way: "To describe the full situation of the Communicane as behavior is precisely the same as to say that the phenomena present themselves to us in behavioral space time."[88] To be able to make a statement in behavioral space-time was to conduct a transactional analysis of the process of human experience as it appeared in the postulate of the uniformity of knowledge. We might para-phrase Bentley's oft-quoted remark to read, "When the Communicanes are stated, everything is stated."

I will not burden these pages, already somewhat narrowly technical, with further elaboration of Bentley's systematic theory. His books them-selves present that far more fully than a hasty summary could hope to ac-complish. I will, however, need to mention another set of terms as they illustrate the final stage of Bentley's effort. They relate to what we have here identified as the central problem of process analysis (a judgment Bentley made himself), namely conceptualization of the object or Objectane

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[86]Ibid., pp. 58-9.

[87]Ibid., p. 63. Thus "explanation" in the mechanical sense is not even to be attempted. Hale's criticism of Bentley's identification of "activity" and "interest" which concludes that this usage "deprives the word interest of any explanatory value, and banishes the economic substructure from the system" (Hale, p. 959) misses the point. More incisive is Charles Hagen's remark that "interest is a posteriori not a priori, and it is consistent with the observed behavior and not contrary to it.", "The Group in Political Science," Richard Taylor, Life, Language, Law (Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1957), p. 117.

[88]Behavior, p. 281.

as dominant observation. Bentley talked increasingly about "techniques of isolation," and although he remained insistent upon flexibility and the investigator's freedom of choice in hypothesis, he became more concerned with the "cutting into" stage as a source of error. In <u>Knowing and the Known</u> he suggested that events might be differentiated "with respect to a certain range of plasticity that is comparable in a general way to the physical differentiations of gaseous, liquid and solid."[89]

This was not to say that Bentley admitted, at this late stage, and <u>qualitative</u> differentiations among events, but he did seek to establish what might be called quantitative rankings. The terms "Situation," "Occurrence," and "Object" were suggested as preliminary benchmarks along what appeared as a scale of isolationality. Situation denoted the full subject matter, not detachable as environment set over against object. Occurrence was defined as "Event designated as in process under transitions such as are most readily identifiable in everyday human-size contacts."[90] Object was a bit less "plastic," "Event in its more stabilized forms," but never, of course, firmly fixed in language nor implanted in our minds as "fact." The key definition is that of Occurrence, since it is here that a criterion for distinguishing events, an index of plasticity if you will, needs to emerge. Not surprisingly Bentley is very vague here. The test is framed in the phrase "everyday human-size contacts." What fun Bentley would have had finding such a ghost in a key passage of a mentalist! A few pages earlier he had provided a somewhat more operational criterion, "When an event is of the type that is readily observable in transition within the ordinary

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[89]<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 63-4.

[90]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 73.

spans of human discrimination of temporal and spatial changes, we shall call it occurrence."[91] Provisionally, then, we are referred back to our vulgar, common sense notions of space and time.

We have now travelled about as far along the road as Bentley can take us. His final suggestion looks toward change that is humanly perceivable as means of identifying an object, but we are left to speculate about how something undergoing change can be detected in the first place. If the difficulty is put in this form, wider perspective opens before us and several lines of convergence which I have thus far only been able to suggest may now be brought under direct examination. In an earlier chapter we recalled the Heraclitean challenge to ordered thought, and the compromise worked out between it and the alternative of Parmenides. We had illustrated the dimensions of that conflict, in a brief and general way, by a quotation from Alfred Whitehead in which he tried to accommodate both permanence and change within his natural philosophy. Whitehead's speculative thought provides us now with a link between this classical debate and the crisis of the object in Bentleyan process analysis.

The brilliant series of Lowell Lectures delivered in 1925 and published as Science and the Modern World contain an extensive and historical discussion of what Whitehead liked to call the philosophy of organism. As with most such systems, it went through various stages and modifications, receiving probably its most profound formulation in Process and Reality, published in 1929. We will be concerned with a few aspects of his notion of process as it reflected both the classical dilemma and as it constituted a parallel to Bentley's vision; it is not a complete nor perhaps even an adequate presentation of Whitehead's philosophy.

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[91] Ibid., p. 70.

His dualism was expressed repeatedly, as these passages illustrate:

Things are separated by space, and are separated by time: but they are also together in space, and together in time, even if they be not contemporaneous. I will call these characters the separative and the prehensive characters of space time.[92]

The general principle, underlying these special cases, is that the erroneous notions of process devoid of individualities, and of individualities devoid of process, can never be adjusted to each other. If you start with either of these falsehoods, you must dismiss the other as meaningless.[93]

But of the two visions of experience, Whitehead, at one time at least, seemed to find the process version more challenging or problematical—if not more fundamental.

Without doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate, integral experience, unwarped by the sophistications of theory, that experience whose elucidation is the final aim of philosophy, the flux of things is one ultimate generalization around which we must weave our philosophical system.[94]

What is perceived is the passage of nature; Whitehead meant that this "process" was a given fact of nature which demanded expression but could have no "explanation."

One critic of Whitehead's thought has seized upon this point as the premise of an interesting analysis.

In his acceptance of process as simply given and inexplicable, as sheer flux, and in his position that all that can be done is speculatively to demonstrate it and express its relation to other factors presented in sense awareness, Whitehead has failed to come to grips with the fundamental problem. The latter is precisely the explanation of process, the discovery of structure within process and in terms of process.[95]

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[92]Science and the Modern World (New York, 1958), p. 65.

[93]Modes of Thought (New York, 1958), p. 132.

[94]Process and Reality (New York, 1960), p. 317.

[95]Harry Kohlsaat Wells, Process and Unreality (New York, 1950), pp. 15-6.

Whitehead rejected the attempt to capture nature in an instant, without its passage, preferring to conceive of the duration which could accommodate process. This, of course, required a conception of space consistent with the temporal form. Harry Wells' formulation of the problem presented by acceptance of this position could as well stand as a summary of our analysis of Bentley's difficulty.

> Sense awareness delivers durations as an essential characteristic of nature. But durations are not atomic entities. They retain within themselves the passage of nature. Further, the relation between durations blurs distinctions. They overlap and contain one another. There are no sharp lines of demarcation so that it is impossible to say of a duration that it is here and now, and in this, not that. Instead of being able to define a duration as just what it is, it must be seen as in transition and as part of larger durations, and as having smaller durations as parts of it.[96]

Experience yields a continuum and thought requires demarcations; what is to become of the laws of identity and contradiction? We are back to Heraclitus and Parmenides, but the Aristotelian compromise no longer seems acceptable, as it purports to have ontological in addition to logical validity.

Anaximenes and Heraclitus, and Hegel many centuries later, explained process in terms of the struggle among opposing forces which was resolved in the form of qualitative change. Aristotle had recognized contradiction or change to the extent of distinguishing between actual and potential characteristics and assigning the troublesome matters of flux to the latter category. Plato had made the law of identity require the principle of non-contradiction (Or non-opposition), thus banishing qualitative change.[97] "Mechanical" change would not have presented anything like the Heraclitean problem, for the internal, "qualitative" nature of the object would not

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[96]Ibid., pp. 20-1. See Whitehead's rejection of Aristotle's subject-predicate logic as the basis for the misleading subject-object dichotomy, Science, p. 152.

[97]See Wells, Ch. 6, "Traditional Method," and contrast F. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles.

have to be regarded as unstable. Whitehead did undertake to extend the

phenomena of flux to the internal nature of the object, but he could not

leave the matter there.

In Process and Reality he distinguished two kinds of "fluency": "One

kind is the concrescence which, in Locke's language, 'is the real internal

constitution of a particular existent.' The other kind is the transition

from particular existent to particular existent."[98] More specifically:

> One kind is the fluency inherent in the particular existent. This
> kind I have called 'concrescence.' The other kind is the fluency
> whereby the perishing of the process, on the completion of the par-
> ticular existent, constitutes that existent as an original element
> in the constitutions of other particular existents elicited by rep-
> etitions of process. This kind I have called 'transition.'[99]

He went on to explain that concrescence was a name for the process in which

the "universe of many things" acquires unity in the subordination of the

multiplicity to the one. The "thing" then is the concrescence; we may not

speak of the "thing" and the concrescence. The analogy to Bentley's dis-

cussion of interest, activity, and group must immediately come to mind,

just as it has certainly occurred to the reader that Bentley, too, pressed

the notion of flux (or "fluency") beyond "transition" into "concrescence."

It is beyond our province to inquire fully into Whitehead's method of

removing himself from the eternal flux, except to point out the perhaps

already apparent teleology in the notion of concrescence as described above.

Whitehead also proposed what he called the "method of extensive abstraction,"

an operation in which the quantitative continuum of events is peeled back

until its "intrinsic character"—what he called the "object"—was discover-

ed.[100] Wells' critique points out that Whitehead, in Process and Reality,

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[98]p. 320.

[99]Ibid.

[100]See Wells, Ch. 3, for the contention that Whitehead is finally un-
able to reconcile his original dualism, and that the reintroduction of "ob-
ject" through "extensive abstraction" was simply wasted effort.

altered Heraclitus' phrase, "all things flow," to the "flux of things,"
thus de-emphasizing internal contradiction. If, Wells contended, White-
head had read Hegel instead of his English disciples, he would have realiz-
ed that a new method was necessary to deal with his duality, a method
which Hegel had begun to construct. In a sympathetic account, Wells argued
that Hegel's idea of internal contradiction had been largely misunderstood;
Hegel intended to maintain that the principle of identity was complex, not
simple. The negation is thus not a nullity but results in a higher unity
of the history of an entity and its "what-is-to-be."[101] Had Whitehead
read Hegel directly, instead of expositions of his system, he would have
found inspiration in the logic and realized that "to have identifiable and
separate things does not require that there be unchanging eternal entities."

Whitehead, unlike Bentley, refused to accept the position of many
modern philosophers that the laws of thought govern logic (though not neces-
sarily a single logic) but have no force in the ontological realm. Wells
suggested P. W. Bridgman's formulation of the principle of identity as a
case in point. "From the point of view of operations, the meaning of iden-
tity is determined by the operations by which we make the judgment that
this object is the same as that one of my past experience."[102] But Bridgman
continued: "This involves the possession by the object of certain charac-
teristics--it must be a discrete thing separated from its surroundings by
physical discontinuities which persist. The concept of identifiability
applies, therefore, only to certain classes of physical objects."[103]

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[101] Ibid., Ch. 7.

[102] The Logic of Modern Physics (New York, 1960), p. 92.

[103] Ibid. In his "Physicists and Fairies," Inquiry, originally publish-
ed in 1938, Bentley had some kind words for Bridgman's early book, but found
his The Nature of Physical Theory, which appeared in 1936, nine years after
Logic, a migration toward conceptual obscurity. Of course as we have seen

Bridgman thought that if we were in fact dependent upon the law of

identity on those levels where it could be given on ontological (operation-

al) meaning--for example, in microphysics--we might well be up against an

impassable barrier to knowledge. This, of course, was precisely the wall

Bentley had encountered. Peter Strawson's recent and interesting essay

poses the question of how we can recognize another instance of a process

name such as "battle" without somewhere referring to things (e.g., "bodies"),

if we must also account for the continuity of space and time of the entities

themselves. He poses, and rejects, the introduction of a category of four

dimensional "process things" with the following argument that merits quo-

tation at some length. The category of material bodies, he has said,

"alone supplies enduring occupiers of space possessing sufficiently stable

relations to meet, and hence to create, the needs with which the use of

such a framework confronts us." He continued:

> We do in fact distinguish between a thing and its history, or the
> phases of its history; we cannot appropriately speak of one in the
> ways appropriate to the other; and we do not speak of either in
> ways appropriate to the category of process-things. Granted the
> distinction we do draw, there is, as we have already seen, a general
> identifiability-dependence of processes which things undergo upon
> the things which undergo them, and not vice versa. This is partly,
> though not only, because, granted the distinction, it is the things
> themselves, and not the processes they undergo, which are the pri-
> mary occupiers of space, the possessors not only of spatial, but of
> spatial dimensions. If one tried to give the spatial dimensions of
> such a process, say a death or a battle, one could only trace the
> outline of the dying man or indicate the extent of the ground the
> battle was fought over.[104]

There is no need to repeat, even by example, what Bentley would have

said to an argument grounded upon how, in fact, we do use words. The point

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in the analysis of Behavior Knowledge Fact, Bentley was aware of difficul-
ties in conducting firm operational research in the behavioral sector; an
awareness which grew to the proportions of a major obstacle in Knowing and
the Known.

[104]Individuals (Garden City, N. Y., 1963), p. 48.

is that Bentley proposed to surmount a blank wall that Bridgman saw as a

barrier to operations, Strawson found in our linguistic representation of

space and time, and Wells identified as the lack of a fully worked out

method to accommodate existential internal contradiction.

I have said that Bentley and Whitehead must probably be placed upon

opposite sides of the question of the applicability of reason to nature,

and in the precise sense intended, this is true. But there remain a num-

ber of interesting affinities and parallels in their respective ideas of

process that should be at least mentioned. Whitehead ultimately was forced

to introduce some notion of "object" (intrinsic characteristic) in order

to save the permanence polarity of his cosmos just as Bentley strove to

define "more plastic segments of the process in order to put his tool to

work at all. Both thus faced a difficulty in finding some units with which

to work but were unwilling to accept any of the alternatives suggested in

the previous paragraph as entirely satisfactory.

Both shared a perception that a process universe was somehow an in-

complete world. For Whitehead this idea was involved with freedom: "Process

is the way by which the universe escapes from the exclusions of inconsis-

tency"; and, "By means of process, the universe escapes from the limitations

of the finite. Process is the immanence of the infinite in the finite; where-

by all bounds are burst, and all inconsistencies dissolved."[105] For Bentley

there was an open universe because knowledge was inextricably behavior in

the world.

Another similarity was their common preoccupation with developments in

the physical and vital sciences; this is especially apparent in Whitehead's

Science and the Modern World, but our previous discussions of Bentley make

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[105]Modes, p. 75.

it plain that he certainly may not be regarded as a novice in those areas.

Each man thought that a process must be seen as consisting "of" its parts,

but also that the parts must be "functionally" related to the larger dimen-

sions of the process as a whole. Both accepted the premise that knowledge

was "in" the world of behavior and not floating freely outside. Bentley

the skeptic and critic was more overtly hostile to the idea of "explanation,"

but Whitehead too viewed the task of science (though perhaps not all ab-

stract thought) as description. Perhaps as a consequence of their shared

interest in Twentieth century science, they found the Newtonian universe

and mechanism outmoded and restrictive. As a final parallel, consider the

following quotation.

> The whole understanding of the world consists in the analysis of
> process in terms of the identities and diversities of the indivi-
> duals involved. The peculiarities of the individuals are reflected
> in the peculiarities of the common process which is their inter-
> connection. We can start our investigation from either end; namely,
> we can understand the process and thence consider the character-
> ization of the individuals; or we can characterize the individuals
> and conceive them as formative of the relevant process. In truth,
> the distinction is only one of emphasis.[106]

This was Whitehead speaking in 1938 and, except for the absence of

warnings against taking his words "fixidly" or "too concretely," it could

have been Arthur Bentley writing in 1908.

> Such interest groups are of no different material than the "indi-
> viduals" of a society. They are activity; so are the individuals.
> It is solely a question of the standpoint from which we look at the
> activity to define it. The individual stated for himself, and in-
> vested with an extra-social unity of his own, is a fiction. But
> every bit of the activity, which is all we actually know of him,
> can be stated either on the one side as individual, or on the other
> side as social group activity.[107]

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[106]Ibid., p. 135.

[107]The Process of Government (Evanston, Ill., 1935), p. 215.

To conclude our examination of Bentley we must now distinguish him from the convergence just detailed. In Science and the Modern World Whitehead referred to an essay by William James, "Does Consciousness Exist" (1904) in which he replaced the Cartesian self or entity with consciousness as a function. Whitehead thought that this challenge mirrored the objection of Twentieth century science to Seventeenth century "matter," and there is surely a case to be made for that belief. He saw the challenge as victorious against Descartes' notion of independently existing substances with simple locations in temporal durations, but he was not anxious to choose either side. Instead, Whitehead read James as criticizing a "stuff" or substance idea, such as Spinoza's, and contented himself with the equivocal remark that a function was, after all, not nothing, and therefore it was "something"; in that sense an "entity."[108]

This was not a very heroic, though perhaps a thoroughly understandable, posture. Bentley however could not be satisfied with such a non-partisan, even tepid, response; for him the challenge demanded positive reaction, and in 1943 (after a series of James Centenary papers had been presented at a meeting of the Conference of Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences in November, 1941), he published "The Jamesian Datum."[109] Much of this essay was devoted to correcting what Bentley took to be misrepresentations and misunderstandings of James; in particular he felt that the commentators had seized upon parts of James' work but had not treated it as a life's--hence, evolving--work. James' psychology began with monism, moved through dualism, and ended in pluralism; he belonged to a post-Darwinian era, by which Bentley meant simply the idea of an evolving universe with organisms and man's activity included.

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[108]Science, p. 144.

[109]Journal of Psychology, Vol. XVI (July, 1943), reprinted in Inquiry.

As early as 1884 James had "overcome" his atomism with what Bentley called "a brilliant figure of speech about the flow, current, flux, or stream of consciousness."[110] The analogy was especially praiseworthy for its sense of continuity and the absence of separate parts in it. In 1890, in Principles of Psychology, James advanced to a conceptualization of stream as activity, referred to "The passing thought that seems to be the thinker," and still later asserted that "We need no knower other than the 'passing thought.'"[111] The "datum" was "experience," "indivisible fact," "the process in full sweep." Bentley gave generous credit to James for this conception of the datum (the raw materials in an earlier phrase), but he preferred John Dewey's "free broad account in historic-geographic setting" to James' "static snapshot of the stream."[112]

The Jamesian datum is passage, process and not substance. The world is movement. Whitehead was reluctant to give himself over to this universe of flux; the philosopher is wary of abandoning the power of thought, even if the alternative is a tool created by a very philosophically minded social scientist. Whitehead's prudence had profound historical antecedents. Aristotle tells us of one Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus and instructor of the young Plato, who determined that the universal flux prohibited any truthful statement whatever and confined his communicative life to wagging a finger.[113] Collingwood has remarked that to a young man who had known the "varied and vigorous intellectual life of Socrates," Cratylus "must

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[110]Inquiry, p. 241. Bentley noted that the subjectivism of the phrase "stream of consciousness" might be overcome by translation into John Dewey's "course of experience."

[111]Ibid., p. 246.

[112]Ibid., p. 261.

[113]Metaphysics, 987a, 1010a.

have appeared as a man who had committed intellectual suicide because he
had got hold of the stick by the wrong end and had not the strength of will
to let go."[114] Cratylus, Collingwood continued, was obsessed by the world
of nature as we perceive it, and in searching for a modern parallel, Colling-
wood makes this startling, but in our context perfectly reasonable, analogy:

> Obsession by the perceptible, one sees, had led him where it led
> William James. The world had melted into a "buzzing, blooming con-
> fusion." What Plato carried away from his training under Cratylus
> was quite clearly the solid experimental knowledge that when you
> allow yourself to be obsessed by the perceptible that is what
> happens to you.[115]

Solid footing goes, said Collingwood; continents and islands go, said
Bentley and Nietzsche. Certainly Behavior Knowledge Fact and Knowing and
the Known may be read as chronicles of a lost mariner, a man who has thrown
the compass of reason over the side as so much excess ballast. As we have
seen, Bentley came to focus on progressively narrower situations as his tech-
nical vocabulary and conceptual categories grew increasingly intricate and
unwieldy, until language itself seemed in need of fundamental reconstruction.
Indeed one might say with some justification that Bentley's series of pub-
lications should have been reversed: Knowing and the Known should have ap-
peared before The Process of Government. The trouble is that had Bentley
arrived at the point he ultimately reached in Knowing and the Known, he
probably would never have written The Process of Government, or at most he
would have written Part One as a critical essay for Philosophy of Science.

The complete description that was to be the complete science became
progressively more difficult to accomplish, even to envision, and it should
not surprise us to find Bentley's attention shifting to more intensive ex-
amination of sociology and politics. But it is not so easy for us to dismiss

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[114]R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (New York, 1960), p. 66.

[115]Ibid.

Cratylus' fixation or obsession as it was for Plato. We are an empirical

century; most of us accept that fact that empirical science has succeeded

brilliantly in giving an account of the world without consulting sovereign

reason at every step of inquiry. In Karl Popper's words, empirical science

has dispensed with "methodological essentialism." Even Whitehead, certainly

to be counted among the more speculative minds of our century, found the

location of a point where reason might plausibly enter the flux of nature

a vexing and arduous task.

It will not do, finally, to dismiss Bentley as a Twentieth century

Cratylus, unless we are prepared to do the same with the century itself.

Bentley's process analysis does employ "reason," but it applies reason to

the creation of the tool by which reality is to be known and described, and

not directly to reality itself. I am of course speaking in the dualistic

terms Bentley hoped to banish, for both the "tool" and "reason" are, in his

sense, "in" the reality, the process.[116] If his final version of the tool

was not adequate to the tasks envisioned Bentley could with justice say

that he had persistently stressed the tentative and hypothetical nature of

his science, and always expressed the reservation--even the hope--that his

writings would shortly be superseded by more sophisticated generations. In

this sense his process analysis was truly "speculative."

Ironically, it is one of Bentley's severest critics who recognized this

when he remarked, "In practice Bentley was the least pragmatic of pragmatists,"

but that insight was blemished by the accompanying complaint that in contrast

to Lincoln Steffens, Bentley "never" gave examples of "scientific procedure

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[116]This distinguishes Bentley from the movement criticized by Reinhard
Bendix, "Social Science and the Distrust of Reason," Univ. of Calif. Publi-
cations in Sociology and Social Institutions, Vol. 1, No. 1, especially
Ch. 3.

and verification in politics."[117] Of course he didn't; he was not a

"logical positivist," or "scientific empiricist," or whatever school be

designated by adherence to a verification principle. As to "scientific

procedure," Bentley said very clearly that science was description, and

as we have seen at considerable length transactional analysis is a means

of description. True, it may have rested upon some sort of "pre-scientific"

personal or private "vision" of the universe, but he constantly urged the

incompleteness and provisional nature of this descriptive technique.[118]

The misinterpretation seems to lie in attempting to fit Bentley into

pre-established categories and to judge him by criteria of "science" that

he did not accept. He considered himself scientific rather than specula-

tive, but his understanding of experience, knowledge, thought, and science

was not such as can be rendered by the mechanical application of general

categories. The same critic accused Bentley of a "naive view of physics,"

seizing upon a comment in The Process of Government, "My epistemological

point of view is admittedly naive, as naive, I hope, as the point of view

of the physical sciences," and concluding somewhat ambiguously that, "A

naive man could scarcely make much of the methodological literature of

modern physics."[119] But even as we disregard this gratuitous derogation,

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[117]Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics (Berkeley and Los
Angeles, 1959), p. 124.

[118]See for example Michael Polanyi's argument concerning the private,
fiduciary element in thought and knowledge, The Study of Man (Chicago,
1958), and the more detailed presentation in Personal Knowledge (Chicago,
1958). The text reference to pre-scientific vision is intended simply to
raise the question and not to imply acceptance of Polanyi's position.

[119]Crick, footnote, p. 126. On the preceding page he further defined
the naive view of physics as, "the analogy of interacting force and fric-
tion is applied to pressure groups, with human interests regarded as mechan-
ical forces in society." Compare my remarks about Dowling's critique
above, footnote 83.

we can recognize a glimmer of relevancy in Crick's complaints. The question is not, as he would have it, "Does Bentley's tool satisfy a criterion of science of my choosing?", but "Did Bentley's tool accomplish what he demanded of it?"

In the large alternatives posed by Gillispie, we would have to say that Bentley's sympathies lay with the Stoics, not with the atomists; with continuum and geometry, the bucket of molasses instead of the pail of sand, and with measurement, not counting or classification. Within the narrower confines of sociological theory and the process tradition, he preferred Weise to Small, formal sociology to group conflict theories. In the end, transactional analysis of the process of sociation paid the penalty of theories of continuity, the heritage of Heraclitus. Bentley gradually gave up energy, conflict, and the "active" aspect of activity for wider, more comprehensive statement, but when he had achieved a measure of the latter, he could not reintroduce discreteness or object. He could stipulate that various perspectives were permissable, to be selected for purposes of the investigator, but he could not get the sense of solidity and constraint of "structure" to come alive. Neither the "habit background," nor frequency of occurrence (for how could one recognize "recurrence," as Strawson might have asked), nor "plasticity" could serve to introduce qualitative distinctions when they had been ruled out by the most fundamental postulations of the idea of process.

I am speaking, of course, primarily of the success enjoyed by transactional analysis in the "behavioral" sectors, particularly the social. It may be the case, though I am insufficient to the judgment, that transactional analysis was and is more viable in the physical and vital fields. This measure of achievement would not have pleased Bentley, for he worked as a social scientist despite strong interest and considerable knowledge

In many other disciplines. Certainly he thought that if transactional

analysis had validity as a scientific technique in one field, it would

in all. Our concern in the following chapter will be to make some specific

evaluations of process analysis in American political science and sociol-

ogy, but it seems necessary to say at least this before we conclude an

already lengthy section. Arthur Bentley hoped that the transactional

analysis of a process reality was capable of transcending the dualism

variously expressed in the course of this paper; he hoped to abolish

boundedness and entities by dissolving all in a qualitatively uniform

passage of activity which would be analyzable from a number of qualita-

tively equal perspectives.[120]

In this attempt he was not successful.

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[120]Again I have used a dualistic construction which might, as a sug-
gestive phrase only, be altered to read: "Transactional analysis is process
with the stress on knowing; process is a transaction with the stress on
the known."

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The difficulties of communication with other workers form the
most serious obstacle. Indeed I know not a single specialized word
in the indicated regions of inquiry upon which I can safely rely to
convey to a hearer just what I say it stands for to me in the present
undertaking.

                                                    Arthur F. Bentley

"Do you still hear nothing?" the prophet went on. "Does not the
sound of rushing and roaring arise from the depths?" Zarathustra was
again silent and listened: then he heard a long, protacted cry, which
the abysses threw from one to another, for none of them wanted to re-
tain it, so evil did it sound.

                                                    Nietzsche

CHAPTER VI

PROCESS, POLITICS, AND SYSTEM

American political science and sociology have accepted and stressed secondary strains in Arthur Bentley's social thought. Political science has welcomed the notion of group analysis but there is almost no discussion in the literature of process _per se._ The situation in sociology has been somewhat more complex. Bentley's notion was one of a number of conceptions of process informing that field, but it was distinctive because it sought to transcend the dualism of activity-relation that had developed during the first three decades of the Twentieth century. The central importance of Bentley is that the evolution of his thought presents a microcosm of the larger dualism which is as yet unresolved by social science theory.

Perception of this situation has been obscured by the transfer of attention from the more philosophical level of process discussion to the more empirical plane of group theory. The debate about the adequacy of the group concept for political analysis has been tangential to my concern in these pages, and I have mentioned it primarily as a means of illuminating the central issue. Nevertheless it remains that the discussion of group theory has often resulted in judgments which characterize the whole of Bentley's contribution, or at the very least include the idea of process in an indiscriminate evaluation. In some instances this means that conclusions have been drawn at a philosophical level from premises located at the empirical or group level.

For example, Myron Hale has determined that Bentley's "cosmology" implies a science of politics which "ended in a science of control within a closed system."[1] Transactional analysis of group conflict, Hale concluded, cannot accommodate alteration in the parameters of the system. He contrasted this position to that of the "socialist sector of the world," which sought to replace the rule of conflict with the principle of cooperation. I have commented above on Hale's interpretation of Bentley as an exponent of the sociology of knowledge, and the conclusion that Bentley accepted some sort of closed system is in the nature of a corollary. It should be apparent that my own examination of transactional analysis leads to the opposite conclusion; I will not review the argument here except to note that Ludwig von Bertalanffy, a profound student of general systems theory, has remarked that "in philosophy . . . the trend toward 'transactional' as opposed to 'self-actional' and 'interactional' viewpoints closely corresponds to the open-system model (Bentley)."[2]

Although I believe Hale is fundamentally mistaken in this phase of his argument, he has posed an opposition between a "socialist sector" and what he calls equilibrium theory that is interesting and important to the conclusion of this paper. I have argued that the concept of process was largely ignored by American political science in favor of the group theory, and further that American sociology, although it did not follow the direction of Bentley's later theory, did find much more significance in the idea of process. Process has functioned on a somewhat different level than "group"; it has served as a more microscopic concept, in the sense of a

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[1]"The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley," APSR, Vol. LIV, No. 4 (Dec., 1960), p. 961.

[2]"General System Theory," Richard W. Taylor, Life, Language, Law (Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1957), p. 64.

process of interaction "within" the group, and as a more general milieu in which the group itself "functions." The text has discussed both uses of the notion of process, but in terms of American political science it is the latter, more general use that is important.

My contention is that political scientists found Bentley's group concept a liberation from barren formalism and a welcome invitation to "go do research," but when they became concerned with the lack of a framework with which to order the mass of accumulated empirical data they turned to their more theoretically sophisticated cousins in sociology and anthropology. The theoretical framework which they found and adopted can be given various names, but for the time being I will designate is as "equilibrium theory." This theory or "outlook" is today the dominant heir of the idea of process, but, as I shall contend below, its contemporary form is not at all what Bentley's transactional analysis sought. Indeed, it is hostile in several important respects.

This argument will constitute a large part of this chapter, but I want to go one step further and to contend that not only are the forms of equilibrium theory in political science and sociology hostile to Bentley's idea of process, but they are inadequate to their task. I will argue that Bentley's developed process analysis represented his refusal to accept the compromises and dualism which are the characteristics of contemporary equilibrium theory. Finally, I hope to indicate what would be necessary for the creation of a successful process theory and some possible lines of exploration. In my judgment we are not now in a position to talk about "solutions."

I will not seek to document the contention that the type of theory specified as equilibrium is dominant in American sociology. The most influential single school has certainly been that represented by Talcott

Parsons, Robert Merton, and Marion Levy, variously called "functionalism"
or "structural-functional analysis."[3] An indication of the pervasiveness
of this type of theory is given by the comment of the anonymous sociologist
quoted in Caplow and McGee: "In that generation, the Davis-Merton gener-
ation, everyone is Parsonian."[4] The roots of functionalism are deep,
extending most immediately into the soil of social anthropology in which
the most prominent names are probably A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw
Malinowski.[5] Parsons himself has recently begun to "apply" his conceptual
apparatus to specifically political matters, but political scientists them-
selves have made the most important attempts to bring equilibrium constructs
to bear on empirical research.[6]

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[3]Among the most important statements are: Parsons, The Social System
(Glencoe, Ill., 1951); Parsons and Edward Shils, Toward a General Theory
of Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); Merton, Social Theory and Social
Structure (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), especially "Manifest and Latent Functions";
and Marion Levy, The Structure of Society (Princeton, N. J., 1952).

[4]Theodore Caplow and Reece J. McGee, The Academic Marketplace (New
York, 1961), p. 90.

[5]Radcliffe-Brown, "On the Concept of Function in Social Science,"
American Anthropologist, N. S., Vol. 37 (July-Sept., 1935); Radcliffe-
Brown, A Natural Science of Society (Glencoe, Ill., 1957); Radcliffe-
Brown, The Andaman Islanders (Glencoe, Ill., 1948); Malinowski, "The
Functional Analysis of Culture," A Scientific Theory of Culture (New York,
1960). See Merton for an excellent summary of the origins and development
of functionalism, and Talcott Parsons, "Durkheim's Contribution to the
Theory of Integration of Social Systems," and Albert Pierce, "Durkheim and
Functionalism," ed. Kurt Wolff, Emile Durkheim: 1858-1917 (Columbus,
Ohio, 1960).

[6]See in particular two essays by Parsons, "Some Highlights of the
General Theory of Action," ed. Roland Young, Approaches to the Study of
Politics (Evanston, Ill., 1958), and "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the
American Political System", ed. Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck,
American Voting Behavior (Glencoe, Ill., 1959). It is interesting to
compare Parsons' writing in these essays with his analysis of the radical
right in which the categories of the theory of action do not appear,
"Social Strains in America," ed. Daniel Bell, The Radical Right (Garden
City, N. J., 1963). There is no doubt that Parsons writes much more
significantly about politics when he is free of the necessity of fitting
his materials into systematic categories.

Gabriel Almond is certainly among the most prominent advocates of a functionalist approach to politics; his Introduction to the widely used text book edited jointly with James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, makes explicit reference to its use of the Weber-Parsons schema.[7] A few years earlier Almond had described the terms of his method of analysis as having "emerged out of the Weber-Parsons tradition in social theory."[8] David Easton, to whom we will need to devote considerable attention below, has suggested a similar approach to comparative analysis.[9] Morton Kaplan's System and Process in International Relations leans heavily upon concepts of structure and equilibrium.[10] Perhaps the most consistently functionalist view of comparative social science theory was taken by the authors of "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society," prominent among them being Marion Levy.[11]

Much of the impetus toward adoption of a functionalist or similar form of equilibrium has stemmed from dissatisfaction with the country-by-country approach to comparative politics. This tradition method of study was condemned by the recent Northwestern conference as "essentially" "noncomparative," "descriptive," "parochial," "static," and "monographic."[12] An im-

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[7](Princeton, N. J., 1960). See also his "Interest Groups and the Political Process," ed. Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Brown, Comparative Politics (Homewood, Ill., 1961).

[8]Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," ed. Heinz Eulau, et al., Political Behavior (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), p. 34.

[9]"The Analysis of Political Systems," Macridis and Brown.

[10](New York, 1957). "Process," however, is simply taken as a basic term and not analyzed.

[11]D. F. Aberle, A. K. Cohen, A. K. Davis, M. J. Levy, and F. X. Sutton in Macridis and Brown. See also Levy's, "Some Aspects of 'Structural-Functional' Analysis and Political Science," Young.

[12]Roy C. Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (Garden City, N. J., 1955).

proved science would presumably provide the investigator with categories which could isolate variables, e.g., "elites," from total political systems and then "compare" them on some as yet undeveloped scale. The functionalist approach has been attractive in this area, in part because of its "neutral" (i.e., not parochial to Western political experience) terms, and in part because it promised a framework capable of sustaining a "general" theory of politics.

Functional theory has thus far been applied more vigorously and with greater success to the developing areas (those we formerly called the "underdeveloped" areas) than to the more sophisticated systems of the West. This would be expected if we accept the argument of some of functionalism's critics who maintain that it cannot be successfully applied to complex systems. Functionalists, of course, do not agree. Merton has analyzed the American political "machine" in functional terms,[13] and Almond certainly believes his framework is applicable to the United States.

The men we have been discussing thus far are more or less sophisticated exponents of functionalism; they have consciously adopted it, are familiar with the basic texts, and have made some changes in the theory to accommodate their particular interests. They are to be distinguished from "group theorists" such as Earl Latham and David Truman, for even though they employ the group unit on occasion, it does not play a major analytic role in their construction. Almond, for example, prefers the Parsonian concept of role as the basic unit of the political system. "The advantage of the concept of role as compared with such terms as institutions, organizations, or groups is that it is a more inclusive, and more open concept."[14]

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[13]Merton, pp. 71-82.

[14]Almond, "Comparative," p. 35.

There are important differences between the "schools" that must not be
minimized, but in order to establish my argument I want first to stress
a similarity.

I have said that the functionalists, perhaps because they have more
consciously adopted a system, are relatively sophisticated and aware of
their methodology. The tradition of group study has been conspicuously
less so until the early nineteen fifties. Since then group theorists have
begun to feel the need for a more general theory of groups _in_ society.
David Easton has documented the birth and evolution of American political
scientists' determination to build "factual inventories."[15] A number of
factors, intellectual and social, converged in the immediate post-Civil
War period to turn attention away from speculative theory and toward ac-
umulation of monographic studies describing "the way in which people act
politically together with the determinants of this activity."[16]

We are now pretty familiar with the difficulties of this simple em-
piricism. Without a general orienting theory the monographs lacked com-
parability and were not, as a consequence, cumulative. In the absence of
agreement on units of analysis and parameters of the field it proved dif-
ficult to make any statements about the political realm as a whole. For
the students of interest groups the notion of equilibrium, in a more or
less articulated form, lay ready at hand. Bentley had discussed equilibrium
in The Process of Government, but in a loose, almost analogical, way.
Interest groups, through their exercise of "pressure," press upon each
other and upon the "government," producing a certain "adjustment." Bentley
spoke most directly about equilibrium when he discussed his conceptualiza-

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[15]The Political System (New York, 1953), especially Chs. 2 and 3.

[16]Ibid., p. 66.

tion of the formal instruments of political society, "government" and "law."[17]

Beyond this highly impressionistic statement, equilibrium theory as employed by the group theorists becomes diffuse, and entangled with a number of other ideas. For example, it is sometimes maintained that the formal apparatus of government (the "narrow" sense, in Bentley's phrase) is an essentially passive agent, simply recording or "ratifying" the victory of one coalition over another. Earl Latham, on the other hand, argues that the legislature is not an "inert cash register" nor a "mindless balance pointing and marking the weight and distribution of power among the contending groups."[18] When equilibrium is viewed from this perspective it becomes very closely involved with the question of the "public interest," as Glendon Schubert's recent book demonstrates.[19] The convergence of the two concepts occurs through inquiry into the origin of the imperatives that constitute public policy. Both empirical or descriptive and normative questions then arise.

Another convergence of more direct interest to us here is that of equilibrium and functional theory. This comes about through the mutual adoption of the notion of "systems" which are analyzed in terms of "input" demands and "outputs," or public policy. Easton's article offered this simple diagram which illustrates the basic characteristics of "input-output analysis."

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[17]See The Process of Government (Evanston, Ill., 1949), Chs. X and XI, and especially pp. 260 and 274.

[18]"The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," APSR, Vol. XLVI (June, 1952), p. 391.

[19]The Public Interest (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), especially Ch. 4.

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Environment    Inputs    Demands         ┌──────────────┐   Decisions or              Environment
                         ----------      │  Political   │   ---------------- Outputs
                         Support         │              │   Policies
                         ----------      │   System     │
                                         └──────────────┘
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Feedback[20]

Gabriel Almond's work represents this convergence between a modified functionalism and a form of input-output, equilibrium theory.[21]

The key point of convergence between some forms of equilibrium theory and functionalism is the notion of system. Easton has correctly stressed its importance. "The equilibrium idea implies that the interrelated parts tend to cohere. This is the fundamental meaning of system."[22] System plays a dual role for Easton; it is a substantive vision of political action, and it is an orienting construct for the understanding of politics. System, he contended, was intimately connected to both equilibrium and process. "Process," considered as a patterned interaction over time, goes on within a "system"; "equilibrium" is a judgment or "fact" about the state of both process and system. As a tool system was an orienting principle, and as a substantive vision it was the "relatedness" of the interaction process, the Sinzusammenhang of the German idealists.

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[20]"Analysis," p. 83.

[21]See also Avery Leiserson, Administrative Regulation (Chicago, 1942), and Schubert, pp. 184-6.

[22]System, p. 291. Almond and Coleman list the attributes of a system as "comprehensiveness," "interdependence," and the "existence of boundaries," The Politics, p. 7. Morton Kaplan's definition is more elaborate if not more informative: "A system of action is a set of variables so related, in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of the variables to each other and the external relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables," System and Process, p. 4.

When group theorists or, more properly, group researchers felt the
need to talk about "societies of interacting groups," system was a natural
concept. But their stress continued to be placed upon the components,
the unit groups.[23] In contrast, political scientists more functionally
oriented have inclined toward the system aspect of equilibrium. Almond's
preference for the "role" concept is an example, for while a study of
group conflict may very well conclude with a generalized statement about
"re-adjustments" or "re-alignments" of the system's equilibrium, a theory
which makes role its fundamental unit cannot begin without reference to
that of which it is a "function." The idea of system, the "general theory"
if you like, is more involved, more integrated in the conduct of research.
This, of course, is precisely the goal sought by most empirical theorists.
Talcott Parsons' 1949 Presidential address delivered to the American
Sociological Society commented on the lack of integration of theory and
research:

> But probably the most crucial factor has been precisely this lack
> of an adequate working theoretical tradition which is bred into
> the "bones" of empirical researchers themselves so that "instinc-
> tively" the problems they work on, the hypotheses they frame and
> test, are such that the results, positive or negative, will have
> significance for a sufficiently generalized and integrated body of
> knowledge so that the mutual implications of many empirical studies
> will play directly into each other.[24]

23See, for example, David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York,
1951), Ch. 2.

24"The Prospects of Sociological Theory," Essays in Sociological
Theory (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), p. 350. The address was given during the
preparation of Toward a General Theory of Action which extends this
theme; see especially Part I. In the same address, Parsons used an
analogy that strikingly illustrates his distance from Bentley, "In the
early stages these 'islands' of theoretical implication may be scattered
far apart on the sea of fact and so vaguely and generally seen that only
relatively broad empirical statements are directly relevant to them . . .
But with refinement of general theoretical analysis, and the accumulation
of empirical evidence directly relevant to it, the islands get closer to-
gether, and their topography becomes more sharply defined. It becomes

Easton's contention that if equilibrium is to serve as a general theory
it must reduce the qualitative stuff of politics to quantitative units,
and the complaints about the "essentially non-comparative" nature of
traditional study of comparative politics voiced by Macridis, are var-
iants of the demand that monographs "play directly into each other."[25]

The reader will recognize in the immediately preceding paragraph
the introduction of a familiar dichotomy or dualism. The group theorists
who found their way to a loose, almost analogical statement of equilibrium
remain in the Gumplowicz-Ratzenhofer tradition, while the functionalists
incline more toward the formalist, relational wing of Weber and Simmel.
It is interesting to note that Almond seemed on the verge of recognizing
this tension when he wrote:

> The term system satisfies the need for an inclusive concept which
> covers all of the patterned actions relevant to the making of
> political decisions. Most political scientists use the term
> political process for these purposes. The difficulty with the
> term process is that it means any pattern of action through time.
> In contrast to process the concept of system implies a totality
> of relevant units, an interdependence between the interactions
> of units, and a certain stability in the interaction of these
> units (perhaps best described as a changing equilibrium).[26]

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more and more difficult and unnecessary to navigate in the uncharted waters
of unanalyzed fact without bumping into or at least orienting to several
of them.", Essays, pp. 353-4.

For Bentley, the islands and continents disappear; for Parsons, they
multiply and converge.

[25]Compare Easton's conception of the nature of a theoretical system:
"It consists, first, of a set of concepts corresponding to the important
political variables and second, of statements about the relations among
these concepts. Systematic theory corresponds at the level of thought to
the concrete empirical political system of daily life.", System, p. 98.
See also Robert Merton's essays, "The Bearing of Sociological Theory on
Empirical Research," and "The Bearing of Empirical Research on Sociological
Theory," Social Theory.

[26]Gabriel Almond, "Comparative," pp. 34-5.

Almond's belief that the difficulty with process is its reference to "any pattern of action through time" is certainly correct, in perhaps a more profound sense than he knew. This is what Easton meant by the need for orienting concepts to isolate certain variables from the flux; this, he said, constituted a certain artificiality.

> This artificiality is imposed upon political scientists by the need for simplification of their data. Since everything is related to everything else, the task of pursuing the determinants of any given relation would be so vast and ramifying that it would defy any tools of investigation available either to the social or physical sciences.[27]

Parsons has spoken of "boundaries" and their "maintenance."[28] An "economy," for example, is defined in terms of: its functional imperatives; the institutional patterns in the larger society especially relevant to regulation of economic activity; and the general "adaptive exigencies" of the general society.[29] It is perhaps worth noting that Parsons' essay, written in 1958, contains an input-output chart which suggests comparisons between the economy and the polity. But the 1951 edition of <u>Toward a General Theory of Action</u> had reservations about this. The concluding "Note" to "A General Statement" suggested that political science, unlike economics, had been unable to orient itself about a few fundamental variables, and

> that if the empirical focus of political science is to remain on the phenomena of government, it will not as a discipline be able to attain a sharpness of theoretical focus comparable to that of economics. It is more likely to draw from a much wider range of the components of the general theory of action and to find its distinctiveness in the way it combines these components in relation to its special empirical interests, rather than in the technical elaboration of a narrow and sharply focused segment of the theory of action, as is the case with economics.[30]

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[27]<u>System</u>, p. 97.

[28]"Highlights," pp. 296-9.

[29]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 296.

[30]Parsons and Shils, <u>General Theory</u>, p. 29.

I do not know whether Parsons has changed his mind about the respective futures of political science and economics, but in the 1958 paper, and in a recent address, he seems to have decided that power can serve as a conceptual unit, somewhat parallel to value in economics. If such a unit could be made operational (and neither Parsons nor anyone else has yet managed this) then Easton's demand for quantitative units in general equilibrium theory would be close to satisfaction. We do not now have such a unit in political science, nor do we have anything like a consensus upon the closely related problem of the "scope of the field" (the boundaries of the political system). Before we turn to a comparison of Bentley's process analysis with various forms of equilibrium theory, we should return to Almond's juxtaposition of system and process. I have said that Almond may have suggested more than he had intended, but he is certainly not the only contemporary political scientist to recognize a tension. Richard Snyder, perhaps the foremost exponent of the "decision-making" procedure, has offered a tentative distinction between "static" and "dynamic" methods of analysis.

> Relatively speaking, dynamic analysis is process analysis. By process is meant here, briefly, time plus change--change in relationships and conditions. Process analysis concerns a sequence of events, i.e., behavioral events. In general, static analysis is a snapshot at one point in time. One basic difference between the two types is in the way (or ways) the time factor is handled. An important brand of static analysis (namely structural-functional analysis), can yield information on the nature of change between two periods in time and on the conditions under which change took place but not on the reasons for change or how it actually unfolded.[31]

Snyder thought that descriptive studies of formal institutions, what he called "head counting" (voting or opinion research?) and equilibrium analysis were other examples of static method.

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[31]"A Decision-Making Approach," Roland Young, pp. 10-1.

The most interesting part of Snyder's account is the division within process or dynamic analysis itself.

> In turn, there are two kinds of process analysis: <u>interaction</u> and <u>decision-making</u>. So far as I can see, there are only two ways of <u>scientifically</u> studying process in the sense employed here: the making and executing of decisions and the patterns of interaction between individuals, states, organizations, groups, jurisdictions, and so on. Interaction analysis does not and cannot yield answers to "why" questions. Thus interactions can be described and measured but the explanation of the patterns--why they evolved as they did-- must rest on decision-making analysis.[32]

Let us for the moment follow Snyder's usage and lay aside functionalism and equilibrium theory (although in doing so we must not forget that the Easton-Almond conception links process and equilibrium), and look only at the two kinds of process analysis. A very striking similarity must surely occur to the reader who has followed us thus far. The "patterns of inter-action" are Weise's action <u>patterns</u>, Giddings' form patterns, Eubank's analytic process, and Hayes' relationships; "decision-making" analyses are Weise's <u>action</u> patterns, Giddings' action patterns, Eubank's evolutionary process, and Hayes' activities. Snyder's distinction rests upon the old explanation-description dichotomy and is hardly distinguishable from the Weise-Becker suggestion that processes <u>result</u> in relations.

Snyder's consignment of functionalism and equilibrium to the static category is based on their inability to accommodate a time dimension, or history. Although he does not for that reason reject them, other critics of functionalism have done so. Lewis Coser wrote:

> A persistent theme runs through almost all of the writings of Talcott Parsons: concern with those elements in social structures that assure their maintenance. Although interest in the process of social change is occasionally present in Parsons, such concern is distinctly marginal. It may be said that all of Parsons' work, beginning with The Structure of Social Action, is an extended com-mentary on the Hobbesian question: How is social order possible?[33]

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[32]Ibid., p. 11.

[33]The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), p. 21.

Coser links Parsons' concern for order to a systemic bias which appears in a view of conflict and dysfunction as strain and sickness.[34] This results in an ideological commitment to existing structures that Coser believes extends to the work of George Lundberg, Lloyd Warner, Elton Mayo and F. J. Roethlisberger, and Kurt Lewin.

Ralf Dahrendorf is another contemporary scholar who has been disturbed by the treatment of change and process in much of sociological theory. He credits Parsons with a realization of the need to conceptualize change and process, but argues that the attempt to build dynamic or variable elements into a structure necessarily subordinates "function." Dahrendorf's conclusion merits quotation.

> Parts of a structure have a function in relation to this structure as a whole. In this sense the category is certainly important. However, it is not "all-important": it is rather the first requisite of a dynamic analysis of structure to find variables which are not subordinated to the category of structure (and are in this sense "within the system") but which operate as forces or factors changing the structure. That Parsons, and with him many other recent "theorists," have overlooked this fact may be due to a more or less deliberate identification of organic and social structures or "systems." For this is the most difficult problem of the analysis of structural change: by contrast to organic structures, the "dynamically variable elements" which influence the construction of social structures do not necessarily originate outside the "system" but may be generated by the structure itself. There are, in other words, within social structures certain elements or forces which are at the same time their constituent parts (and therefore "function" within them) and impulses operating toward their supersedence and change.[35]

The implication of dialectic method is unmistakable. In the more philosophical terms of an earlier discussion, we might say Dahrendorf is reminding us that identity is complex, not simple.

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[34]Ibid., pp. 22-3. Compare Coser's remarks about Parsons' medical analogies with Renford Bambrough's article, "Plato's Political Analogies" in Peter Laslett, Philosophy, Politics and Society (New York, 1956).

[35]Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Societies (Stanford, Calif., 1959), p. 123. Ch. IV contains a more generalized discussion of the problem of change; it is among the best in the literature.

Dahrendorf is more sympathetic to functionalism (in his terms the stress is laid on the structural component) than is Coser, in that he considers a theory of structure a preliminary step toward conceptualization of structural change. Barrington Moore, in two essays highly critical of contemporary trends in social theory, has put the case for history in sharp opposition to systematic theory. In comparing the "strategies" of Nineteenth century sociology to those of current theory Moore lists these differences:

> First of all, the critical spirit has all but disappeared. Second, modern sociology, and perhaps to a lesser extent also modern political science, economics, and psychology are ahistorical. Third, modern social science tends to be abstract and formal. In research, social science today displays considerable technical virtuosity. But this virtuosity has been gained at the expense of content. Modern sociology has less to say about society than it did fifty years ago.[36]

He contends that a tradition of "abstract formalism" is apparent in Max Weber's later work, and that this trend was carried forward by Simmel and Weise. The second point, that social science has abandoned the temporal dimension, is linked to a conception of events as isolated atoms which may be "aggregated" in statistical operations. This, Moore argues, ignores the continuity of history.

The "abstract and formal" character of contemporary theory, its "substanceless" nature, stems from precisely the desire for "true" comparability we found in Macridis' criticism of comparative political science. This occurs because the generalized categories cannot accommodate the richness of the material they are to order, and hence they must be framed in the most general terms at the most abstract level.[37] The result is a

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[36]"Strategy in Social Science," Political Power and Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 123.

[37]This critique is applied more specifically in "The New Scholasticism and The Study of Politics," Political Power.

"formalist deductive tradition in search of laws" because of its disregard

for what the German schools called the Einmaligkeit of social situations.

The static bias enters at this point.

> Closely related to the preceding difficulties are those derived
> from the importation of equilibrium theory into social science,
> which may also produce a static bias. In equilibrium theory
> the key assumption is that any social system tends toward a state
> of rest in which the conflicts and strains among its component
> parts are reduced to a minimum.[38]

Moore's complaint here is that the shift described by Earle Eubank, from

evolutionary to analytic versions of process analysis (with Park and

Burgess' adoption of Simmel's forms), occurred at all. The loss of a

sense of the material, and of its connectedness, are the result. It is

difficult to know to what extent Snyder's version of decision-making study

could meet the objections raised by Coser, Dahrendorf, and Moore. Snyder's

division of process versus static analysis seems over-elaborate in that

his "interaction patterns," the second mode of process analysis, does not

seem to possess much "dynamism." Indeed, the sociologists examined in

this paper have inclined toward viewing the patterned aspect of interaction

as static, and thus placed it with what Snyder defined as static analysis,

functionalism and equilibrium theory. For purposes of simplicity it would

seem that we can proceed with the two categories of process and static or

equilibrium theories. In this context, we would be dealing only with

decision-making as Snyder's dynamic alternative.

His desire to incorporate time, the "why" factor of explanation would

earn him the applause of the critics, but his use of the Parsonian frame to

the extent of "actor (or actors), goals, means, and situation" would probably

fall under Moore's indictment of "abstract formalism." Still, Snyder seems

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[38]"Strategy," p. 137.

somewhat clearer about these issues than are most of his colleagues who use or imagine they use equilibrium theory.

There is a final criticism of function and equilibrium concepts that should be mentioned, namely the charge of ideological conservatism. This is expressed in Moore's regret at the demise of the "critical spirit." Taken in context with formalism (lack of substance) and disinterest in history, it means that contemporary social scientists have abandoned their role as social critics and have written to celebrate the status quo. Alvin Gouldner has made an analagous argument in which he divides the field of sociology into those who conceive it as a "profession" (and value neutral), and those who imagine themselves and their colleagues as a "learned society" with all the critical responsibilities of the intellectual toward improving his world.[39] There appears to be a tendency on the part of the former toward systematic study, and of the latter toward a more Marxian, class and historical orientation.[40] In political science Henry Kariel has voiced a sim-

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[39]"Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value Free Sociology," Maurice Stein and Arthur Vidich, Sociology on Trial (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963).

[40]A related but by no means identical division within sociology should be mentioned though it is tangential to our interest here. It is represented by the work of C. Wright Mills, especially his criticism of the lack of social awareness and relevancy in contemporary sociology, and those persons identified with the "end of ideology," as presented by Daniel Bell in the volume of that name (Glencoe, Ill., 1960). The latter group is associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, publishers of the British monthly, Encounter, and includes: S. M. Lipset, see "A Personal Postscript," Political Man (Garden City, N. Y., 1960); Edward Shils and Raymond Aron. To my knowledge the phrase "end of ideology" was originated by Shils in 1955.

Mills' position has been espoused by the younger sociologists (notably Maurice Stein), intellectuals of the "New Left," and the magazine Studies on the Left. The issue is joined pretty clearly in Mills' "The New Left," Power, Politics and People (New York, 1964); and the essay by Stephen Rousseas and James Farganis in Irving Louis Horowitz, The New Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in Honor of C. Wright Mills (New York, 1964). One has the feeling that the full impact of Mills' influence has yet to be felt.

ilar criticism of what he considers a retreat from criticism and an endorsement of naked power struggles.

> To know America is to know it as a community within which those who care will struggle fraternally for public power. To have knowledge of America's political process is coincidentally to have knowledge of America's substantive goals as well. What had once been dealt with by an inexact political philosophy concerned with eliciting, juxtaposing, and sifting common opinions—a philosophy aspiring to discriminate between right and wrong conduct—is to become an amoral, natural science of human behavior.[41]

Kariel also finds that the new goal of social research is "to identify the social structure and determine what is functional in it," and to "restore upset balances, resolve conflicts, heal sore spots, facilitate assimilation, and, most important, remove the innumerable blocks to understanding."[42] He approves Robert Nisbet's conclusion that "The social group has replaced the individual as the key concept in a great deal of social science writing, and it is almost as apt to observe that social _order_ has replaced social change as the key problem."[43] Nisbet specifically identified functionalism as part of the "conservative revolt."

Much of Kariel's criticism of American political science agrees with Bernard Crick's indictment in The American Science of Politics which we discussed briefly above;[44] we could also include Myron Hale's juxtaposition of a conservative functionalism built on a closed system and a comparatively "open" socialism emphasizing "cooperation." One could further expand the list of indictments by adding Herbert Storing's volume, which is hostile to virtually the entire empirical movement in political science. It is apparent that the critics are vocal, if they are not in complete agreement.[45]

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[41]The Decline of American Pluralism (Stanford, Calif., 1961), p. 133.

[42]Ibid., p. 116.

[43]The Quest for Community (New York, 1953), p. 28.

[44](Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959).

[45]Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York, 1962).

Robert Merton has argued forcefully that functionalism need not bear
a conservative bias, and one can sympathize with the impartience of Parsons
and his allies who have become a bit shrill in answering so persistent and
sometimes uninformed a charge. Despite this reaction I am inclined to side
with the critics on this point, and to concur with Moore's remark that
"The bias is in the air more than in the print."[46] Functionalists would
be right to feel dissatisfied with so casual a judgment, but I will note,
not with the hope of proving the point but to indicate that the feeling
in the "air" has some substantiality, Merton's argument that functionalism
can escape an alliance with the status quo if it denies the "postulate of
indispensibility," i.e., if it holds that there are functional equivalents,
alternatives, or substitutes for some particular existential institution
or cultural form.[47] Functionalism does not need to maintain that any given
arrangement of concrete parts is inviolate.

This seems reasonable, but it has a corollary that is somewhat dis-
turbing. Merton's application of the theory in his interesting discussion
of the American political machine stresses the unanticipated consequences
which followed attacks upon the machine, and he warns of the needs left
unfulfilled by the formal instrumentalities of the political and Constitu-
tional systems. His conclusion is striking:

> To seek social change, without due recognition of the manifest and
> latent functions performed by the social organization undergoing
> change, is to indulge in social ritual rather than social engineer-
> ing . . . In the deliberate_enactment of social change, they /man-
> ifest and latent functions_/ can be ignored only at the price of
> considerably heightening the risk of failure.[48]

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[46]Barrington Moore, "Strategy," p. 137.

[47]Merton, "Manifest," p. 37 and pp. 32-5.

[48]Ibid., p. 81.

The ideas of latent function and multiple functions are the crux of this passage, but the hook in the argument is the question, "What constitutes 'due recognition'"? The problem is that often we simply cannot know the infinite ramifications of an action before it is taken, nor can we entirely ignore the specter of the "self-fulfilling prophecy." We may well be cautious of change, but the admonition to look beyond and at the "underside" of a proposed action sounds very much like Edmund Burke.[49] Ironically, because Merton rejects the postulate of indispensibility but retains the notion of infinite interconnection, he must postpone action presumably until he has exhaustively examined the possibilities and complexities, and by completion of that task the system will have changed.

I have now described in necessarily general terms some of the common concepts, emphases, and criticisms of those contemporary theories categorized as "equilibrium" theories--including the variants of functionalism--and the general equilibrium of Easton's usage. I want next to try to show that Bentley's transactional analysis was intended as a different kind of procedure, and to indicate the main lines of divergence in historical perspective. It will be convenient to return to Easton's remarks on Bentley and equilibrium, but first I might indicate the nature of the argument to be developed by this quotation:

> The fact of the matter is that any model which involves some sort of equilibrium-disequilibrium analysis is incompatible with the other philosophical postulates in the transactional scheme. The transactional scheme requires freedom from the acceptance of any given relationship established before inquiry begins. Equilibrium analysis, however, is usually conducted within the framework of a set of postulations which posit a determined system as a point of departure.[50]

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[49]Compare also Karl Popper's argument for "piecemeal" social engineering in The Poverty of Historicism (Boston, 1957).

[50]Nathan Hakman, "Bentley's Transactional View of Politics: An Approach to Social and Political Analysis," Social Science (Jan., 1958), p. 42.

It is true, as Easton points out, that Bentley talked about balance, adjustment, and equilibrating tendencies that went on among the lower-lying groups in society. It is also true that Bentley did not provide much of a suggestion about the nature of politics, preferring to talk off-handedly about "narrow," "broad," and "intermediate senses" of the word "government."[51] He thought that political groups, more "highly differentiated" and thus presumably more visible, were more accessible to study than those groups operating at "deeper" social levels.[52] But precisely because he spoke of tendencies toward equilibrium, and because he declined to set any limits or definite boundaries to "the political," the notion of system is inappropriate to The Process of Government.

Bentley's writing in this volume is deceptive on this point, as it was on the subject of the group as analytic unit. He consistently yielded to the temptation to suggest examples of the kind of analysis he had in mind, always adding that the actual work cited was preliminary or needed some changes here and there, but with the optimistic implication that some people were on the right track at last. An early example was the appendix to The Process of Government which Bentley included as a modest attempt on his own part to get at the raw material of politics. It describes his rather crude studies of municipal elections and roll call analyses of the Illinois legislature and the Chicago city council. The trouble with this lies not in the crudity of the measures, but in the fact that Bentley's vision of adequate social theory required a tool that had not yet been formulated, and his preliminary examples hopelessly compromised the demands and hopes of the text.

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[51] Process, pp. 260-3.

[52] Ibid., p. 209.

The appendices to Relativity in Man and Society abound with additional examples. It would seem to a casual reader that a massive convergence toward Bentley's recommendations was well underway in the social and the physical sciences. One example must suffice. Bentley warmly endorsed von Weise's work as quite close to what he had in mind, but then proceeded to suggest a "minor" improvement which would have completely transformed the formal nature of Weise's sociology. Becker's complaint that Bentley's work lacked an "archimedean point" indicated either a more profound understanding of Weise or less interest in affecting a theoretical revolution.

We must wonder why Bentley, otherwise so analytically discriminating, should consistently mislead his readers by offering incomplete and partial illustrations of his vision when they could only weaken the "confirmed landsman's" resolve to leave the islands and the continents altogether. I think there were three reasons: First, the very depth of his criticism combined with the loftiness and magnitude of his vision to produce a hiatus between the inadequacy of existing social theory and the requirements of adequacy. Bentley may well have felt the need to offer examples, even partial and incomplete, as guidelines to those who must do research in the absence of refined tools. Second, he did, in fact, have a conviction of a vast theoretical convergence, and in the face of the revolutions in Twentieth century science the divergent and contradictory currents appeared trivial and temporary.[53] Finally, and this is particularly applicable to the 1908 appendix, Bentley simply did not foresee the divergence between a developed transactional analysis and the examples of empirical study he had offered.

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[53]See, for example, the confident notations of a wide convergence in "Kennetic Inquiry," published in 1950, Inquiry into Inquiries (Boston, 1954).

Easton noted Bentley's disinclination to apply "his equilibrium frame-
work to the details of political research," and his conclusion that Amer-
ican political scientists have not pressed beyond this point to inquire
into the need for a general conceptual framework seems correct.[54] What
Easton does not mention is that the process analysis which emerged from
the pen of the later Bentley was not in harmony with the idea of a bounded
system. We have already seen how the _units_ of political analysis dissolve
in transaction, and the insurmountable difficulty of re-introducing en-
tities or object-in-envbronment. Ironically, it is Easton himself who
has argued for the intimate connection between analytic units and the idea
of system, and for the necessity that these units be quantitative. Bentley's
difficulties arose because a rigorously quantitative description precluded
the segmentation requisite to system. On this point Kariel has been the
more perceptive commentator.

> There is always an impinging environment. The specific organization,
> it becomes evident, must be seen in a progressively broader context.
> For those few whose vision penetrates all boundaries, there is finally
> nothing but an undifferentiated whole, the wonderful unity of nine-
> teenth century German idealism and romanticism. The plurality of
> previously esteemed parts fades entirely. No valid theory can re-
> veal their distinctiveness, and it becomes unnecessary to consider
> the possibility of conflict between them.[55]

German thought, as should be apparent from an earlier chapter, was
not quite so unified as this passage suggests, and the attempt to distin-
guish parts is not so much unnecessary as impossible, but Kariel's central
point--the disappearance of distinctions into the "all togetherness of
everything"--is perceptive and important. Easton insisted upon the in-
dispensibility of orienting concepts because the task of tracing undif-

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[54]_System_, p. 271.

[55]_Decline_, p. 126.

ferentiated interrelations "would defy any tools of investigation available either to the social or physical sciences";[56] what he does not seem to recognize was that this was precisely what Bentley's tool was designed to accomplish!

Bentley's process analysis was thoroughly inductive; its mistrust of ghosts, originally those of the spirit or the soul, was no more willing to entertain "concepts" of actor, goals, or function (in the technical sense). A strong contemporary argument is that order or meaning are always imposed on the facts by application of analytic categories, and "Therefore, it is better to make these categories and hypotheses as explicit and logically watertight as possible at the outset of the inquiry, in order to force the data to yield a clear-cut decision in respect to the tenability of the theory."[57] Bentley did not accept this. The constant thrust of transactional analysis, and in particular of Bentley's writings, was toward tentative formulation, freedom and scope in hypothesis formulation, and the provisional nature of knowledge or, more properly, "knowing."[58] This is the truth in Bernard Crick's complaint that Bentley didn't say much about how to be scientific, and it is a reason that The Process of Government is more often encountered in political parties courses than in political theory bibliographies.

There is the further question of whether, after uncountable transactional studies, Bentley would have entertained the idea of synthesizing

[56]Easton, p. 97.

[57]Moore, p. 97.

[58]Instructive in this regard is John Dewey's instrumental logic which takes its departure from a problem, an irritation in experience. See F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (New York, 1959), especially Chs. I-III; and Justus Buchler, The Concept of Method (New York, 1961), Chs. X and XI.

the results into a system. I cannot offer a final answer, but _if_ he would have conceded the possibility it would lie so far in the future and be created out of such radically new materials, we could not now envision its nature. Certainly he believed that his mission, and probably that of several succeeding generations, was and would be the sharpening of the tool. It remains that Bentley did talk about "function," and about the constant need to relate one factor or event to others, but the relations were relative to the inquiry which was always to be provisional and "open." The "process-content" distinction was of course a matter of stress and selection, and Bentley explicitly tells us it is _not_ analagous to "form-content," nor "process-product," nor "function-structure."[59]

I have contended above that Relativity in Man and Society represented a crucial phase in Bentley's relation to the mainstream of American sociology and political science. "Formalism," in the sense of the descriptive study of institutions, had been successfully challenged, and the question had become, "What units of investigation can the new social science discover or create?" Group theorists had an answer, but though many of them presented the idea of group as a concept, a "construct," their empirical work was usually done with existential, organized, "concrete" groups. The landmark studies invariably cited in the literature have described the Anti-Saloon League, the American Medical Association, the Farm Bureau Federation, and so on. In brief, these studies expanded the boundaries of the field beyond the specifically governmental sphere (Latham's groups possessing "officiality"), but continued to work with _actual_ social collectivities. In Dilthey's terms they found the units of their science given in experience, even though **these** were now plurals instead of individuals.

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[59]Arthur Bentley, Behavior Knowledge Fact (Bloomington, Ind., 1935), p. 361.

A more thorough-going attempt to restructure social science accepted historical and experiential flux, but determined to construct a body of knowledge by abstract and formal categories. In one sense this second alternative can be traced to Max Weber's ideal typical constructs; Parsons' theory of action would then appear as a lineal descendent. Nathan Rotenstreich takes this view, and concludes that Parsons' advance beyond Weber lay in his ability to conceptualize a social framework <u>within</u> which individual action takes place.[60]

Bentley did not reject the study of formal groups, though he thought it insufficient. But although I have argued that he moves steadily toward the second alternative, toward the continuum, he refused to accept the creation of and introduction into the flux, of the abstract categories of the functionalists. Bentley's revolution emancipated social science from bondage to formal institutions and their historical development, but political scientists betrayed the revolution by reintroducing concrete entities discovered in the "social" sphere outside the traditional scope of political institutions. The functionalists betrayed him on opposite grounds; they established their units by systematically emptying their categories of precisely the content, the activity that for Bentley was the sum of experience and of science. The idea of system is simply a further extension or "progression" of both betrayals.

I have now concluded that neither group theory's rather foggy notion of homeostasis nor the more rigorous efforts of functionalism, both branches

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[60]<u>Between Past and Present</u> (New Haven, Conn., 1958), p. 179. Mention should be made of contradictory interpretations of the Weber-Parsons relationship. Peter Blau contends that Parsons' has exaggerated <u>W</u>eber's concern with structure, organization and rationality. "/ Weber_/ did not view social structure as a functionally unified <u>Gestalt</u> but as a complex pattern governed by opposing forces and hence in continued flux.", "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority," <u>APSR</u>, Vol. LVII, No. 2, p. 306. Blau prefers Reinhard Bendix's stress on the Hegelian elements in Weber's theory.

of what I have loosely characterized as "equilibrium" theory, are compatible with Bentley's vision of transactional analysis and the process universe. In the preceding chapter I argued that Bentley's efforts fell short of success in crucial regards. These are disheartening conclusions because we have been concerned with mainstream theories, and if the post-Bentlean world (or, adopting Laswell and Kaplan's phrase, the "post-empirical revolution" world) has not been able to solve major theoretical difficulties, must we return to 1908 and try to get around Bentley's damaging criticism? This is not a reasonable expectation. The empirical revolution, including Bentley's contribution, has been too successful in discrediting its predecessors to imagine that a full-scale reopening of debate could win much support. The issue which emerges seems to be this: Is there a way to accept Bentley's critical position and his vision of a process universe, without adopting the categories, the boundaries, and the system of the equilibrium idea?

Another and perhaps better formulation is: Can Bentley's destructive genius provide the basis of a new social science? I can do no more than offer two possible alternative paths which, at least at present, seem to hold promise of retaining the idea of process without betraying it to either Scylla or Charbodis. The first of these rests upon the possibility of distinguishing between the ideas of "field" and "system." Dorothy Emmet's interesting book, Function, Purpose and Powers (which is as yet insufficiently recognized by social scientists), makes the distinction on the basis of the relative "openness" of the two concepts.[61] Her analysis was inspired primarily by social anthropologists Meyer Fortes, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, and Radcliffe-Brown, although she is also aware of the work of

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[61](London, 1958), especially Ch. II.

Kurt Lewin. Fortes' idea, inspired by Whitehead's natural philosophy, sought to express relationships without establishing a total system which would not only embrace the "total" society but serve as a universal framework of investigation.

. Pointing out that no total description of a society is in fact possible, he says that if a society is to be analyzed at all, it must be with reference to certain selected interests or insitutional complexes. How people group themselves vis-a-vis others in these will yield a certain structure of social relations which can be called a "field."[62]

The field so understood might serve as a mediating concept between the idea of society as simply an "aggregate," a "heap," and society as a total, structured system. As Emmet remarks:

The appeal of the "field" analogy lies in the fact that it suggests a range of interaction within a region which can be taken as wider or narrower according to the relations selected. It also allows us to think of a society as exhibiting a number of overlapping fields.[63]

S. F. Nadel has presented a carefully constructed theory of social structure built upon various degrees of role abstractions, but he was wary of the pitfalls of "reification," and the difficulties of accounting for change in equilibrium theories. In answer to Raymond Firth's critique of the static bias of "structure" theories, Nadel argued:

When we analyze social structure (the positions of actors relative to one another, the "network" of their relationships), we do use language suggestive of, and suitable for, static states, as if the positions were fixed and timeless, and the relationships simply continuous. But let us be clear that this is only "as-if" language. For we cannot but define social positions in terms of behavior sequences, which consume time and happen on a time scale; relationships cannot but be abstracted from successive, repetitive actions . . . which we collect together in such class concepts as subordination, reciprocity, respect, loyalty, rivalry, and the like. Time "enters" in all of these. If our descriptive categories do not refer to the time factor more explicitly, we yet imply it, much as we may say of two seaports that "they are linked by boat,"

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[62]Ibid., p. 32.

[63]Ibid., footnote, p. 35.

meaning, of course, that boats move between them more or less regularly.[64]

Nadel carries the argument further than the field-system distinction, but the point I wish to emphasize is that it certainly seems possible to conceive of "constellations" of relationships which are constructed for purposes of particular investigations and do not embrace an entire social system. This kind of concept would satisfy Bentley's demand for flexibility; it would not incur the onus of postulating "boundaries" nor the difficulties of total system. On the other hand, the very freedom of postulation achieved by the field idea militates against a demand for cumulative research. It is certainly most doubtful that Bentley would have approved Nadel's use of _role_ as the basic unit, and he would not of course have adopted introspective means toward the determination of role.

Before _field_ can be considered a genuine alternative to the equilibrium or system idea, we would have to know much more about its possibilities than we know today. Kurt Lewin's use of the idea seems more illustrative than predictive, and to my knowledge there is no developed concept of field in political science. It is questionable to what degree field can serve as more than an analogical and illustrative instrument. There have been suggestions about field construction which border on the second alternative to contemporary theories of equilibrium: the idea of complementarity.[65]

Emmet's suggestion that the flexibility of the field construct permits the investigator to choose the focus as well as the subject matter of his

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[64]_The Theory of Social Structure_ (London, 1957), p. 128. For Firth's argument see his _Elements of Social Organization_ (London, 1951), pp. 39-40. Nadel's analysis is of course opposed to Richard Snyder's contention that decision-making is dynamic while equilibrium and structural theory is not. See especially Ch. VI.

[65]Not present in Emmet

study is the first step toward complementarity. Herbert Bonner takes a large second step when he distinguishes between "typological" and "dynamic" constructs in field theory; the former is the general science of spatial relations especially suited to part-whole analyses, and the latter is the general science of the motion of bodies, a science better able to depict social mobility. Typological concepts would include: space, boundary, region, and barrier. Dynamic constructs might be: field, vector, and fluidity. The central point is that the two do not share a universe of discourse, nor can the concepts be interchanged.

Bentley came very close to the complementarity idea when he explained that "The distinction between 'process' and 'that which is processed' is one of selective observation; and our phenomena are functional as much in the one phase of selection as in the other."[66] "Habit," he added, must not be distinguished sharply from "process," and it certainly must not be viewed as a "product" or an "outcome" of process.[67] This distinguishes Bentley from those sociologists who have considered patterns to be "congealed" activity. Earle Eubank and Kimball Young expressed the complementarity idea, but they did not distinguish it from constructs in which both process and structure inhabit the same universe.

In a complementarity theory we may view the social universe as process or as structure, dynamically or statically, but we cannot see both simultaneously. C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze's brilliant book Society as Process is to my knowledge the only effort to confront the problems of complementarity theory. He presents the inadequacy of contemporary treatments of change in these words:

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[66]Behavior, p. 361.

[67]Ibid., p. 359.

Whatever one could say about the logical relationship between
"change" and "structure," to expect that this conception of change,
as a shift from one structure into another, could be an efficient
tool of the intellect is little short of a miracle of imaginative
power.[68]

If instead of concerning ourselves with the dualism of permanence and

change as an <u>existential</u> problem and attempting to find a logical link

between the two categories, we focus on the logical link itself, we can

make complementarity a meaningful concept.[69]

If, then, complementarity is chosen as the starting point of rea-
soning, one obtains a prospect of promising results in regard to
the relationship between what is stable and what is not. They
would feature as two ways of approaching reality, with a comple-
mentarity relationship between them: mutually exclusive in the
strict logical sense, yet not effectively contradictory on account
of the existential circumstance that man cannot conceive of real-
ity in terms of stability and in terms of instability at once.[70]

Nieuwenhuijze uses some terms in a rather precise manner that cannot

be fully indicated here, but his remarks about Marion Levy's work are

readily translatable into the terms of our text.

The structural approach should bring out static, formal, struc-
tural aspects of reality; it should center around such terms as
equilibrium, in an attempt to postulate or vindicate the legiti-
macy of its inherent one-sidedness. The "process-wise" approach
should be functional-analytic; it threatens to be confounded with
the former. The temptation for either of them is to pass for the
one encompassing approach to reality,--which neither of them can
be. Between them, again, a complementarity relationship obtains.
When applying one, one cannot hold on to the other.[71]

These brief remarks about field and complementarity concepts can only

indicate alternative paths for contemporary social and political theory.

I have been most concerned to show that equilibrium, functional, and

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[68](The Hague, 1962), p. 54.

[69]<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 46-8.

[70]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 48.

[71]<u>Ibid.</u>, footnote, p. 160.

system concepts are not compatible with Bentley's idea of process analysis.
Nieuwenhuijze too finds a tension between process and system, and he con-
cludes that current systematic theories do not adequately conceptualize
change and permanence.[72] The case is made very convincingly. But although
both field and complementarity theory seem more compatible with transaction-
al analysis, Bentley himself probably preferred the former. As indicated
above, some formulations of field theory introduce complementarity at some
point (though they would not appear to be necessary to all versions), but
it is difficult to associate Bentley with the complementarity idea.[73]

Transactional analysis was to be the complete description of a process
universe, and by "process" universe Bentley did mean to speak existentially.
The world was, in fact, in process, and the descriptive tool had to be
shaped accordingly. He insisted upon the freedom of the investigator, but
that freedom which permitted various stresses did not imply the constraint
of having to choose between the perspectives of change or permanence. The
reconstruction of thought patterns which required rejection of at least
the ontological implications of Aristotelian logic was part of the effort.
It was, however, to be a process logic to fit a process universe. Inter-
estingly enough, Nieuwenhuijze devotes a considerable section of his book
to a criticism of what he calls the "Platonic-Aristotelian" framework of
thought, and it seems probable that the dissatisfaction with our basic
patterns of thought transcends particular social theories.[74] Bentley's

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[72]Ibid., Ch. II. I might add that Nieuwenhuijze also finds a bias
toward the permanence category in much structural-functional theory, p. 55.

[73]I have benefited considerably from conversations with Norman
Jacobson about complementarity notions in Bentley's work. The text rep-
resents, of course, my own interpretation.

[74]Nieuwenhuijze, Ch. III. "We need another pattern of thought to do
jobs we cannot satisfactorily perform in our inherited one," pp. 121-2.

process theory needed new descriptive categories, but it did not need a complementarity principle to mediate between structural and process viewpoints; geometry was to be translated into a new physics, and the persistent dualism we have encountered in so many contexts simply disappears.

My remarks about forms of equilibrium and process analysis apply to its use in social science generally, but there are respects in which the idea of process is uniquely related to the tradition of political science and political theory. Hannah Arendt has discussed the central importance of process of Nineteenth and Twentieth century political thought; her concern is more with the philosophy of history than with the process tradition considered in the body of this paper, but many of her insights are directly relevant. She believes that the quarrel between the natural and historical sciences during the Nineteenth century resulted in the Twentieth century's belief in process as their "common denominator."[75] The modern age considers that both nature and history "imply that we think and consider everything in terms of processes and are not concerned with single entities or individual occurrences and their special separate causes."[76]

The notion of process deprives events of their individual importance because they must all be related to the "meaningful" whole.

> What the concept of process implies is that the concrete and the general, the single thing or event and the universal meaning, have parted company. The process, which alone makes meangful whatever it happens to carry along, has thus acquired a monopoly of universality and significance.[77]

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[75]Hannah Arendt, "The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern," Between Past and Future (New York, 1961), p. 62. See also The Human Condition (Garden City, N. Y., 1959).

[76]Ibid., p. 61.

[77]Ibid., p. 64.

Arendt is especially concerned with the loss of meaning that deprives action of its aim; a deprivation that she characterizes as the replacement of antiquity's "immortality" by modernity's "history." I am less interested in her judgments about the treatment of time in political theory than in her perception that events are no longer considered meaningful in themselves. This is the same point that appeared in our preceding discussion as the loss of faith in traditional units of investigation.

Political actors as well as political theorists have traditionally believed that they know the important "segments" of political life; individuals, states, classes, and groups have had their vogues, but that there was, in politics, a unit of analysis was not doubted until our century. The choice of that unit determined not only the segmentations of experience but dictated the kind of questions that could yield salient information about politics. Plato's famous remark that the state is man writ large enabled him to draw conclusions about the former by inquiring into the nature of man. When the state became the instrument of an oppressive class the matter of individual virtue was irrelevant to political knowledge. Madison's political instrument was designed to control the effects of faction, and neither individual nor class units sufficed to explain its mischief. There was, in short, the conception of an acting unit confronting an environment, an Umwelt, from which it was actually, not simply analytically, set off.

The modern idea of history, in Arendt's view, fails because we can make any number of constructions and theories about the process, and not only will we receive differing answers to different questions, but there are no longer any unanswerable questions. Her remark that there is no longer a distinction between finding a "pattern" and "meaning" in history

is simply the other side of Bentley's demand for the investigator's free-

dom of hypothesis. A striking example of this transformation was noted

by Daniel Bell's comparison of two interpretations of America: Max Lerner's

America as a Civilization and Harold Laski's The American Democracy.[78]

Laski's interpretation was Marxian, employing socio-economic categories

and the notions of ruling class and superstructure. Lerner, by contrast,

explicitly rejects interpretative frameworks and declares that causation

has given way to description of relation and interaction. Bell calls this

the lack of a unifying vision.

> In the end there is no answer, but process. Lerner is forced to
> say that analysis consists only of "an interplay of the material
> world and the moral-psychological." And so while he has talked
> bravely of America as a "civilization"--and has defined the term
> as a "distinctly etched style of life, historically shaped and
> recognized by self and others as a new design for living"--in the.
> end the "interplay" dissolves all coherence, and there is no unify-
> ing vision.[79]

Lerner certainly has a sense of a "whole"; indeed, Bell thinks there is an

holistic bias. Lerner lacks, indeed explicitly rejects, "meaning" in the

process. In specifically Bentlean terms it is the problem of segmentations,

of discreteness. Abraham Edel has called this the "locus problem."

> The question "What is society?" raises what we may call the locus
> problem--the selection of basic unit or object in terms of which
> social and cultural traits or properties are to be analyzed, or
> subjects to which they are referred.[80]

It is difficult to avoid the feeling that the impact of the idea of

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[78]"The Refractions of the American Past: On the Question of National
Character," The End of Ideology.

[79]Ibid., p. 100.

[80]"The Concept of Levels in Social Theory," Llewellyn Gros, Symposium
on Sociological Theory (White Plains, N. Y., 1959), p. 172. See also the
essay by M. Brewster Smith on the terms "culture" and "personality, John
Gillin, For a Science of Social Man (New York, 1954); and S. Stansfeld
Sargent and Marian Smith, Culture and Personality (New York, 1949), Part I.

process on the locus problem has raised more difficulties for political science and political theory than for other social sciences, but it is also difficult to show why this should be true. We may, I think, safely contend that the study of politics has been uniquely concerned with action, with the consequences of action on both the ethical and empirical levels. Whether politi.. . .n-eived in Aristotelian terms as the master science, or in more con'ernor e· y language as a policy science, this concern for the meaning of action endures. Perhaps it is the case that what we might call the "ordering" function of politics (again, both in empirical and ethical respects) is most seriously threatened by the abolition of natural units which function between isolated events and the Umwelt. It is possible that the theory and the practice of politics have adopted Aristotelian logic because it reflected the distinctive political situation of men "set off from" an alien universe.[81] If there is merit in this suggestion, a proposal to scrap Aristotelian logic for description of process would simply be to violate a convention, to decline to play the game of politics.

"We seek a pattern, and we no longer ask what it is a pattern of or what it is a pattern in."[82] Burkhardt sounded the note of modern historiography when he said that history exhibits continuity. If it is true that events were "engulfed" by the total process of history in the Nineteenth century, then history was itself swallowed by the process of society in the Twentieth. Arthur Bentley's transactional analysis dissolved history, nature, and man in the universal process. Political scientists have not yet confronted the demands of the process idea, and perhaps it is true

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[81] I am indebted for this suggestion to my colleague Matthew Stoltz.

[82] Martin Johnson, "Science and Poetic Insight," H. Westmann, Man in His Relationship (London, 1955), p. 31.

that those demands are, in fact, beyond human abilities. Bentley professed his willingness to suffer through the painful, initial steps of inquiry, confident that social science could not do otherwise than go forward on a process basis. We must not minimize the difficulties of such a procedure, but neither should we profess ourselves disciples or students of Bentley while our work ignores the criticism from which process analysis emerged.

If we are not satisfied with the limitations our still primitive techniques impose on research, and are not prepared to create and refine such concepts as "behavioral space-time," then we must return to Part One of The Process of Government and grapple with Bentley's critical genius. Those who choose the latter alternative will be few, and perhaps that is a good and necessary thing, for they will find themselves forced to justify the very possibility of a social science.

One of the most striking phases of the history of philosophic thought is the recurrent grouping together of unity, permanence (or "the eternal") completeness and rational thought, while upon another side full multiplicity, change and the temporal, the partial, defective, sense and desire. This division is obviously but another case of violent separation of the precarious and unsettled from the regular and determinate.

John Dewey

The modern concept of process pervading history and nature alike separates the modern age from the past more profoundly than any other single idea.

Hannah Arendt

CONCLUSION

The idea of process originated in the Western mind as a problem.
When Heraclitus proclaimed that reality was flux he imperiled man's
ability to reason about the world and his experience therein. Aristotle's
great solution lasted twenty-two centuries until it was eclipsed by
Hegel's philosophy of flux in the historical century. Sociology emerged
in Germany from the philosophy of history, and through the dialogue be-
tween positivism and idealism. The currents of idealism, romanticism,
and historicism resisted the tide of positivism, and where their opposi-
tion was not successful, they still succeeded in modifying it.

Idealism's case against the positivists rested in large part on a
distinction between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften. The
former were thought to deal with regular occurrences which could be des-
cribed by general laws; the latter studied individual, unique phenomena.
The passage of human history and activity occupied a realm of conscious-
ness and freedom that could not be fully known from the "outside," i.e.,
by observation of behavior. The meaning of human events, and its under-
standing required a grasp of the Bedeutung which bound occurrences to-
gether. This raised the perplexing problem of identifying the units of
investigation, the entities of history, that constitute Bedeutungzusam-
menhangen. Various alternatives were proposed: Dilthey suggested the
individual; Hegel and his disciples talked of the spirit inhabiting an
age or culture; Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer preferred conflicting interest

296

groups; and Simmel favored interaction. The last two alternatives were most important to the idea of social process.

When history was viewed as passage of unique occurrences, as a process, there was a danger that historical knowledge could be no more than an approximately complete catalogue or enumeration. Hannah Arendt has argued that this peril invited an extreme sort of holism, in which the event or happening lost its individual meaning to the overall passage. This did happen in the case of those philosophers and historians who chose to locate the meaningful unit at a relatively high level of abstraction, the nation state, or a "culture," for example, but for others the matter was more complex. Intimately related to the question of the proper unit of historical and social analysis was the problem of whether units had an existence or were simply creations of the investigator. Bergson argued strongly that the stuff of life, experience and history, could not be grasped by discoursive thought without introducing crippling distortions. Windleband and Rickert believed that the uniqueness of the human realm prohibited the discovery of behavioral uniformities, but the latter joined with Dilthey in urging that the method of Verstehen could uncover existential entities immanent in history. Rickert's great concern with the role of values in history and society strongly influenced Max Weber's notion of the ideal type, a method of analysis which though rooted in experience frankly proceeded to "construct" a model which deliberately emphasized or exaggerated selected values.

Simmel's sociology radically separated the realm of life and experience from that of social science, restricting the latter to a description of the forms in which various contents manifest themselves. Simmel's forms,

as Weber's ideal types, had a real existence, but when abstracted they also become artificial constructions. The stuff of society, in Simmel's terms the content of the forms, was individual interaction. Formal sociology was one of the two most important strains in the idea of society as process; the second emerged from the group conflict theories of Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer. This group version was a much more empirical theory than Simmel's in that it did not concern itself with a philosophy of form or experience. Instead, it used conflict as a means of determining the actual, existential collectivities acting in the real world. The group universe imagined the social collectives, defined by conflict planes, to constitute the units of understanding social life.

While Simmel had conceived life as a _process_, ever rich and ever fluctuating human activity, the group theorists accepted the social aggregate at a level "above" individual interaction and then linked that "group" to its "interest," usually defined in individual terms, e.g., health, wealth, etc. In this sense, the group theorists proceeded by determining which _conflicts_ seem to appear, and then through "imaginative reconstruction," or some comparable operation, these presumably empirically manifest divisions were traced back to their psychological origins.

The Process of Government reflected both versions of the social process idea, but did not discriminate between them. Bentley rejected Small's notions of causation because Small linked social events to sub-social urges, and most importantly, he rejected a vision of the universe which imagined it to be broken up into segments which were mere reflections of non or sub-social phenomena. In this sense he was the most adamant of anti-reductionists. By 1926 Bentley had advanced to an appreciation of the tension between the group and the process interpretation, and he had

learned enough about the new physics to hope that it could aid social science to transcend the units problem. He recognized that Gumplowicz's school of group interpretation was inadequate because it simply enshrined existing alignments, and because it tended to celebrate spatial and temporal discreteness, but he also rejected Simmel's philosophical distinction between form and content. For Bentley, the task of a social science was the complete description of what had and was happening. To accomplish this effort social science had to achieve a distinct measure of liberation from the conceptual restriction of traditional and philosophic thought since Newton. Further, it required the restructuring of categories of time and space that had remained at the basis of speculation since the Aristotelian synthesis.

Bentley demanded that social scientists find new categories to express social life, but that this be done without reference to the dimension of *Verstehen* (the "meaning" or intention of individual actors). He thought that if the categories of description could be expanded in space and extended in time so that we no longer thought of an "actor" but of "action," we could give the complete account of what had happened. Bentley transcended both the group idea and the notion of society as interaction in that he faced the world of life, experience, and passage, and insisted that a "science" of society work with a process devoid of conceptual fixities or Archimedean points.

Bentley determined to confront Heraclitus and Bergson, but he declined to introduce any *a priori* schema of motive "behind" action, or to admit boundaries to either the explanatory or the descriptive worlds. His vision of society was much like Simmel's, but the science he proposed was very different. In 1926 Bentley thought the systematic sociology of von Weise was a close approximation of his own efforts and preferred it to the

evolutionary version of process represented by Albion Small. Bentley's reservations about Weise's science were much more important than he made them appear. Essentially, Weise had followed Simmel and Bergson in believing that the science of society had necessarily to distort its subject matter, the process that is life.

The thrust of Bentley's work after 1926 was toward finding a means of bringing science into harmony with the subject matter of human activity, i.e., to eliminate the distortion seemingly implicit in scientific procedure. It is this attempt that sets Bentley's thought apart from the mainstream of American political science and sociology because it required that he confront a Twentieth century version of Heraclitus' problem. Thought seemed to require fixed terms, and if social reality was a continual process through time, what entities "in" the flux could correspond to the symbols of thought? The problem was compounded by Bentley's insistence that thought and its symbols were themselves _facts_ within the world, therefore in process. This position required Bentley to join Whitehead and others in attacking the Aristotelian synthesis of logic and ontology represented by the principle of identity.

Bentley did not seem to recognize the importance and the difficulty of creating or identifying units or entities in the process until his relatively later writings. The task was particularly difficult for Bentley because of his ruthless empiricism. He had, of course, rejected speculative constructions of historical entities, and also any attempt to use individual drives or motives as the basis for segmenting the social realm. But he had gone much further and denied that the "natural" units of individual and group, as they appear in our "common sense" three

dimensional world, constituted an adequate observational framework. His early writing about transactional analysis stressed the extension of inquiry and the need for "observational coherence," but when he tried to suggest how a selection might be justified he found himself caught between his rejection of a priori principles and the inadequacy of observation itself.

The sociology of Small and that of von Weise represent the two versions of process analysis in American sociology. The latter, more analytic, school became dominant rather early in the Twentieth century, but neither version followed Bentley in his transactional inquiry. American political scientists seized upon Bentley's early discussion of the group as unit of analysis but did not perceive that it was important primarily as a segment of the process. Instead, the process idea was used as a means of broadening the legitimate area of political research beyond the narrow realm of "government" to include political groups. For the most part, these "interest groups" were structured or organized groups such as the Anti-Saloon League and the American Medical Association, but less formal groups were also admitted to study. Not only were the boundaries of inquiry extended but the interest agglomerates in the wider society were presumed to underlie the specifically governmental agencies.

The idea of process, in the hands of group theorists, was a means of expanding inquiry, but though it discarded the formal instruments of government as units, it turned to "concrete" relatively structured groups in the larger society. Political scientists embraced the interest group concept for many reasons, but among the most important was their desire to build factual inventories. This task occupied them for several decades;

but in recent years they have increasingly felt the need for orienting concepts, sometimes expressed as a general theory. The two most prominent versions of this framework are general equilibrium theory which grew out of group study, and some form of functionalism that has been borrowed from anthropology and sociology.

I have argued that the general characteristics of both theories, their abstraction, postulation of boundaries, and units, are incompatible with Bentley's mature transactional analysis. The tension is perhaps best illustrated by the ambiguity of terms such as "moving equilibrium," "action patterns," and "structural operations." The central problem that contemporary systematic theory seems to have ignored, or only superficially treated, is how the flux of experience can be made to yield a meaningful "fit." We do not talk about _Verstehen_ procedures today, but a simple "operational" solution is meaningless until we can specify the significant operations. How many contemporary social scientists would be satisfied with Weise's test which measured distance "toward" and "away from" an Archimedean point?

Bentley resisted a simple operationalism, just as he remained vigilant against any attempt to smuggle in an a priori Wirkungzusammenhang. The problem may have appeared less urgent to him in view of his repeated conviction that social science must remain open to various alternative procedures and resign itself to unforseeable future development. In this sense, and despite the grandness of his vision, Bentley's most important legacy may be an admonition to preserve our humility before the magnitude of the task. To the degree that they are closed against the future, our present general theories do not belong in the Bentlean tradition.

Bentley's transactional analysis represents a radical statement of
the idea of process. Bentley sought to restructure the most basic cate-
gories of thought, and through that reconstruction accomplish much more
complete description. That description would faithfully reflect the tex-
ture and contours of social reality in all its richness, instead of dis-
torting or "abstracting" from it. Despite this intention, Bentley's
image of society remains curiously "empty." I think it is precisely be-
cause his tool is so inclusive that we become fascinated by sheer passage
and overwhelmed by multiplicity and detail, and cannot isolate or stress
important happenings. This is the peril of Cratylus, the legacy of
Heraclitus, and it is in part what Hannah Arendt described as the mean-
inglessness of the individual event.

Bentley hoped that new logic and restructured categories could over-
come this dilemma by "specifying" aspects and phases of the process that
is behavioral space-time, and we certainly cannot foreclose that possibil-
ity, remote though it seems today. The history of Western science con-
firms Bentley's belief that progress is often made when we simply press
ahead doing research, when we do not have adequate conceptual tools, and
even when our procedure seems to violate logic and common sense. But
Bentley was willing to tolerate failure only if it attended early efforts
in a promising direction and not if it seemed a necessary consequence of
an entirely erroneous approach. His criticism was intended to clear away
those impediments, and it is the critical Bentley that has been forgotten.

This tension between Bentley the critic and Bentley the system-
builder was not resolved within that bit of behavioral space-time we would
call the life of the man, but the tension itself may provide us with a
way forward. Bentley rejected dualisms of all kinds, and despite the
hints we have noted, it is doubtful he would have approved the complemen-

tarity notions discussed in the preceding chapter. Yet it is an intriguing exercise to interpret the man Bentley in terms of complementarity. His greatest achievements were, I believe, as a critic of the pretentious and the complacent in social science; in this he is unequalled in America. But Bentley was not, as was Hume, satisfied to dwell in the ruins left by his destructive genius and struggled throughout his life to build a new temple where science could dwell. Bentley may be read with profit by us all, and perhaps it is finally less important what doctrine we take from him, than that with him we look out upon chaos and feel both the exhileration and the challenge of the scientific enterprise.